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Abstract 
 
ELANOR TAYLOR: The Perspectival Nature of Emergence 
(Under the Direction of Marc Lange) 
 
 
 
Philosophers use the term “emergence” for the phenomenon whereby a whole has 
properties that are in some way autonomous from, while still dependent upon, the properties 
of its components. Emergence is crucial for those who hold that there are distinct levels of 
properties in nature, because it is thought to be the relation that accounts for distinctions 
between such levels. However, there is a problem that afflicts philosophical accounts of 
emergence: for any purported case of emergence, there is a micro-level property that 
apparently makes the emergence “collapse.” Given this micro-level property, the purportedly 
emergent macro-level property is no longer autonomous, and there seem to be no good 
grounds for excluding the collapse-inducing property from the set of micro-level properties 
on which the macro-level is dependent.  
I examine various attempts to solve this problem of “collapsing emergence” by 
imposing principled restrictions on the admissible micro-level properties underlying cases of 
emergence. I argue that such attempts fail and that to solve the problem we must appeal to 
the connection between emergence and explanation. I argue that we use the concept of 
emergence to track the availability (or not) of scientific explanations, and that what qualifies 
as an available explanation differs across different “perspectives”, where a “perspective” is 
the point of view of a particular observer. This connection between emergence and 
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explanation provides a solution to the collapse problem because, I argue, collapse-inducing 
properties fail to provide resources for the explanations that emergence tracks, and so cannot 
render a macro-level property non-emergent. Embracing this solution (and hence the 
possibility of emergence) involves embracing the idea that emergence is relative to a 
perspective.  
Understanding emergence as relative to a perspective is contrary to some popular 
conceptions of emergence, which take emergence to be a metaphysical, perspective-
independent phenomenon. I argue that such conceptions are misguided and that emergence 
can play a major role in philosophical and scientific enquiry into relationships between 
properties of parts and wholes and between different levels in nature, but it can do so only as 
a perspectival phenomenon, rather than a metaphysical one.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
“The ultimate coherence of the notion of an emergent property 
remains controversial…”1 
 
“The higher quality emerges from the lower level of existence 
and has its roots therein, but it emerges therefrom, and it does 
not belong to that lower level, but constitutes its possessor a 
new order of existent with special laws of behavior. The 
existence of emergent qualities thus described is something to 
be noted, as some would say, under the compulsion of brute 
empirical fact, or, as I should prefer to say in less harsh terms, 
to be accepted with the “natural piety” of the investigator. It 
admits no explanation.”2 
 
Philosophers use the term “emergence” for the phenomenon whereby a whole has 
properties that are in some way autonomous from, while still dependent upon, the properties 
of its components. The position that some macro-level properties are emergent is fairly 
popular: emergence has been presented as the relationship that obtains between different 
levels in nature, such as the relationship between properties of qualitative experience and 
physical properties3, and some argue that a successful account of emergence can vindicate 
the apparent causal autonomy of certain higher-level entities, particularly the entities of the 
special sciences4.  Emergence is crucial for those who hold that there are distinct levels or 
                                                       
1 Kim, J. (1995) pg 224 
2 Alexander, S. (1920) pg 47 
3Chalmers, D. (2006); Chalmers, D. (1996) 
4 Wilson, J. (forthcoming) 
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layers of properties in nature, because emergence is thought to be the relation that accounts 
for distinctions between such levels. 
I am going to argue that this conception of emergence is misguided. Existing accounts 
of emergence face a problem, the collapse problem, which shows that emergence does not 
track relations between distinct levels of properties in nature, as it is a metaphysically 
arbitrary relation. However, I will argue, this does not mean that emergence is completely 
arbitrary. Instead, according to the solution I will offer to the collapse problem, emergence 
tracks the availability or otherwise of scientific explanations.  
I will develop a positive account of emergence, the perspectival account of 
emergence, according to which a property if emergent if and only if a certain scientific 
explanation is unavailable to an observer. I will argue that, in addition to avoiding the 
collapse problem, the perspectival account of emergence makes for a unified and naturalistic 
account of emergence.  
In Chapter 1 I will offer an introduction to the idea of emergence, a survey of its 
historical development and an examination of some related concepts. In Chapter 2 I will 
present the collapse problem for accounts of emergence, and will discuss some failed 
responses to that problem. In Chapter 3 I will offer a solution to the collapse problem, based 
on the connection between emergence and scientific explanation. In Chapter 4 I will develop 
and defend an explication of the concept of emergence as the unavailability of a scientific 
explanation for an observer, based on the findings of Chapter 3. And finally in Chapter 5 I 
will formulate and defend the perspectival account of emergence, based on the explication 
developed in Chapter 4. I hope to show that, in light of the perspectival account of 
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emergence, the “ultimate coherence of the notion of an emergent property” is no longer 
controversial. 
  
Chapter 1: The Idea of Emergence 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
In this chapter, I will offer a brief introduction to emergence in Section 2, an 
overview of the historical development of the concept of emergence in Section 3, and an 
overview of contemporary approaches to emergence in Section 4. In Section 5 I will examine 
some closely related concepts, including reduction, physicalism and supervenience, and in 
Section 6 I will discuss objections to accounts of emergence, including the problem of 
downward causation and the claim that a commitment to emergence is non-naturalistic and 
non-parsimonious. This discussion will set us up for Chapter 2, in which I will present the 
collapse problem for metaphysical accounts of emergence. 
 
Section 2:Dependence and Autonomy 
The term “emergence” is used for a diverse range of phenomena – so diverse, in fact, 
that it can be hard to recognize what such phenomena have in common. For an illustration of 
this variety, consider the following list, every item on which has been described by a 
philosopher or a scientist as a case of emergence: 
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1. The relationship between convection rolls in a body of heated fluid and the micro-
physical states of that fluid5 
2. The relationship between configurations in Artificial Life worlds and the cells that 
form them6  
3. The relationship between phenomenal and neural properties7  
4. The relationship between entangled states and the components of their constituent 
systems8 
5. The relationship between the properties of a chemical compound and the properties of 
its constituent elements9  
Despite the variety of the phenomena in question, however, the philosophical literature on 
emergence isn’t entirely heterogeneous. Discussion tends to gather around three central 
questions, which are:  
• Interpretation: What is emergence? 
• Viability: Is there any emergence? 
• Taxonomy: What is the relationship among the different forms of 
emergentism?10 
                                                       
5 Kelso, J.A. Scott (1995)  
6 Bedau, M. (2003); Dennett, D. (1991)  
7 Chalmers, D. (1996) 
8 Redhead, M. (1995); Teller, P. (1986)  
9 Broad, C.D. (1925)  
10 Where “emergentism” is the position that there are emergents.  
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In Chapters 2-5, I will develop answers to all three of these questions, but before doing so I 
will offer a brief overview of some central features of the concept of emergence.  
Despite the diverse range of different accounts and purported cases of emergence, 
there is a common, schematic conception of emergence: assuming a distinction between 
micro-level and macro-level properties, emergent properties are macro-level properties that 
are in some sense both dependent on and autonomous from their underlying micro-level 
properties.11 I will assume this rough conception of emergence, as it is a plausible, 
mainstream commitment and provides a useful starting-point for this discussion.12 
The combination of these two features – dependence and autonomy - makes 
emergence mysterious and also somewhat problematic. Dependence on and autonomy from 
the micro-level aren’t mutually exclusive features but, prima facie, they stand in tension with 
one another. As one commentator puts it, understanding emergence in terms of dependence 
and autonomy “is like viewing something as both transparent and opaque.”13 Most attempts 
to answer the Interpretation Question involve some attempt to reconcile these two features 
and dissolve the appearance of tension.  
In formulating an account of emergence, a philosopher specifies the exact nature of 
the dependence and autonomy relation involved in cases of emergence. These relations vary 
radically across different accounts of and purported cases of emergence. Some accounts of 
                                                       
11 See Wilson, J. (forthcoming), Bedau, M. & Humphreys, P. (2008), Chalmers, D. (2006) for endorsement of 
this schematic conception of emergence.  
 
12 I’ll focus entirely on cases of purportedly emergent properties, rather than emergent laws, configurations, 
substances or causes. I will also assume that in most cases a “property” means a property token rather than a 
type.   
 
13 Bedau, M. (2003) pg 156 
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emergence portray the autonomy characteristic of emergence in metaphysical terms, and 
others portray that autonomy in merely epistemic or explanatory terms. I will examine these 
differences in more detail in Chapter 4, but in the meantime we can simply note that different 
accounts of and purported cases of emergence involve a wide range of different conceptions 
of this characteristic combination of dependence and autonomy.  
The schematic understanding of emergence as involving a combination of 
dependence and autonomy applies not only to the concept’s role in the philosophical 
literature, but also to its use in science. For instance, scientific practitioners often use 
“emergent” as a label for natural phenomena (particularly pertaining to properties of complex 
systems) that resist certain kinds of reductive explanation.14 In such cases, emergent macro-
level properties may be dependent on their micro-level bases in so far as the micro-level 
properties are properties of the parts that make up the whole that bears the macro-level 
properties, and autonomous in so far as, for example, they cannot be explained in micro-level 
terms. The concept of emergence appears in areas as diverse as systems biology and systems 
chemistry, Artificial Life, fundamental physics and cognitive science.  
2.2 A note on the micro-macro distinction 
In the philosophical and scientific literature on emergence, cases of emergence are 
always presented as relative to a distinction between micro-level and macro-level properties. 
Properties are not emergent per se, but instead properties of the macro-level are emergent 
                                                       
14 For example, see Kelso, J.A. Scott (1995) “It was once thought that single neurons called command neurons 
might be responsible for generating patterns, a kind of superordinate motor program, but this is not generally 
so. Complex behavior patterns in neuronal networks are the result of cooperative effects (or as neuroscientists 
now say, emergent properties) not typically found at the single neuron level.” (pg 240-1) 
 
  
 
8 
from properties of the micro-level. So in order to understand the concept of emergence, we 
must understand this distinction between micro- and macro- levels.  
There are many different ways to draw a distinction between micro and macro levels, 
and in the literature on emergence, cases of emergence are presented as relative to a many 
different micro-macro distinctions. The cases I listed earlier in this section give us some idea 
of this variety: in case 1) the micro-level properties are the micro-physical properties of the 
fluid and the macro-level properties are properties of the convection rolls in that fluid, in case 
2) the micro-level properties are the properties of cells in Artificial Life worlds and the 
macro-level properties are properties of the configurations formed by those cells, while in 
case 3) the micro-level properties are neural properties and the macro-level properties are 
phenomenal properties. For the purposes of this introduction to the idea of emergence, we 
can take “micro” to simply mean “more fundamental than macro”. The examples we have 
considered, however, indicate that “more fundamental” can mean a number of different 
things.  
One way in which micro-level properties can be more fundamental than macro-level 
properties is for the micro-level properties to be properties of the parts, components or 
constituents of a whole that bears the macro-level properties. Consider, for example, the 
difference between the properties of individual members of a population of organisms and 
the properties of the population itself. I will take the case of the European Herring Gull, 
Larus argentatus, as an example. The population of European Herring Gulls has statistical 
properties, such as an average wingspan of 144cm, a high relative frequency of living in 
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shore and estuary habitats and a low relative frequency of living in marsh habitats.15 And yet 
any individual European Herring Gull does not have those properties. They have properties 
such as “lives on an estuary” and “has a wingspan of 140cm”, which in turn are not had by 
the population of European Herring Gulls. This is one example of a micro-macro distinction 
drawn in terms of the distinction between the properties of a whole, the population, and the 
properties of its parts, the individual gulls.  
Another way to draw a distinction between micro and macro levels is to claim that the 
micro-level properties belong to a more fundamental science, as physics stands to chemistry, 
or neuroscience to psychology.  
Jackson and Pettit explore some alternative notions of fundamentality in their 
discussion of explanatory ecumenism.16 They describe different ways in which explanations 
can be fine-grained, including closeness of grain and smallness of grain. When an 
explanation is close-grained, it gets closer to the causal roots of the phenomenon being 
explained and so there is typically less of a temporal gap between the explanans and the 
explanandum. When an explanation is small-grained it gets to the micro-foundations of the 
phenomenon being explained and so typically the entities that appear in the explanans of a 
small-grained explanation are smaller in size than those that appear in the explanans of a 
large-grained explanation. Although Jackson and Pettit focus on explanation rather than 
fundamentality, their findings indicate some ways in which one level can be more 
fundamental than another. One level can be more close-grained than another if it is closer to 
                                                       
15 British Trust for Ornithology. http://blx1.bto.org/birdfacts/results/bob5920.htm 
16 Jackson, F. & Pettit, P. (1992)  
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the causal roots of the features of the higher level, and one level can be more small-grained 
than another if it is closer to the microphysical level.  
Although there are a great many different ways to draw a distinction between micro- 
and macro – levels, picking out such a distinction isn’t just a matter of stipulation. We may 
choose to focus on a particular micro-macro relationship, such as the relationship between 
neural and phenomenal properties, rather than another, such as the relationship between 
physical and chemical properties, but there will be a fact of the matter about whether any two 
levels do instantiate a “more fundamental than” relation. For the purposes of discussing the 
concept of emergence as it appears in philosophy and in science, I will leave aside questions 
about just how many fundamentality relations there are, and what makes for a legitimate 
micro-macro distinction. We need simply recognize that emergence is always relative to a 
micro-macro distinction, and that different authors choose to draw that distinction in different 
ways. In the philosophical and scientific literature on emergence there is no one particular 
privileged micro-macro distinction, and so the following discussion will not presuppose any 
particular version of this distinction.  
 
Section 3: The historical development of the idea of emergence 
G.H. Lewes first introduced the philosophical use of the term “emergence” in 187417 
and the concept was taken up and developed by the British Emergentists, a group of British 
philosophers working in the late 19th and early 20th centuries that included J.S. Mill, C.D 
Broad and Samuel Alexander as well as Lewes himself. There are some earlier precursors to 
                                                       
17 Lewes, G.H. (1874)  
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the concept of emergence. For example, Aristotle claimed that wholes are ontologically prior 
to their parts and that sometimes wholes are more than the sum of their parts, claims which 
are similar to those made by contemporary proponents of metaphysical emergentism.18 But 
even given these precursors, I will start this historical overview with the British Emergentists 
as they were the first philosophers to explicitly use the term “emergence”.  
C.D. Broad, one of the British Emergentists, developed his account of emergence in 
response to 19th century debates between vitalists and mechanists. I will examine the vitalist-
mechanist debate in more detail in Chapter 4, but in the meantime I will characterize it very 
roughly as a debate about whether or not certain kinds of explanation were available of 
certain features thought to be characteristic of living organisms.19 Mechanists thought that 
these features, which included metabolism and fermentation, could be explained through 
appeal to the activities and interactions of the parts of living wholes. Vitalists, on the other 
hand, thought that these mechanistic attempts at explanation failed, and that in order to 
explain the characteristic features of living organisms, we had to posit a special kind of 
substance, a life force or élan vital, which endowed living organisms with their special 
characteristics. C.D. Broad presented the emergent theory as offering a middle ground 
between these two positions. As Beckermann puts it, “When C.D. Broad developed his 
theory of emergence in the early 1920s, his aim was to create room for a third position 
mediating between these two extremes.”20   
                                                       
18 See discussion in Mitchell, S. (forthcoming) 
19 See Beckermann, A. (2000) for discussion of this characterization. 
20 Beckermann, A. (2000) pg 1 
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So what did British Emergentism amount to? Although there were many 
philosophical differences between the British Emergentists, they were united by the fact that 
they all appealed to emergence in their attempts to offer a philosophical account of particular 
relationships between levels in nature. In a definitive historical study of the British 
Emergentists, Brian McLaughlin argues that their shared position can be characterized in 
terms of some central features, and I will present those features along with McLaughlin’s 
descriptions of them.21  
The British Emergentists were materialists. As McLaughlin puts it, “… British 
Emergentism maintains that everything is made of matter. There are, for example, no 
Cartesian souls, or entelechies, vital élan, or the like.”22 They were also committed to the 
idea that there are distinct levels of matter, and particular kinds associated with those distinct 
levels. McLaughlin states, “According to British Emergentism, there is a hierarchy of levels 
of organizational complexity of material particles that includes, in ascending order, the 
strictly physical, the chemical, the biological and the psychological level. There are certain 
kinds of material substances specific to each level. And the kinds of each level are wholly 
composed of kinds of lower-levels, ultimately of kinds of elementary material particles.”23 
The kinds of the different levels have properties particular to the kinds of that level alone, 
and those kinds have fundamental causal powers. McLaughlin again: “British Emergentism 
maintains that some special science kinds from each special science can be wholly composed 
of types of structures of material particles that endow the kinds in question with fundamental 
                                                       
21 McLaughlin, B. (1992)  
22 McLaughlin, B. (1992) pg 49 
23 McLaughlin, B. (1992) pg 50 
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causal powers.”24 Finally, emergent laws attribute such powers to special science kinds: 
“Such a structure will have an emergent causal power as a matter of law, but the law will 
not be ‘reducible to’ or ‘derivative from’ laws governing lower levels of complexity.”25 
McLaughlin claims that this is an idealized description of the central British 
Emergentist doctrines, but that it offers a rough representation of the ground that was shared 
between these thinkers. This shared ground is notable for being naturalistic, as it was based 
on an attempt to understand scientific results of the time, while also metaphysically non-
reductionist, in so far as the British Emergentists took special science kinds to have non-
reducible causal powers endowed on them by emergent laws. As such, emergentism lives up 
to Broad’s attempt to carve out some middle ground between vitalism and mechanism. 
Unlike vitalism, emergentism doesn’t involve commitment to non-material substances such 
as élan vital, while unlike mechanism, emergentism allows that properties of certain complex 
entities may have autonomous, irreducible causal powers. 
McLaughlin describes the decline of British Emergentism, which he argues was 
precipitated by scientific developments that rendered emergentism redundant: “It went wrong 
for deep empirical reasons. It took many of the greatest scientific achievements of the 
twentieth century to refute it.”26 For example, a paradigm case of emergence, according to 
many British Emergentists, was the case of chemistry. Chemical kinds were thought to have 
special, irreducible properties endowed upon them by chemical laws. The development of 
physical models of chemical bonding showed that the emergentist position was wrong; 
                                                       
24 McLaughlin, B. (1992) pg 50-51 
25 McLaughlin, B. (1992) pg 51 
26 McLaughlin, B. (1992) pg 91  
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scientists developed physical explanations of chemical bonding. Other scientific 
developments followed, including the development of molecular biology and genetics, which 
rendered British Emergentism obsolete. 
From the decline of British Emergentism up until the late 20th century, the concept of 
emergence wasn’t at all prevalent either in science or in philosophy. This was a reductionist 
era, in which the progress of science and of philosophy was measured in terms of the extent 
to which higher-level phenomena could be explained in terms of more fundamental 
phenomena and laws. As physicist P.W. Anderson wrote in 1972, “The reductionist 
hypothesis may still be a topic for controversy among philosophers, but among the great 
majority of active scientists I think it is accepted without question.”27 Since the 1970s, 
however, a combination of different factors including developments in the sciences of 
complexity, and philosophical developments such as a renewed interest in questions about 
consciousness and a special focus on the autonomy of the special sciences, have led to a 
resurgence of interest in the concept of emergence. In the preface to a recent textbook on the 
subject, Bedau and Humphreys say 
Thirty years ago emergence was largely ignored in philosophy and science. 
Its ethos ran counter to the reductionist views of the time, and it seemed to invoke 
mystical and unexplainable levels of reality. Things have changed. Emergence is now 
one of the liveliest areas of research in both science and philosophy… The reason for 
this change is complicated, but it results in part from developments in a number of 
vigorous and successful research programs within complexity theory, artificial life, 
physics, psychology, sociology and biology. In parallel, though often driven by 
independent developments in the philosophy of science and philosophy of mind, 
philosophers have been developing new conceptual tools for understanding emergent 
phenomena.28 
                                                       
27 Anderson, P.W. (1972) pg 393 
28 Bedau, M. & Humphreys, P. (2008) pg ix 
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The concept of emergence is now prevalent across many different areas of philosophy 
and science. In the next section I will offer a brief survey of different uses of the concept of 
emergence in contemporary philosophy and science.  
 
Section 4: Emergence in contemporary philosophy and science 
In this section I will offer a brief survey of contemporary uses of the concept of 
emergence in philosophy and in science.  
Emergence plays a major role in contemporary metaphysics. Metaphysical uses of 
emergence typically treat the “autonomy” in “dependence and autonomy” as metaphysical, 
such that the autonomy characteristic of emergence is metaphysical rather than merely 
explanatory or epistemological. Emergence is most often appealed to in metaphysics as a 
way of formulating and defending metaphysical non-reductionism. For example, Merricks 
defends eliminativism about most composite objects according to which most composite 
objects are not metaphysically distinct from the atoms that compose them, but he argues that 
persons are metaphysically distinct from the atoms that compose them in virtue of having 
emergent properties.29 Alternatively, Chalmers defends a position according to which all 
facts about the universe are logically determined by the fundamental physical facts, except 
for the facts about consciousness, and hence that consciousness is emergent.30 Shoemaker 
also offers a detailed discussion of emergent properties in the development of a non-
                                                       
29 Merricks, T. (2001) Chapter 4.  
30 Chalmers, D. (1996); Chalmers, D. (2006) 
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reductionist metaphysics of realization.31 According to each of these authors emergence 
tracks metaphysical distinctions, such as the distinction between physical and conscious 
properties for Chalmers, and between persons and atoms for Merricks.  
In philosophy of mind, emergence is also commonly presented as a metaphysical 
phenomenon, particularly as a way in which properties of conscious experience may be 
related to other properties such as physical or neuroscientific properties. For example, 
O’Connor & Wong have argued that the relationship between the mental and the physical is 
one of “ontological emergence”32, where they understand ontologically emergent properties 
as properties of wholes that are not reducible to relations between properties of the parts of 
that whole. Kim has explored metaphysical emergentism as a response to the mind-body 
problem, although he ultimately argues that metaphysical emergentism is self-undermining.33 
In the philosophy of cognitive science, “systems-based” conceptions of emergence have been 
used to taxonomize characteristic features of dynamical or self-organizing systems. Clark, for 
example, defines emergence in terms of “collective variables” which he describes as 
controlling parameters of dynamical systems34, while Port and Van Gelder describe 
dynamical systems (which, they argue, undergird cognition) as having emergent properties.35 
In philosophy of science, Wilson has recently defended an account of emergence 
understood in terms of “degrees of freedom”, where a degree of freedom is, as she puts it, 
                                                       
31 Shoemaker, S. (2007) Chapter 4 
32 O’Connor, T. and Wong, H. (2005) 
33 Kim, J. (2006) 
34 Clark, A. (1997) Chapter 6. 
35 Port & Van Gelder (1995) Chapter 1 
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“an independent parameter needed to characterize an entity as being in a state functionally 
relevant to its law-governed properties and behavior.”36Wilson appeals to this notion of 
emergence in her defense of non-reductive physicalism, which is motivated by a particular 
concern to recognize the autonomy of the special sciences. Some philosophers, including 
Teller and Silberstein & McGeever, have argued that fundamental physics reveals cases of 
metaphysical emergence.37 In the mid-20th century, Hempel and Oppenheim argued for an 
epistemic account of emergence, according to which emergence marks the limits of our 
scientific knowledge.38 And finally, Humphreys and Bedau have developed computational 
accounts of emergence that focus particularly on purported cases of emergence generated by 
computer simulations and in Artificial Life worlds.39 In these cases, the autonomy 
characteristic of emergence is understood in computational, rather than metaphysical, terms.  
The concept of emergence appears also in many different areas of scientific practice. 
In Artificial Life, for example, the term is often used for properties of the complex 
configurations that appear in Artificial Life worlds.40 In systems biology and systems 
chemistry, the term “emergence” is sometimes used as a label for complex phenomena that 
are particularly surprising or hard to predict from the behavior of their simpler components. 
Emergence also crops up in areas as diverse as developmental psychology and ecology. For 
example, a recent article in Science describes mussel bed eco-systems as displaying 
                                                       
36 Wilson, J. (2010) pg 281-2 
37 Teller, P. (1986); Silberstein, M. & McGeever, P. (1999) 
38 Hempel, C. & Oppenheim, P. (1965) 
39 Humphreys, P. (2008); Bedau, M. (2003) 
40 Bonabeau & Therelautz in Langton, C. (1995) 
  
 
18 
“emergent” self-organization, while in a Brain and Behavioral Sciences article and 
discussion from 2003, Rumbaugh et al describe “new forms of behavior that are adaptive” 
as “emergent”.41   
In addition to its uses in philosophy and science, the idea of emergence has been 
documented in the popular press, particularly in a number of popular science books of the 
later 20th and early 21st centuries. Authors including Stephen Johnson42 and John Holland43 
have written popular books about emergence, focusing particularly on purported cases of 
emergence generated by complex systems.  
In Chapter 4 I will offer a detailed survey of contemporary appeals to the concept of 
emergence in philosophy and science, but the very brief sketch I have offered here is enough 
to provide a snapshot of the wide range of different accounts of and purported cases of 
emergence.  
 
Section 5: Associated Ideas 
“Emergence” is one of a group of concepts associated with the possibility that there 
may be distinct levels in nature. In this section I will give a brief survey of some of these 
concepts, focusing particularly on reductionism, physicalism and supervenience.  
5.1 Reductionism and Non-reductionism 
                                                       
41 Rumbaugh et al (2003); Koppel et al (2008) 
42 Johnson, S. (2002)  
43 Holland, J. (1999) 
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“Reductionism” is a term used in many different areas of discourse. The preface to a 
recent compilation on the subject states, “Roughly speaking, to reduce is to show that that 
which is reduced is nothing over and above that which it is reduced to.”44 This is a schematic 
characterization, but it captures the general idea. For example, we may say that to reduce 
chemistry to physics, we must show that the kinds, properties and entities of chemistry are 
nothing more than the kinds, properties and entities of physics. Reduction and reductionism 
are common terms, used quite widely in areas outside of philosophy, and exactly how best to 
move beyond this schematic, general conception of reduction to something more precise is a 
much-debated topic in philosophy.45 
In the mid 20th century reduction was commonly understood in terms of laws, 
following a very influential model of reduction offered by Ernest Nagel.46 According to 
Nagel, “Reduction … is the explanation of a theory or a set of experimental laws established 
in one area of enquiry, by a theory usually though not invariably formulated for some other 
domain.”47 Nagel argued that in some cases of reduction, which he called heterogeneous 
reductions, generalizations in higher-level sciences are reduced to generalizations in lower-
level sciences via principles that establish connections between the kinds of the higher-level 
sciences and the kinds of the lower-level sciences.48 These principles have come to be known 
as “bridge laws”, and Nagel argued that bridge laws not only capture correlations between 
                                                       
44 Hohwy & Kallestrup (2008) pg 1 
45 Nagel, E. (1961); Putnam & Oppenheim (1958); Sklar, L. (1967) 
46 Nagel, E. (1961) 
47 Nagel, E. (1961) pg 338 
48 Nagel, E. (1961) pg 353-354 
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the kinds of different sciences, but also permit the laws of the higher-level science to be 
derived from the laws of the lower level science.49 Nagel argued that thermodynamics 
reduces to statistical mechanics in precisely this way. 
The idea of reduction played a central role in philosophical discussion of the unity of 
science. Putnam and Oppenheim famously offered a formulation of the idea of the “Unity of 
Science” and argued for its viability in their 1958 “Unity of Science as a Working 
Hypothesis”. Their conception of the unity of science was made up of two elements: 
linguistic and explanatory. Linguistic unification is achieved, they argue, when “all of the 
terms of science are reduced to the terms of some one discipline”50, and explanatory 
unification is achieved when “the laws of science become reduced to the laws of some one 
discipline.”51 They took the combination of explanatory and linguistic unification to be 
equivalent to (a particular kind of) reduction52, and the claim that the unity of science is 
achievable is, by their lights, a reductionist hypothesis.  
The exact details of Putnam and Oppenheim’s model of reduction is not essential to 
this discussion53, but we should note that they took their central hypothesis (that scientific 
unity is achievable, if not yet achieved) to indicate that metaphysical emergentism was false. 
                                                       
49 Nagel, E. (1961) pg 354. Sklar has argued that bridge laws are identities rather than correlations in Sklar 
(1967) 
 
50 Putnam & Oppenheim (1958) pg 3 
51 Putnam & Oppenheim (1958) pg 4 
52 Though not equivalent to all conceptions of reduction, as they point out on pg 5 of Putnam & Oppenheim 
(1958) 
 
53 They adopted the account of reduction developed by Kemeny and Oppenheim. Putnam and Oppenheim(1958) 
pg 5.  
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Consider, for example, this passage, which followed in from some discussion of various 
sources of support for their Unity of Science hypothesis: 
“The consideration just outlined seems to us to constitute an argument against the 
view that, as objects of a given level combine to form wholes belonging to a higher 
level, there appear certain new phenomena which are ‘emergent’ in the sense of 
being forever irreducible to laws governing the phenomena on the levels of the 
parts.”54 
The authors go on to then point out that they are opposed only to this metaphysical claim, 
and that they acknowledge that there “are many phenomena which are not reducible by 
currently available theories pertaining to lower levels”.55 
As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, reductionism in philosophy and in science was 
popular up until the latter half of the 20th century. At this time, a number of philosophers 
began exploring problems for reductionism of the kind defended by Nagel and by Putnam 
and Oppenheim. Fodor, for example, published his paper “Special Sciences” with the 
subtitle, “The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis” intended to mirror the title of 
the original Putnam and Oppenheim piece.56 Here, Fodor argued for a non-reductionist view 
of the special sciences, according to which special sciences types, or kinds, don’t reduce, as 
in a Nagel style reduction, to the types or kinds of other more basic sciences.  
If understood as a metaphysical relation, such that the autonomy characteristic of 
emergent macro-properties is metaphysical, then generally speaking, emergentism is 
incompatible with reductionism because emergentism posits metaphysically autonomous 
macro-level properties or entities. If understood as an epistemic relation, emergence can be 
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compatible with metaphysical reductionism, though of course this depends on the details of 
both views. As a matter of general use, however, emergence is typically thought of both in 
philosophy and in science as a “non-reductive” concept, and emergentism as the antithesis of 
reductionism. 
5.2 Physicalism 
Physicalism is, schematically speaking, the view that everything is, or is reducible to, 
the physical. This schema requires us to specify what is meant by “everything”, “is”, “is 
reducible to” and “physical”, and differences in those specifications make for a wide range of 
different varieties of physicalism. Jackson and Chalmers have argued, for example, that 
physicalism amounts to the position that all facts are a priori derivable from the fundamental 
physical facts.57 Ney has argued that physicalism should be understood as a stance, or 
attitude, rather than a metaphysical position: “we ought to construe physicalism as nothing 
more than an attitude, a commitment to form one’s ontology according to whatever the 
physics of the day says exists.”58  Van Fraassen also argues for the position that physicalism 
is a stance rather than a thesis.59 Regardless of these debates about the correct formulation, 
however, physicalism has played a significant role in philosophy of mind, philosophy of 
science and metaphysics of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. So much so that recent 
                                                       
57 Chalmers, D. & Jackson, F. (2001) 
58 Ney, A. (2008) pg 3 
59 Van Fraassen, B. (2004) Chapter 4 
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commentators have described physicalism as “the Weltangschauung of modern analytic 
philosophy.”60  
Part of what has been so attractive for philosophers about the idea of physicalism is 
that it is seen as a naturalistic position. Naturalism is a vague idea, and it is hard to pin down 
exactly what is means. I won’t attempt to offer a working definition of naturalism here, but 
will simply say that naturalism is commonly associated with the belief that philosophy is 
close to and continuous with scientific practice, and is also associated with a set of 
methodological commitments including the claim that philosophical methods are like 
scientific methods, and that philosophers should avoid commitment to “supernatural” entities 
such as gods or ghosts. On this rough characterization of naturalism, we can easily recognize 
the plausibility of the claim that physicalism may be associated with, and indeed motivated 
by, naturalism. For philosophers who hold that all sciences in some way are grounded in, if 
not reduced to, physics, and also hold that philosophy shouldn’t posit anything that cannot be 
studied by scientists, physicalism would be an attractive position.  
Some have argued that physicalism is incompatible with metaphysical emergentism. 
For example, Jackson and Chalmers’ a priori physicalism is incompatible with Chalmers’ 
formulation of emergentism.61 Others have argued that metaphysical emergentism is 
compatible with physicalism. Crane, for instance, has argued that non-reductive physicalists 
must endorse emergentism, though he goes on to argue that this makes non-reductive 
physicalism a problematic position.62 The situation is made even more complicated by the 
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fact that many philosophers of physics have argued that fundamental physics provides the 
strongest evidence of metaphysical emergence.63 Regardless of whether or not physicalism in 
general is compatible with emergentism in general, however, the account of emergence that I 
will develop in Chapters 3 through 5 is compatible with most conceptions of physicalism.  
5.3 Supervenience 
Very roughly speaking, set A of properties supervenes on set B of properties if there 
can be no change in the A-properties without a corresponding change in the B-properties. 
This idea is often introduced using aesthetic examples, such as, for example, the relationship 
between the microphysical properties of a statue and that statue’s aesthetic properties. The 
aesthetic properties of the statue may be said to supervene on the physical properties of the 
statue in so far as there can be no change in the aesthetic properties without a corresponding 
change in the physical properties. Similarly, we may say that mental properties supervene on 
physical properties if there is no change in the mental properties without a corresponding 
change in the physical properties.  
The concept of supervenience was widely adopted by philosophers working in 
philosophy of mind and metaphysics of the late 20th century as tool for expressing the idea 
that mental and physical properties co-vary with one another. Davidson, for example, stated 
“… the position I describe … is consistent with the view that mental characteristics are in 
some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics. Such supervenience 
might be taken to mean that there cannot be two mental events alike in all physical respects 
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but differing in some mental respects…”64 However, there are a great many different notions 
of supervenience in use in contemporary philosophy. For example, some distinguish between 
global and local supervenience: the former is a relation that obtains between possible worlds, 
while the latter is a relation that obtains between sets of properties.65 Others distinguish 
between nomic supervenience, which obtains of natural necessity, and logical supervenience, 
which obtains of logical necessity. Kim also distinguishes between strong and weak 
supervenience, where weak supervenience obtains between two sets of properties in a single 
possible world, and strong supervenience between two sets of properties across all possible 
worlds.66  
Supervenience of some kind is clearly necessary for reduction, though there is an 
ongoing debate about whether or not supervenience is also sufficient for reduction too. Some 
philosophers argue that supervenience is a reductive relation, while others argue that 
supervenience merely captures a pattern of property co-variation, and lacks an explanatory 
element which they take to be essential to reduction.67 Either way, most claims about and 
views on emergence have a supervenience claim built into them, such that emergent macro-
level properties supervene in some sense on the relevant micro-level properties. The account 
of emergence I will defend in Chapters 3 through 5 will involve supervenience, a detail that I 
will return to discuss in Chapter 4. 
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Section 6: Problems for accounts of emergence 
Although the concept of emergence is popular and prevalent in philosophy and 
science, some philosophers have argued that forms of emergentism, particularly metaphysical 
varieties of emergentism, are problematic and even self-undermining. In this section I will 
offer a brief survey of some common objections to emergentism, including the problem of 
downward causation and the objection that emergentism is non-naturalistic and 
unparsimonious.   
6.1 Downward Causation 
“Downward causation” is the term for a phenomenon whereby an emergent property 
has autonomous causal powers to affect other properties or entities at the macro-level and 
also to affect micro-level properties and entities. Some philosophers have argued that 
downward causation is a central but also problematic feature of emergence. Kim, for 
example, argues that downward causation is necessary for emergence but that downward 
causation is impossible, hence undermining the possibility of emergence.68 In this section I 
will briefly outline the idea of downward causation and why it is thought to be a necessary 
but also problematic feature of emergence. In Chapter 5 I will return to this topic, and argue 
that the problem of downward causation is not a problem for my account of emergence.  
Given an idea of emergence as a combination of dependence and autonomy, some 
philosophers, particularly those who favor metaphysical accounts of emergence, have argued 
that there must be a causal element to emergent autonomy. According to this view, any 
emergence worthy of the name must involve macro-level properties that are in some sense 
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causally autonomous. What this means will vary from author to author, but the basic idea is 
that emergent macro-level properties must be capable of causing effects, and that this 
capacity is not reducible to the causal capacity of the relevant micro-level properties. If 
emergent macro-level properties are causally autonomous, however, we face the two 
problems: a general causal exclusion problem and the particular problem of downward 
causation.  
To illustrate the general causal exclusion problem, consider two sets of properties, P 
and Q, where P-properties are micro-level properties and Q-properties are macro-level 
properties, and imagine that all Q-properties are emergent from P-properties. Q1 is an 
emergent property, and Q1 causes the instantiation of Q2, another Q-property. However, if all 
Q properties are emergent from P properties, then Q2 must itself have a corresponding micro-
level P-property, P2, from which it emerges. But if Q2 is emergent from P2, then the 
instantiation of P2 is sufficient to cause the instantiation of Q2, which leaves us with an 
ovderdetermination problem: both P2 and Q1 are sufficient to cause the instantiation of Q2. 
The overdetermination is systematic; every case of emergence will bring with it an 
overdetermination problem, which challenges the idea that emergents bring novel causal 
contributions to the world.69  
This causal exclusion problem is a problem generated by the possibility of emergent 
properties being causally autonomous. But the prospect of downward causation generates an 
additional problem for those who endorse the principle of the completeness of physics. I will 
take downward causation to be the phenomenon whereby an emergent property has 
                                                       
69 This is a very rough presentation of the overdetermination problem as presented by Kim in Kim (2006).  
  
 
28 
autonomous causal powers to affect micro-level properties and entities, such as, for example, 
a case in which a mental property causes a physical property to be instantiated.  I will adopt 
Crane’s rough formulation of the principle of the completeness of physics, according to 
which “any physical effect … is completely fixed, deterministically or indeterministically, by 
purely physical causes”.70 The prospect of downward causation violates the principle of the 
completeness of physics, because in downward causation, a macro-level property causes an 
effect at the micro-level, and this cannot be reduced to an instance of micro-micro causation. 
Kim argues that the causal exclusion problem undermines the possibility of 
emergence71, and Crane argues that downward causation is a problem faced by both 
emergentists and non-reductive physicalists.72 I will save a more detailed discussion of the 
problem of downward causation for Chapter 5, but in the meantime we should note that both 
causal exclusion and the possibility of downward causation present a serious problem for 
proponents of metaphysical emergence.  
6.2 Naturalism, Parsimony 
Some argue that metaphysical emergentism is non-naturalistic because it requires us 
to endorse the idea that there are brute facts about macro-level properties and entities, and 
hence that emergents pose mysteries that science will never explain. As Bedau puts this 
challenge, “Strong emergence starts where scientific explanation ends.”73 This charge 
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applies only to strong metaphysical accounts of emergence because epistemic accounts of 
emergence tend to leave open the option that in our future science we may reduce or explain 
what it currently emergent. Some have argued that fundamental physics offers evidence for 
the existence of metaphysical emergence, which provides a counter-challenge to the position 
that metaphysical emergentism is non-naturalistic.74 Even leaving that case aside, however, 
scientific practice is full of appeals to emergence, made in attempts to taxonomize, account 
for and describe various different natural phenomena. Given this fact, it seems odd to 
describe emergentism in general as non-naturalistic, although strong metaphysical 
emergentism may turn out to be. 
Another challenge, related to these claims about naturalism, is the idea that 
emergentism is ontologically unparsimonious. The emergentist is committed to an extra 
metaphysical category, the category of emergents, which are not reducible to other 
metaphysical categories. This again is a challenge applied to metaphysical accounts of 
emergence, because epistemic emergentism doesn’t involve any ontological commitment. 
Proponents of metaphysical emergence tend to respond to this challenge by arguing that 
parsimony is a virtue that must be balanced against the other theoretical virtues. If it turns out 
that emergents appear in the best metaphysical theories, proponents of this position would 
argue, then, unparsimonious or not, we have reason to believe that emergentism is true.  
The view of emergence that I will defend in Chapters 3 through 5 is, I will argue, 
both naturalistic and ontologically parsimonious.  
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Section 7: Moving on 
In Chapter 4 I will offer a more detailed study of the concept of emergence, and of 
important distinctions such as the distinction between metaphysical and epistemic accounts 
of emergence. In the meantime I have simply attempted to offer enough background on the 
concept to set us up for the chapters to come.   
Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned that some accounts of emergence portray 
emergence as a metaphysical relation. According to proponents of metaphysical accounts of 
emergence, emergence tracks distinctions between metaphysically distinct levels in nature. In 
the chapters that follow, I will argue that metaphysical accounts of emergence face a 
problem, called the “collapse problem”. The collapse problem also applies to epistemic 
accounts of emergence, but I will present collapse objections only to metaphysical accounts 
of emergence, and in Chapter 4 I will offer an independent argument for the position that the 
perspectival account of emergence I develop on the basis of my response to the collapse 
problem is preferable to an epistemic account of emergence. I will return to this point in 
Section 2 of Chapter 2. 
After presenting the collapse problem in Chapter 2, and surveying some failed 
responses to it, in Chapter 3 I will show that the best way to solve the collapse problem is 
through an appeal to the connection between emergence and explanation. In Chapter 4 and 5 
I will build a positive account of emergence, the perspectival account of emergence, and will 
argue that the perspectival account of emergence doesn’t simply avoid the collapse problem, 
but that it also offers a unified, naturalistic account of emergence.  
  
 
Chapter 2: Collapsing Emergence 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
In this chapter I will reveal a problem that afflicts accounts of emergence. The 
problem is this: cases of emergence presuppose a distinction between micro-level and macro-
level properties. For any purported case of emergence, there are properties that prima facie 
belong to the micro-level, but if they are included in the micro-level, then the purported 
emergent fails to meet a necessary condition for emergent autonomy. I call these problematic 
properties collapse-inducing properties because when they are included in the micro-level, 
the purported emergent effectively “collapses”, and yet it seems arbitrary to exclude them. 
Furthermore, this problem does not depend on the details of any particular account of 
emergence and so applies quite generally. This is the problem of collapsing emergence (or, 
for short, the collapse problem) and I will give an account of it in Section 2. The collapse 
problem suggests that emergence tracks relationships between arbitrary groups of properties, 
rather than distinctions between levels of properties in nature.  
An intuitive response to the collapse problem is to restrict the micro-level properties 
in cases of emergence in line with some or another metaphysical distinction, such as the 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. In Section 3 I will survey some of these 
strategies and argue that they fail. In Chapter 3 I will then move on to offer an alternative 
solution to the collapse problem, based on the connection between emergence and scientific 
explanation.  
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Section 2: The Collapse Problem 
An “account” of emergence attempts to characterize (typically by offering necessary 
and sufficient conditions) what it is for some property to be emergent. In this section, I will 
present a problem for accounts of emergence (the collapse problem), which will show that a 
purportedly emergent property fails to meet a necessary condition for emergent autonomy.75 
This problem is generated by following a recipe, which I will illustrate first by formulating a 
simple, toy case of a collapse problem and then by formulating collapse problems for three 
different accounts of emergence: from C.D. Broad, Mark Bedau and David Chalmers. The 
proponent of the position that there are emergent properties faces the challenge of showing 
that the recipe for generating collapse problems is illegitimate, a challenge which proves 
surprisingly hard to meet.  
2. 1 A Simple Case 
Consider one hundred apples arranged in a circle with a circumference of forty feet. 
Consider also a person with complete knowledge of the intrinsic properties of each of those 
one hundred apples.76 It is not possible for this person to deduce the circle’s circumference 
from the intrinsic properties of its constituent apples.  
Suppose that a philosopher (let’s call her Em) observes that this is the case and claims 
that the circle has properties that emerge from the properties of its constituent apples. Em 
claims that the micro-level properties are the properties of each of the apples, the macro-level 
properties are properties of the circle, and the emergent macro-level properties are dependent 
on the micro-level properties in so far as the circle is constituted by the apples, but 
                                                       
75 The claims I aim to establish are about emergent properties, but a simple transformation would allow this 
objection to apply to claims about emergent entities or substances instead.  
76 We can understand ‘intrinsic’ in the Lewisian sense to mean ‘invariant over duplicates’. Lewis, D. (1986) 
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nevertheless autonomous in so far as they cannot be deduced from complete knowledge of 
the micro-level properties. Em presents the failure of deducibility as a necessary condition 
for emergent autonomy; she takes having a circumference of forty feet to be an emergent 
property of the circle. 
However, Em appears to be confused, because whether the circumference of the 
circle meets the necessary condition for emergence obviously depends on which properties 
are included in the micro-level. If the micro-level properties include only the intrinsic 
properties of the apples, then it is impossible to deduce the circumference of the circle from 
the micro-level properties, and having a circumference of forty feet meets the necessary 
criterion for emergence. If, on the other hand, the micro-level properties include the extrinsic 
properties of the apples, particularly their relative positions, then there is no failure of 
deducibility. It seems as if Em has made a mistake in claiming that having a circumference of 
forty feet is an emergent property of the circle, because the moment we broaden the micro-
level properties to include extrinsic properties, this property is plainly not emergent. One 
might argue that Em has not made a mistake because what counts as the micro-level 
properties in cases of emergence is a matter of stipulation. However, if we don’t think that 
Em has made a mistake, then we take emergence to be an arbitrary, fragile phenomenon that 
disappears when a wider, and seemingly equally legitimate, group of micro-level properties 
is taken into consideration. 
This is an example of a collapse objection, and it follows a very simple recipe. 
Starting with the micro-macro distinction used by the proponent of the account of emergence, 
we find a micro-level property that crosses the barrier that marks emergent autonomy but is 
also, according to the original micro-macro distinction, a micro-level property. Following 
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this recipe, the collapse objection generalizes to existing accounts of emergence. In the rest 
of this section, I will present collapse objections to three different accounts of emergence. I 
will show that, if we think that Em is wrong to believe that having a circumference of forty 
feet is an emergent property of the circle, then we are committed to thinking that most 
mainstream philosophical treatments of emergence are wrong for similar reasons.  
2. 2 Broad’s Emergent Wholes 
In the following famous passage, C.D. Broad laid out the commitments of his 
“emergent theory”: 
 
Put in abstract terms the emergent theory asserts that there are certain 
wholes, composed (say) of constituents A, B, and C in a relation R to each other; that 
all wholes composed of constituents of the same kind as A, B and C in relations of the 
same kind as R have certain characteristic properties; that A, B and C are capable of 
occurring in other kinds of complex where the relation is not of the same kind as R; 
and that the characteristic properties of the whole R(A, B, C) cannot, even in theory, 
be deduced from the most complete knowledge of the properties of A, B, and C in 
isolation or in other wholes which are not of the form R(A, B, C).77 
 
For Broad, the micro-level properties are the properties of the parts A, B and C in 
isolation, while the macro-level properties are the properties of the whole R(A, B, C). Broad 
claims that in cases of emergence we cannot, even in principle, deduce the properties of the 
whole R(A, B, C) from complete knowledge of the properties of the parts A, B and C in 
isolation or in wholes other than R(A, B, C). That is to say, if we knew about the parts, and 
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furthermore knew that they were arranged in whole R(A, B, C)78, then we would not be able 
to deduce the features of the whole. This is presented as a necessary condition for emergence.  
There is a lot packed into the claim that the micro-level properties are the properties 
of A, B and C in isolation, and the case of sodium chloride provides an illuminating example. 
Broad thought that sodium chloride has emergent properties, such as solubility in water, and 
that its possession of these properties cannot be deduced from full knowledge of the 
properties of sodium in isolation and of chlorine in isolation, nor from the properties of other 
wholes of which they may form parts. From our complete knowledge of the properties of 
sodium and chlorine as elements or in any compound other than sodium chloride, and our 
knowledge that they are combined together into a compound, we cannot deduce the features 
of sodium chloride.  
To generate a collapse objection to Broad’s view, let’s focus on part A of the whole 
R(A, B, C) and let X, Y and Z be the characteristic, and purportedly emergent, features of 
whole R(A, B, C). Part A has the following dispositional property: to form a whole with 
characteristic features X, Y and Z when combined in relation R with parts B and C. Parts B 
and C have similar properties.79 The emergent features of the whole R (A, B, C) can 
obviously be deduced from complete knowledge of the features of the parts A, B and C and 
the knowledge that they are arranged as a whole R(A, B, C), so long as the features of the 
parts include these dispositional properties. This case of emergence “collapses” when these 
dispositional properties are included among the micro-level properties.  
                                                       
78 Broad doesn’t make this element explicit, but a reconstruction of his view suggests that it is necessary 
because without it Broad’s account permits many trivial cases of emergence. For instance, any case in which 
some parts may be arranged in different ways to form different wholes will generate a case of emergence.  
 
79 For the purposes of this discussion, I will assume that A’s disposition necessarily manifests itself in response 
to the stimulus condition of A’s being joined in relation R with parts B and C. 
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Returning to the case of sodium chloride, we can see that these dispositional 
properties are, by Broad’s own standard, micro-level properties. For example, one of the 
characteristic properties of sodium chloride is its solubility in water. Accordingly, sodium 
has the following dispositional property: to generate a compound that is soluble in water 
when combined with chlorine into sodium chloride. Sodium has this dispositional property 
even if it is never manifested, as would be the case if sodium never came into contact with 
chlorine. In Broad’s terms, this property is a property of sodium “in isolation”. This claim 
may be counterintuitive, but by Broad’s own lights, the dispositional property is a property of 
sodium and so a micro-level property.   
According to Broad, the failure of deducibility is a necessary condition for 
emergence. Yet this case shows that whether a macro-level property meets the necessary 
condition for emergence depends on what counts as a micro-level property. Later, I will 
consider various kinds of non-arbitrary restrictions on the admissible micro-level properties, 
such as that micro-level properties not be dispositions. Under this restriction, sodium’s 
disposition to generate a water-soluble compound when combined with chlorine does not 
count as an admissible micro-level property. But, I will argue, this restriction fails to solve 
the collapse problem.  
2.3 Bedau’s Weak Emergents.  
Mark Bedau has recently offered an account of “weak emergence” based on cases 
from Artificial Life, and his approach is typical of proposals rooted in scientific applications 
of the concept of emergence.80 Bedau’s account of emergence was developed in a 
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philosophical context very different from Broad’s, but I will show that Bedau’s view is also 
subject to the collapse objection.  
Artificial Life worlds are computer worlds consisting of cells that can be ‘dead’ 
(empty) or ‘alive’ (filled). Filled cells form configurations that change in accordance with 
simple update rules that specify, given the current configuration of alive and dead cells, what 
the configuration will be after the next tick of the clock. The state of any given configuration 
after any interval of time can be derived by simulation; we can simply apply the update rules, 
over and over again, to determine how the configuration changes with each successive time 
step. For some configurations, computational shortcuts allow us to find out about the state of 
the configuration at a given stage without our having to carry out this step-by-step 
simulation. Other configurations, however, resist such treatment. If we want to find out about 
the state of those configurations after a certain number of generations, we have to simulate 
their development. According to Bedau, such configurations have “weakly emergent” 
properties, and underivability except by simulation is necessary for weak emergence. The 
macro-level properties, which are the properties of configurations, are dependent on the 
micro-level properties, the properties of the individual cells, in that the cells constitute the 
configuration. The macro-level properties are autonomous from the micro-level properties in 
that there is no computational shortcut by which the macro-level properties can be derived 
from the micro-level properties. 
One example of a weakly emergent property is possessed by the “R-Pentomino” 
configuration, which appears in Conway’s famous Game of Life, an Artificial Life world. 
This configuration starts off very simply and develops into increasingly flamboyant shapes 
before settling into a stable state at 1103 generations (the R-Pentomino’s “halting point”). 
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Armed with our knowledge of the states of the cells in the first stage of the configuration and 
our knowledge of the Game of Life’s update rule, we can derive the halting point only by 
walking the configuration through each stage in its development. Bedau claims that having a 
halting point of 1103 generations is an emergent property of the R-Pentomino configuration., 
but Bedau’s position is subject to a collapse objection. A filled cell in the Game of Life has 
the property of forming a configuration whose development halts at 1103 generations when 
combined with other cells into an R-Pentomino.81 This disposition is a property of the 
individual filled cell, and by that standard is a micro-property. But if we include this property 
among the micro-level properties, then we can obviously derive the halting point of the R-
Pentomino by means other than simulation.   
Of course, any given observer faced with the R-Pentomino for the first time would be 
unlikely to know that the configuration halts at 1103 generations, and that accordingly any 
filled cell has the property of forming a configuration whose development halts at 1103 
generations when combined with other cells into an R-Pentomino. But whether a given 
observer knows that a filled cell has this property is irrelevant to whether it in fact has the 
property, and having the property is all we need to establish the collapse objection to Bedau.  
2.4 Chalmers on emergence as failure of logical necessitation. 
According to David Chalmers, almost all of the facts about the world are logically 
necessitated by the fundamental physical facts, with one very important exception: the case 
of consciousness.82 The facts about consciousness are not logically necessitated by the 
fundamental physical facts, but only nomologically necessitated. In worlds with laws like 
                                                       
81 As in the case of Broad, I will assume that this disposition manifests itself of natural necessity in response to 
the stimulus condition. 
 
82 Chalmers, D. (2006) and (1996) 
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ours, the same micro-states will give rise to conscious experience, but there are logically 
possible worlds in which the same micro-states will not give rise to conscious experience. 
The relationship between the fundamental physical facts and qualitative experience is 
governed by what Chalmers calls psychophysical laws.  
Chalmers presents failure of logical necessitation by the fundamental physical facts as 
a necessary condition for emergence. Unlike Bedau’s and Broad’s, Chalmers’ account of 
emergence is rooted in contemporary metaphysics, but his view is also subject to a collapse 
objection. Take a particular individual’s conscious experience to have characteristic (and 
purportedly emergent) features x, y and z, and along with Chalmers take the micro-level 
properties in question to be the fundamental physical properties of that individual. For the 
moment let’s interpret “fundamental physical properties” as the properties of the most 
fundamental physical entities, and let the “Psycho-Law” be the psychophysical law that 
governs the relationship between the fundamental physical facts and the relevant features of 
qualitative experience. Now consider the property of being governed by the Psycho-Law. If 
this is included among the micro-level properties, then the micro-level properties logically, 
rather than just nomologically, necessitate the macro-level properties. With the inclusion of 
this micro-level property, the purported case of emergence has collapsed.  
One might respond by suggesting that the property of being governed by the Psycho-
Law does not belong in the micro-level because it is not a candidate for a fundamental 
physical property. Jackson and Chalmers describe their understanding of ‘fundamental’ as 
follows:  
Microphysical truths are truths about the fundamental entities and properties of 
physics, in the language of a completed physics … We will not engage the issue of 
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what counts as “physics”, but will stipulate that if there are any fundamental mental 
entities or properties, they are not part of physics.83 
 
The property of being governed by the Psycho-Law cannot be the referent of a predicate 
featured in the language of a completed physics. If we accept the restriction of the micro-
level properties to those picked out by predicates in the language of a completed physics, 
then features x, y, and z meet Chalmers’ criterion for emergence. Note, however, that their 
doing so depends on the fact that this restriction is applied. If the micro-properties include the 
properties of the most fundamental entities, say, rather than the properties that correspond to 
the predicates of a completed physics, then the features x, y and z would not meet Chalmers’ 
criterion for emergence, since being governed by the Psycho-Law is a property of the most 
fundamental entities. Chalmers is similar to Em in this respect; the case of emergence 
collapses when a wider group of micro-level properties is taken into consideration. 
An immediate response to the collapse objection is to think that it involves some kind 
of cheating. One might suspect that in formulating the collapse problem I have willfully 
misinterpreted the authors in question, by attributing a broader group of properties to the 
micro-level than they themselves would recognize. In this paper, I will cut off several 
attempts to flesh out this criticism by attempting to restrict the relevant group of micro-level 
properties in cases of emergence. Then, in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 I will offer an account of 
emergence that not only avoids the collapse objection, but also explains the intuition that the 
collapse objection involves some kind of cheating.  
2.5 The Impact of the Collapse Problem 
                                                       
83 Chalmers, D. and Jackson, F. (2001), pg 316.  
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Before moving on to consider some responses to the collapse problem, let’s take a 
moment to reflect on what is at stake. In philosophy, emergence has been used to cash out the 
idea that the universe is composed of metaphysical levels, or layers. For example, the British 
Emergentists thought that there was a hierarchy of levels of matter, from physics through 
chemistry and biology, up to consciousness84, and some contemporary authors have argued 
that there is a metaphysical division between consciousness and everything else.85 On this 
kind of picture, there are distinctions between levels of properties in the universe and 
emergence is the relation that tracks those distinctions. The collapse problem, however, 
suggests that emergence does no such thing.  
A very basic way to think of this problem is in terms of the familiar metaphor of a 
layer cake.86 Think of the universe as a gigantic layer cake, composed of a layer of plain 
sponge, followed by a layer of cream, followed by chocolate sponge, followed by icing. 
Emergence is thought to be the relation that tracks the distinctions between those layers, such 
that the properties of the icing emerge from the properties of the chocolate sponge, which 
emerge from the properties of the cream and so on. The collapse objection indicates that 
instead, we have half of the properties of the icing emerging from the properties of the top 
left quarter of the chocolate sponge and a spoonful of the cream. Unless we can find a 
solution to the collapse problem, we are left with the result that emergence isn’t doing its job; 
it isn’t tracking the right divisions in the cake. 
                                                       
84 Broad, C.D. (1925), McLaughlin, B. (1992) 
85 Chalmers, D. (1996) 
86 The “layer-cake” metaphor has been used to illustrate many different claims, by philosophers including 
Sellars. Sellars, W. (1961).  
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One seemingly attractive response to the collapse problem is to rule out any micro-
level properties that in some sense “involve” a property that can only be possessed by the 
macro-level. If we adopt this restriction, then the collapse-inducing property won’t count as a 
micro-level property. Obviously this strategy requires a carefully specified notion of 
“involve”, and the exact details of that notion will determine just how general this solution 
will be. However, even a general version of this response won’t solve the collapse problem 
for the simple reason that it permits too much emergence. For example, consider a bundle of 
pieces of wood, which are arranged into a whole that happens to be a table. Suppose I 
wonder whether or not features of this whole are emergent, and suppose I use Broad’s 
criterion for emergence in my investigations. These pieces of wood could be gathered into 
wholes with any number of different properties: boats, piles of sticks of different shapes and 
sizes, even art installations. If I cannot include among the micro-level properties any 
properties that in some general sense “involve” the macro-level, then many properties of the 
table, such as having four legs and a flat top, will be emergent.87 This would not be 
recognized as a case of emergence by Broad, Bedau, or Chalmers, indicating that this attempt 
to avoid the collapse problem on their behalf still permits too many cases of emergence.  
Alternatively, one might respond to the collapse objection by arguing that there is 
something special about the three cases I have chosen to present, in so far as each of them 
involves a failure of deducibility. Perhaps if we consider a case in which the necessary 
condition for emergence doesn’t involve a failure of deducibility, but rather a metaphysical 
factor such as a difference in causal powers, then the collapse objection won’t apply. Without 
                                                       
87 Some may be worried that artefacts like tables have macro-level properties that are plausibly emergent 
because they are tied to intentional and qualitative states. To avoid complications, we can stick to simple 
properties such as “having a flat top”.  
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wishing to spoil the suspense, I will say upfront that this hope is misguided. I will now 
examine such a case and to show that the collapse objection does indeed apply.  
Suppose a philosopher claims that an individual’s qualitative experience has 
properties that emerge from the properties of that individual’s brain, in virtue of the 
properties of the experience having causal powers that aren’t exhausted by the causal powers 
of the brain-properties.88 The micro-level properties are the properties of the brain, the 
macro-level properties are the properties of the experience, and a necessary condition for 
emergence is that the macro-level properties have causal powers that aren’t exhausted by the 
causal powers of the micro level properties. So, in cases of emergence, one can take all of the 
causal powers of the micro-level properties and “add” them together and they still wouldn’t 
amount to the causal powers possessed by the macro-level property. The macro-level 
property has some causal powers over and above the causal powers of the micro-level 
properties.  
It is not at all clear what such “addition” would amount to in the case of causal 
powers, but we can leave that detail to the proponent of such a view. The main point is that a 
collapse objection to this position can easily be formulated. Let “E” be a property of this 
individual’s qualitative experience, one of the purportedly emergent properties. Suppose that 
the micro-level includes the property of giving rise to qualitative experience having property 
E. Then any causal power associated with E is associated with the micro-level properties. 
Therefore, the purported case of emergence collapses unless the micro-level excludes this 
property. This case appears to indicate that accounts of emergence that don’t impose 
                                                       
88 I am assuming that properties have associated causal powers simply for the purposes of exposition, but this 
assumption could be dispensed with in favour of some other way of accounting for causal capacity.  
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limitations on the admissible micro-level properties are subject to collapse objections, 
regardless of whether or not they are based on a failure of deducibility.  
So far I have presented the collapse problem as a problem for metaphysical accounts 
of emergence, which use emergence to track metaphysical distinctions between levels of 
properties in nature. But the collapse problem also applies to epistemic accounts of 
emergence, so long as such accounts take emergence to be a non-arbitrary relation. Epistemic 
accounts of emergence typically treat emergence as tracking the limits of human knowledge, 
such that when a property is emergent we do not yet know, or cannot explain, the fact that it 
is instantiated, but that as we build on our knowledge this contingent epistemic gap will be 
closed. The collapse problem is a problem for any account of emergence that presents 
emergence as a non-arbitrary relation, where emergence doesn’t disappear with the inclusion 
of some arbitrary property among the micro-level properties. Insofar as epistemic accounts of 
emergence present emergence as a non-arbitrary relation, the collapse problem applies to 
them too. However, in Chapter 4 I will provide an additional argument for the position that 
the perspectival account of emergence that I develop in Chapters 3 through 5 is preferable to 
an epistemic account, for conceptual reasons.  Accordingly, rather than working through the 
collapse problem as a problem for epistemic accounts of emergence, and considering 
responses on behalf of the proponent of such an account, I will consider the collapse problem 
as a problem that poses a serious objection only to metaphysical accounts of emergence.  
The collapse problem appears to show that emergence tracks relations between 
arbitrary groups of properties rather than between distinct levels in nature, but there is an 
intuitive way to resist this conclusion. If we can find a way to restrict the micro-level 
properties in line with a metaphysical distinction, then we can avoid the idea that emergence 
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tracks relations between arbitrary groups of properties. The idea behind this strategy is that 
we can show that the recipe for generating collapse objections is illegitimate because it 
involves the wrong micro-level properties, where the distinction between “right” and 
“wrong” micro-level properties is understood in terms of some antecedently recognized 
metaphysical distinction.  
 
Section 3: Distinctions to Hitch To 
Here are my standards for the success or failure of an attempt to solve the collapse 
problem by imposing a restriction on the micro-level properties. If a proposed restriction lets 
in collapse-inducing micro-level properties for many mainstream accounts of emergence, and 
accordingly permits collapses, then it won’t help. If a proposed restriction requires us to rule 
out many of the properties that one could sensibly wish to include in the micro-level base of 
an emergent, then it also won’t help, because were we to preclude such properties, we would 
depart too far from philosophical and scientific practice. 
3.1 Intrinsic/Extrinsic 
It is tempting to respond to the collapse problem by thinking that collapse-inducing 
properties are somehow illegitimate; they aren’t genuine, “proper” properties. One way to 
respect this intuition is to restrict the micro-level properties in cases of emergence to only 
intrinsic properties. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties is the subject of 
some controversy, but the basic idea is that a property-bearer has intrinsic properties in virtue 
of features independent of its environment, and accordingly that intrinsic properties, unlike 
extrinsic properties, hold across duplicates.89 A canonical example is the difference between 
                                                       
89 For discussion of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, see Lewis, D. (1983); Langton, R. 
and Lewis, D. (1998); Kim, J. (1982); Weatherson, B. (2001). 
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mass and weight; the mass of an object is among its intrinsic properties while its weight, 
which it has in virtue of the force of gravity exerted upon it, is extrinsic. For the purposes of 
making the appeal to intrinsic properties as attractive as possible, I will assume that there is a 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, that this distinction is metaphysically 
non-arbitrary, and that we can wield this distinction to some level of accuracy.  
In appealing to the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, the 
emergentist would claim that emergence is relative to a micro-level composed entirely of 
intrinsic properties. This appears to be a sensible strategy. Indeed, in the simple case 
involving apples from Section 2, the collapse-inducing micro-level properties (such as the 
apples’ relative positions) were extrinsic properties, so it might appear that by ruling out 
extrinsic properties, an emergentist would be able to avoid collapse objections. There are, 
however, serious problems with this strategy: it is both too restrictive and too permissive.  
The appeal to intrinsic properties is too restrictive in so far as there are many cases of 
extrinsic properties that an emergentist may very reasonably wish to include among the 
micro-level properties in purported cases of emergence. In many contemporary treatments of 
emergence, philosophers concentrate on the relationship between neuroscientific (or simply 
physical) properties and the properties of qualitative experience. These facts about the 
literature suggest that two paradigm micro-level bases for purported cases of emergence are 
physical properties and neuroscientific properties. Both physics and neuroscience are, 
however, full of extrinsic properties. Take voltage for example. The property of being 5 volts 
is relative to a ground and accordingly extrinsic, but being 5 volts is also a paradigm case of a 
physical property. Relative speed is another example. One particle having speed of 5 m/s 
relative to another is an extrinsic property and another paradigmatic physical property. 
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Turning to neuroscience, the property of being a synaptic cleft is extrinsic; a synaptic cleft is 
simply a gap across which neurotransmitter molecules are passed from neuron to neuron.90 
The region of space is a synaptic cleft in virtue of the use that it made of it by the 
neurotransmitters, which makes being a synaptic cleft an extrinsic property of that region of 
space. There are many extrinsic properties that an emergentist may reasonably wish to 
include in the micro-level base of a purported case of emergence, and in most cases these are 
not collapse-inducing properties.  
As well as being too restrictive, the strategy of restricting micro-level properties to 
just the intrinsic properties is also too permissive. The property that generated the collapse 
objection to Broad (having the disposition to form a whole with characteristic features X, Y 
and Z when combined in relation R with parts B and C) is plausibly intrinsic91 and so 
wouldn’t be ruled out by the restriction to intrinsic micro-level properties.  
To my claim that the restriction to intrinsic properties is too restrictive, one might 
respond that for each extrinsic property there may be a corresponding intrinsic property or 
properties. For example, consider the property of being a synaptic cleft. A gap may be a 
synaptic cleft in virtue of being the site of a certain kind of neurotransmitter activity, but one 
could argue that this is simply a matter of the site having certain intrinsic properties and other 
things, such as neurons, having certain intrinsic properties too. If this turns out to be the case, 
then ruling out extrinsic properties won’t be restrictive at all because, so long as we include 
the right intrinsic properties in the micro-level, we miss nothing by excluding the extrinsic 
properties.  
                                                       
90 Purves, D. et al (2008) pg 96. 
 
91 The position that all dispositions are intrinsic is popular, but we need not endorse it to take this as a plausibly 
intrinsic property. See McKitrick, J. (2003) for discussion.  
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The proponent of such a position faces a dilemma. On the one hand, the promise in 
the appeal to the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties lies in the idea that it is 
a metaphysically non-arbitrary distinction. Posit too tight a connection between intrinsic and 
extrinsic properties and we lose the idea that this is a metaphysical distinction. For instance, 
someone who claims that each and every extrinsic property is token-identical with an 
intrinsic property or properties will have trouble defending the claim that there is a genuine 
metaphysical distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic properties, rather than, say, a 
conceptual distinction. On the other hand, if the proponent of this objection posits too loose a 
connection between the relevant intrinsic and extrinsic properties, then they again face the 
charge of being overly restrictive. For instance, if they agree that not every extrinsic property 
corresponds to an intrinsic property or properties, then excluding extrinsic properties will still 
be restrictive. The prospects for stable middle ground are thin, and so this way to save the 
appeal to the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction looks unpromising. Accordingly I will move on to 
examine an alternative, the distinction between dispositional and non-dispositional 
properties. 
3.2 Dispositional/Non-Dispositional 
As we just saw, the distinction between dispositional and non-dispositional properties 
appears to be a promising candidate. The basic idea behind this distinction is that what it is to 
possess a given dispositional property is to have the power to produce certain manifestations 
in response to certain stimuli. This power exhausts the property and is associated with it as a 
matter of necessity, while non-dispositional properties lack a stimulus-manifestation essence. 
Classic examples of dispositional properties include solubility and fragility. The emergentist 
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could stipulate that the micro-level properties in cases of emergence are exclusively non-
dispositional properties, and thereby hope to avoid the collapse problem.  
This response assumes a clear distinction between dispositional and non-dispositional 
properties, and this distinction is a matter of significant controversy.92 Some philosophers 
hold that all properties are dispositional, others hold that no properties are dispositional, and 
others hold that the question of whether the fundamental properties are dispositional or not is 
in fact unanswerable.93 Some think that there is a distinction between dispositional and non-
dispositional properties, but that this is not a metaphysical distinction.94 Some think that there 
is a metaphysical distinction between dispositional properties and non-dispositional 
properties, but that every instance of a dispositional property is token-identical with an 
instance of its categorical basis.95 This is a wide and controversial range of options, but for 
the purposes of this discussion I will adopt the most charitable view possible. I will assume 
that there is a distinction between dispositional and non-dispositional properties, that we can 
successfully wield that distinction, and that the distinction is metaphysical rather than, say, 
conceptual.   
This strategy shows promise because dispositional properties often are the properties 
that generate collapses. In the last section, I mentioned the property that generated the 
collapse for Broad’s case of emergence: the disposition to form a whole with characteristic 
features X, Y and Z when combined in relation R with parts B and C. Once again, however, 
                                                       
92 The literature on these questions is vast. See e.g. Blackburn, S. (1990); Molnar, G. (1999); Mumford, S. 
(1998); Langton, R. (1998): Lewis, D. (2004); Bird, A. (2007); Prior, E. Pargeter, R. & Jackson, F. (1982) 
 
93 Langton, R. (1998), Lewis, D. (2004) 
 
94 Blackburn, S. (1990) 
95 Mumford, S. (1998) 
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the restriction to non-dispositional properties is both too restrictive and too permissive. For 
instance, if we turn to the cases of physics and neuroscience, we can see that both are full of 
dispositional properties. Consider, for instance, the property of being a working 
neurotransmitter receptor (that is, a molecule that is primed to bind a neurotransmitter). This 
property has the stimulus-response essence of a dispositional property and is a central 
neuroscientific property. Or, turning to physics, consider the property of having a mass of 5g. 
Some philosophers have suggested that this property is the susceptibility to be accelerated by 
n cm/s/s by a net force of 5n dynes, for any n.96 This is again a very central physical property 
that many people take to be dispositional.97 These cases indicate that the restriction to non-
dispositional properties is too strong, because, in appealing to this distinction, an emergentist 
will very seriously restrict the properties they can take to be included in the micro-level. 
Furthermore, these dispositional properties aren’t typically collapse-inducing, which 
indicates that the dispositional/non-dispositional distinction doesn’t track the distinction 
between collapse-inducing and non-collapse-inducing properties.  
The restriction to non-dispositional properties is also too permissive, for there are 
some non-dispositional properties that generate collapse objections. Consider, for example, 
the problematic property that generated the collapse objection to Chalmers: being governed 
by the Psycho-Law. Dispositional properties have a stimulus-response essence, but there is no 
stimulus in the case of the property that generated the collapse objection to Chalmers. Hence, 
                                                       
96According to classical physics.   
97 This claim is somewhat controversial, as endorsing it appears to involve endorsing baseless dispositions. Such 
controversy depends on the precise conception of the dispositional/categorical distinction in play, however, and 
so I will leave this question to one side.    
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this is not a dispositional property even though it generates a collapse. Therefore, the 
restriction to non-dispositional properties won’t rule out all of the problem cases.  
3.3 Natural/Non-Natural 
According to many philosophers, some properties are privileged in so far as they 
account for similarity, play a role in causation and the laws of nature and ground other kinds 
of properties.98 These “natural properties” are the categories that really divide up the world, 
and typically those who endorse the idea that there are such properties follow Lewis99 in 
endorsing the idea that there is a spectrum from perfectly natural to non-natural properties, 
rather than a binary distinction between natural and non-natural. Many philosophers have 
appealed to natural properties in response to skeptical problems very similar to the collapse 
objection. Lewis famously appealed to perfectly natural properties to avoid a similar 
skeptical problem for his Best System Account of laws and chances100, and this commitment 
proved invaluable in solving problems across his philosophical system. It might seem that by 
restricting the micro-level properties to natural properties, the emergentist can avoid the 
collapse objection.  
There is significant controversy about what naturalness actually amounts to - whether, 
for example, the natural properties are given to us by all of the sciences, or whether they are 
simply the most fundamental properties.101 The answer to this question will determine just 
how useful the appeal to naturalness will be for an emergentist. The micro-macro distinction 
in cases of emergence is a distinction between more and less fundamental levels rather than 
                                                       
98 See Lewis, D. (1983); Armstrong, D. (1978); Sider, T. (forthcoming) 
99 Lewis, D. (1983)  
100 Lewis, D. (1983) 
101 Schaffer claims that Lewis and Armstrong vacillate between the two in Schaffer, J. (2004) 
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between the most fundamental level and some other level. Therefore, if the natural properties 
appear only in the most fundamental level, then it is impossible for properties to emerge from 
anything other than that level. Let’s again adopt the most charitable interpretation, assuming 
that metaphysically natural properties are given by all of the sciences, and examine the 
strategy of restricting the micro-level properties to the natural properties. 
Even given these concessions, however, there are some problems with the appeal to 
naturalness as a way to solve the collapse problem. First of all, naturalness comes in degrees, 
at least according to Lewis, so we would have to find some point on that spectrum of 
naturalness at which properties are excluded from the micro-level. If we resort to the idea 
that properties are non-natural enough to be ruled out of the micro-level only when they 
generate collapse objections, then this would, of course, be ad hoc. An easy response would 
be to rule out all but the perfectly natural properties. This move does, however, lead to a very 
restrictive result. For the perfectly natural properties, even if they are given to us by all of the 
sciences, presumably form a small group.  
The appeal to natural properties also appears not to track the distinction between 
collapse-inducing and non-collapse-inducing sets of micro-level properties. Consider, for 
example, the Artificial Life case discussed in Section 3. Being alive in the Game of Life and 
being dead in the Game of Life are clearly very important properties of the Game of Life, but 
they do not have that status outside of the Game of Life, which suggests that naturalness per 
se may not be enough to account for the inclusion of such properties among the micro-level 
properties in a case of emergence. Being alive in the Game of Life and being dead in the 
Game of Life may play a role rather like the role that natural properties are thought to play, 
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but only in the very limited context of the Game of Life, whereas metaphysical naturalness is 
a context-independent matter.  
 As well as being too restrictive, the appeal to natural properties is also too 
permissive. Some of the properties that one would need to exclude to avoid collapse 
objections look fairly natural. Consider, for example, the property of being the firing C-fiber 
of a person in great pain. This property is not perfectly natural, but is not completely 
gerrymandered either and would certainly have to be excluded from the set of micro-level 
properties to avoid collapse objections to the claim that properties of qualitative experience 
emerge from neural properties. Chalmers holds that there are irreducible psychophysical laws 
that link facts about the physical world to facts about qualitative experience. He doesn’t go 
into much detail about the role of natural properties in such laws, but perfectly natural 
properties are widely thought to be those that appear in the laws of nature. If this is correct, 
then Chalmers’ view implies that some properties such as being the firing C-fiber of a person 
in great pain will be perfectly natural. Restricting the micro-level properties to only the 
natural properties still lets in too much.  
One might worry that in this discussion we have come perilously close to abandoning 
a useful and important commitment to naturalness, but in response I would point towards the 
very particular nature of the task at hand. We are not at the moment engaging with questions 
about whether or not there are natural properties, whether the universe is fundamentally 
structured, or whether we can limn that structure. Indeed, I am assuming for the sake of 
argument that these things are true. The question at hand is whether or not the philosopher 
who wants to talk about emergence can use the notion of metaphysical naturalness to avoid 
collapse objections. And the answer to that question is no.  
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3.4 Where do these failures leave us? 
 So far we have examined three different metaphysical distinctions between kinds of 
properties, with the aim of establishing whether or not someone who thinks that emergence 
tracks levels of properties in nature could hitch claims about emergence to one of these 
distinctions and thereby avoid the threat posed by the collapse objection. I showed that none 
of these three distinctions tracks the distinction between collapse-inducing and non-collapse-
inducing properties. Of course I have considered only three distinctions, but it seems that no 
metaphysical distinction will do the job.102  
One response to this result is to take it as an argument against the existence of 
emergent properties. On this view, it is more plausible to conclude that there are no emergent 
properties at all than to embrace the idea that emergence can be made to disappear with the 
inclusion of some arbitrary property in amongst the micro-level properties. Denying 
emergence is certainly one way to deal with the collapse problem, but in the chapters to come 
I will explore another, less drastic alternative.  
The collapse problem is surprisingly unifying. Accounts of emergence from very 
different areas of philosophy face the collapse problem. For each purported case of 
emergence, there may be one particular way to “save” that case and seemingly avoid the 
collapse problem. For instance, restricting the micro-level properties so as not to include 
dispositions would avoid the collapse to Bedau’s case of emergence, the halting point of the 
R-Pentomino, and restricting the micro-level base properties to rule out laws would avoid the 
collapse for Chalmers, the case of consciousness. At first glance this fact suggests a way to 
                                                       
102 One approach I haven’t yet considered is Wilson’s account of emergence in terms of eliminations in degrees 
of freedom, in Wilson, J. (2010). I will quickly note that I do not regard a degree of freedom as a purely 
metaphysical restriction – a distinction that can be drawn in the absence of considerations about explanation and 
the goals of investigators. Indeed, I suspect that the degrees of freedom account may end up tracking the 
explanatory considerations I discuss in Section 4.  
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avoid the collapse problem; simply find a way to specify the micro-level property in each 
case such that the emergence does not collapse. Yet this attempt to solve the collapse 
problem only works if we regard emergence as an arbitrary relation, relative to the particular 
way that we choose to restrict the micro-level properties. Without some principled basis on 
which to make such restrictions, and without the promise of a general solution to this general 
problem, rather than an ad-hoc, piecemeal solution, we are committed to a view of 
emergence as held hostage to a particular way of characterizing the relevant micro-level 
properties. The solutions I attempted in Section 3 of this chapter were attempts to find a 
principled basis on which to offer a general solution to the collapse problem by restricting the 
micro-level properties in cases of emergence, and as we saw, none of these solutions worked.  
One might be tempted to think that embracing this result involves embracing the idea 
that emergence is an uninteresting and arbitrary relation, but in the next Chapter I will argue 
that this is not the case. According to the solution I will now offer to the collapse problem, 
emergence tracks the availability and unavailability of certain scientific explanations.  
  
 
Chapter 3: An Appeal to Explanation 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
In this chapter, I will defend a novel condition for emergence, the explanation 
condition, and I will argue that this condition provides resources for a solution to the collapse 
problem. A collapse-inducing property appears to make a purportedly emergent macro-level 
property non-emergent. I will show that the presence of a collapse-inducing property is not 
enough to render some property non-emergent. Of course, the property in question may still 
turn out to be emergent, or non-emergent. I aim simply to show that a collapse objection 
doesn’t settle the matter either way.  
I will begin, in Section 2, by outlining the conceptual connection between emergence 
and explanation, and codifying that connection into the explanation condition for emergence. 
In Section 3 I will introduce a minimal constraint on scientific explanation, based on the 
intuition that facts cannot explain themselves. In Section 4 I will combine these resources to 
offer a solution to the collapse problem. In Section 5 I will explore the motivation for and 
implications of the appeal to perspectives brought in by the association between emergence 
and explanation.  
 
Section 2: Emergence and Explanation 
Emergence is typically presented as one way in which properties of different levels 
may be related. For example, in debates in philosophy of mind that focus on the relationship 
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between neuroscientific properties and the properties of qualitative experience, emergence is 
an option, a way in which the levels may turn out to be related. This option, I will now argue, 
specifically tracks the availability or otherwise of certain kinds of scientific explanation. In 
this section I will explicate this connection between emergence and explanation, before 
codifying the connection into the “explanation condition” for emergence.  
Many authors are committed to the idea that emergence is associated with the 
unavailability of explanations. For example, Hempel and Oppenheim offer an account of 
emergence, and they say of this account: “If the assertion that life and mind have an 
emergent status is interpreted in this sense, then its import can be summarized approximately 
by the statement that no explanation, in terms of micro-structure theories, is available at 
present for large classes of phenomena studied in biology and psychology.”103 Chalmers 
explicitly ties emergence to failure of a priori reductive explanation. According to Jackson 
and Chalmers, failure of a priori reductive explanation is failure of a priori entailment, and 
the facts about emergent macro-level phenomena are not a priori entailed by the facts about 
their micro-level bases.104 Finally, Kim describes the conceptual connection between 
emergence and explanation: “the concept of explanation is invoked in the claim that 
emergent phenomena or properties, unlike those that are merely “resultant”, are not 
explainable, or reductively explainable, on the basis of their “basal conditions”, the lower-
level conditions out of which they emerge.”105 
                                                       
103 Hempel, C. & Oppenheim, P. (1965) pg 65 
104 Jackson, F. and Chalmers, D. (2001)  
105 Kim, J. (1999) pg 6 
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Furthermore, in most purported cases of emergence, an attempt at a scientific 
explanation of the relevant kind has failed. For example, consider the decline of British 
Emergentism, which I discussed briefly in Chapter 1. The British Emergentists, including 
C.D. Broad, thought that chemical properties emerged from physical properties. The advent 
of new physical models of chemical bonding, however, showed them to be wrong. As 
McLaughlin puts it, “... quantum mechanical explanations of chemical bonding in terms of 
electro-magnetism, and various advances this made possible in molecular biology and 
genetics... made the main doctrines of British Emergentism, so far as the chemical and 
biological are concerned at least, seem enormously implausible.”106 In this case, the British 
Emergentists were shown to be wrong about certain cases of emergence because of a new 
explanation of chemical bonding. This connection between emergence and explanation is 
manifest in the work of authors such as Chalmers, Bedau, Hempel & Oppenheim, Silberstein 
& McGeever, Kim and Wilson, all of whom present purported cases of emergence as 
tracking the success and failure of attempts at explanation.107 
These facts about the literature provide evidence for the idea that emergence is 
conceptually tied to the absence of (at least certain kinds of) explanations. In the rest of this 
section, I will codify this connection into a condition for emergence, “the explanation 
condition”. I will argue that, in addition to capturing the conceptual connection between 
emergence and explanation, the explanation condition will provide resources for a solution to 
the collapse problem.  
                                                       
106 McLaughlin, B. (1992) pg 23 
107 Silberstein, M. & McGeever, J. (1999); Kim, J. (1999); Wilson, J. (forthcoming) 
  
 
59 
I propose a condition for emergence (“the explanation condition”) that captures the 
connection between emergence and explanation. I will start by simply stating the condition, 
and then go on to examine and defend its particular features in greater detail.  
Where macro-level property “p” is a property of some whole, and parts A, B, C... n 
are parts of that whole, and where the distinction between whole and parts should be 
understood loosely, such that any version of the micro- macro distinction discussed in 
Chapter 1 could correspond to the part-whole distinction, the explanation condition states the 
following: 
A macro-level property p possessed by whole made up of components A, B, C ... n in 
relation r is emergent iff there is no available explanation of the fact that the 
following regularity obtains of natural necessity: Whenever components A, B and C... 
n are combined in relation r, the resulting whole instantiates property p.  
 
According to the explanation condition, emergence is relative to a part-whole 
relation. For example, the property of water-solubility may be emergent relative to the part-
whole relation borne by sodium and chlorine to sodium chloride, but not emergent relative to 
the part-whole relation borne by carbon, hydrogen and oxygen to sucrose. A property is not, 
according to this condition, emergent per se, but is instead emergent relative to a 
specification of the relevant parts and wholes and their relations. This feature may generate 
an immediate concern that this position allows for cases of emergence relative to problematic 
conceptions of the part-whole relation, according to which we can simply generate cases of 
emergence by picking out the parts in a particular way. I will put this concern to one side for 
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the moment, but later on in this section and in Chapters 4 and 5 I will argue that this feature 
does not pose a problem.  
To explicate this proposal, I will now specify 1) Why this explanandum?  2) What is 
meant by “explanation”? 3) What is meant by “available”?  
Applying this proposal to the three accounts of emergence examined earlier, from 
Broad, Bedau and Chalmers, will illustrate exactly what I take the explanandum to be in 
these particular cases. I will start with Broad’s account applied to the case of the water-
solubility of sodium chloride. According to my proposal, if water-solubility is an emergent 
property, then there is no explanation available of the natural necessity Whenever sodium and 
chlorine are combined into sodium chloride, the resulting compound is soluble in water. 
Turning to Bedau, if having a halting point of 1103 generations is an emergent property, then 
there is no explanation available of the natural necessity that Whenever five individual filled 
cells are combined into an R-Pentomino, the resulting configuration halts at 1103 
generations. And finally, let’s use the example of properties of qualitative experience when 
applying my proposal to Chalmers. This is slightly more complicated than the other cases, 
because Chalmers doesn’t defend any particular instance of the claim that properties of 
qualitative experience emerge from fundamental physical properties. I will take a person, 
Jim, who is experiencing red and is in physical state P, as the object of our enquiry. If Jim’s 
experience of redness is emergent, then there is no explanation available of the natural 
necessity Whenever micro-physical entities are combined together into P, Jim experiences 
red.  
Why, then, should we take this to be the explanandum? First of all, as we can see 
from the cases above, this proposal fits all the cases we have considered in so far as I have 
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offered reasonable contenders for the explanandum in each of these cases. Secondly, the 
concept of emergence picks out one way in which some micro-level properties and one 
particular macro-level property may be related. The question we are asking when we are 
investigating whether or not some property is emergent is why it is that when a group of 
micro-level entities are combined into a macro-level entity, that macro-level entity 
instantiates a certain property. This feature is captured in the general form of the 
explanandum I have offered. 
It is also important to note, as I mentioned before, that the component-whole relation 
should be understood very loosely, simply in terms of whatever bears the micro and macro- 
level properties respectively in this particular purported case of emergence. This openness 
allows the explanation condition to capture a wider range of different cases of emergence 
than would be permitted by a stricter interpretation of the component-whole distinction. For 
example, if we adopt an interpretation of the component-whole distinction according to 
which the components must be object-like pieces that compose a larger object-like whole, 
rather like a jigsaw puzzle or the pieces of a watch, then we have to exclude as potential 
emergents a wide variety of purported cases of emergence that don’t fit this profile, such as 
properties of systems that don’t decompose neatly into object-like parts, or the virtual objects 
involved in Artificial Life cases. Rather than impose restrictions on the part-whole relation 
which would bring with them major restrictions on the kinds of cases of emergence that can 
obtain, I will leave the part-whole specification and relation quite open, so we can encompass 
the wide range of different purported cases of emergence and versions of the part-whole 
relation discussed in Chapter 1.  
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I haven’t yet accounted for the fact that the explanandum involves a natural necessity. 
Why should we take the explanandum to be the fact that this regularity obtains of natural 
necessity, rather than as a matter of fact? In response, I would point out that natural 
necessities are counterfactually stable, non-accidental and therefore more explanatorily 
potent than other generalizations about relationships between levels in nature, and this partly 
accounts for their being the objects of interest in investigations between levels in nature. 
When investigating relations between levels in nature, we are interested in the question of 
why, given the laws of nature, a certain macro-level property is instantiated when a group of 
micro-level entities are gathered together. This is reflected in the fact that, as I discussed in 
Chapter 1, some authors argue that supervenience is necessary for emergence.108 I hold that 
the right way to conceive of this supervenience relation is as supervenience with respect to 
the laws of nature, or nomological supervenience. Of course, those who don’t recognize a 
distinction between natural and other kinds of necessity wouldn’t use an appeal to natural 
necessities to capture this feature, and so later on in this chapter I will discuss alternative 
versions of the explanation condition which don’t make appeals to a distinction between 
natural and other kinds of necessity.  
I also wish to leave room for the idea that there may be micro-macro laws that govern 
the relationship between whole and components, as both Broad and Chalmers, among others, 
have claimed. That there is a micro-macro law would explain the fact that the relation holds, 
which undermines the conceptual connection between emergence and explanation for which, 
I will argue, we have substantial evidence. If we take that evidence seriously, as I will argue 
                                                       
108 See e.g. Crane (2001) 
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we should, then we should take the relevant explanandum to be a natural necessity rather 
than a mere generalization. 
I have of course helped myself to the notion of natural necessity, and the idea that 
there is a distinction between logical and natural necessity. I will continue to adopt this 
framework for ease of exposition, but after presenting my solution to the collapse problem I 
will argue that neither the explanation condition for emergence nor my solution to the 
collapse problem depend on these resources. Someone who, for example, thinks that 
necessity is exhausted by metaphysical necessity could still endorse the explanation 
condition and my solution to the collapse problem. I will return to this point in Section 4.   
I will now move on to address the question of what is meant by “explanation” in 
“explanation condition”. There are many different sorts of scientific explanation associated 
with emergence. For instance, Stephan associates emergence with the failure of mechanistic 
explanation109, Bonabeau and Therelautz associate emergence with the need for a new model 
of the relevant phenomenon110, Chalmers and Jackson argue that emergence involves the 
unavailability of a priori reductive explanation111 and Bedau takes underivability except by 
simulation to be associated with the unavailability of what he calls “micro-level 
explanation”112.  A reasonable way to take this variation into account is to acknowledge that 
the relevant kind of scientific explanation may vary depending on who is conducting such 
investigation. For instance, one investigator may be interested in an explanation that involves 
                                                       
109 Stephan, A. (2006) 
110 in Langton, C. (1995) 
111 Chalmers, D. and Jackson, F. (2001) 
112 Bedau, M. (2003) 
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a particular kind of model, which another may be interested in an explanation that involves 
decomposing a mechanism.  
The driving force behind this idea is recognition of the fact that different sciences, 
and different ways of practicing those sciences, are associated with different kinds of 
explanation. Before expanding on this point, it is important to note that a “kind” of scientific 
explanation is different from a “conception” of scientific explanation. A kind of scientific 
explanation is simply one of the sorts of explanations offered in science, while a conception 
of scientific explanation is a characterization of the general role that explanation plays. An 
example of a conception of scientific explanation is Salmon’s “ontic” conception113 
according to which scientific explanations aim to uncover objective causal relations among 
events. One may admit many different kinds of scientific explanation while maintaining that 
there is only one accurate conception of scientific explanation, and this discussion will not 
assume a particular conception of scientific explanation. To say, then, that the relevant kind 
of explanation differs depending on who is conducting the investigation, is not to say that the 
relevant conception will differ.  
Many different kinds of explanation are associated with different areas of scientific 
enquiry. For example, some have argued that neuroscience proceeds through the uncovering 
of mechanisms114, whereas different approaches to cognitive science are associated with 
different explanatory styles, including computational, connectionist and dynamicist 
explanations.115 Idealized models, some argue, play a major role in chemical explanation.116 
                                                       
113 Salmon, W. (1989) pg 120-121 
114 Craver, C. (2007) 
115 See Bechtel, W. & Abrahamsen, A. (2002) 
116 Weisberg, M. (2011) 
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Some economists devote themselves to offering explanations of economic phenomena in 
terms of the rational choices of individuals, while other economists choose to focus on 
causal, rather than rational-choice, models.117 These cases all give us reason to think that the 
kind of explanation an investigation aims at will differ across, and often also within, different 
areas of science, even if we adopt a view according to which there is only one correct 
conception of scientific explanation.  
Depending on the kind of investigation at hand, the kind of explanation that the 
investigation aims at will differ. To explicate this idea, I will introduce a “perspective” as a 
catchall term for the point of view of a particular observer. Having done so, we can express 
the current proposal as the idea that the relevant notion of explanation will vary across 
different perspectives, depending on the kind of investigation that the relevant observers are 
undertaking. It follows that what it takes for some macro-level property to be emergent from 
some micro-level properties will differ from perspective to perspective.118  
One response to this strategy is to argue that it would be preferable to specify an exact 
kind of scientific explanation that is associated with emergence, rather than allow for this 
kind of variation across perspectives that, as I will discuss later, has major metaphysical 
implications. Sadly, however, this is unsuccessful. The collapse problem affects almost all 
accounts of emergence, and yet those accounts involve very different notions of scientific 
explanation. To adopt a connection between emergence and explanation based on only one 
kind of scientific explanation would not offer a general solution to the collapse problem, 
whereas the solution that permits variation across perspectives does. Furthermore, 
                                                       
117 Hoover, K. (2001); Becker, G. (1962) 
118 In Chapter 5 I will discuss the idea of “perspective” in more detail. For the moment I will simply take this to 
mean “the point of view of a particular observer”.  
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understanding emergence as relative to only one kind of explanation presupposes not just a 
clear definition of scientific explanation, but also an argument for one particular form being 
privileged. Neither of these is a desirable requirement on an account of emergence, whereas 
the appeal to variation across perspectives offers a simple, universal solution to the collapse 
problem, making only minimal assumptions about the nature of scientific explanation.  A 
critic may still worry about the idea that a property’s “emergent” status is dependent upon a 
perspective, but in Chapters 4 and 5 I will argue that a concept of emergence as relative to a 
perspective not only offers a general solution to the collapse problem, but also offers a 
unified and naturalistic account of emergence.  
Having proposed that when a given macro-level property is emergent, a certain 
scientific explanation is unavailable, we now face the question of what it is for an 
explanation to be “unavailable”. I propose that what counts as availability may also vary 
across perspectives, depending on factors such as, for example, the number of people 
involved in an investigation and their interests. For example, from one perspective, an 
explanation may be thought to be unavailable if many scientists have made sustained efforts 
to formulate such an explanation and have been unsuccessful. From another perspective, the 
standard may be different, such that an explanation is unavailable only if it is impossible for 
someone in an ideal epistemic position to formulate one. Again, the notion of “perspective” 
captures the very simple idea that different observers may adopt very different standards, 
depending on their goals, background knowledge and so on, although multiple observers may 
well share standards for unavailability as well as for explanation. I will return to a fuller 
discussion of this point, and the appeal to perspectives in this account of emergence more 
generally, in Section 5 of this chapter and in Chapters 4 and 5.  
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Earlier in this section, I argued that a good reason to endorse the explanation 
condition for emergence is that we already do endorse a conceptual connection between 
emergence and the unavailability of explanations. I will now offer a further argument for the 
position that we should endorse the explanation condition, because doing so not only respects 
the practice of using the concept of emergence to track the availability of certain kinds of 
explanation, but also offers a solution to the collapse problem.  
 
Section 3: A Minimal Condition for Explanation 
In this section I will present a minimal condition for scientific explanation that 
applies to almost all philosophical accounts of scientific explanation, and is intended to 
capture the very basic idea that facts cannot explain themselves. In this section, I intend to 
use the intuition that facts cannot explain themselves to motivate a restriction on whether or 
not any two sentences can stand in the relationship of explanans to explanandum. The idea 
behind this strategy is that, although it may be simple to say that facts cannot explain 
themselves, it is more difficult to say what it is for two sentences to have the same facts as 
their content. Accordingly I will attempt to formulate a necessary condition for two sentences 
to stand in the relation of explanans to explanandum, based on how factually close those 
sentences are to one another, that doesn’t involve an account of what it is for two sentences 
to have the same factual content.119 This minimal condition for explanation, combined with 
the explanation condition for emergence, will enable me to offer a solution to the collapse 
problem.  
                                                       
119 For the sake of convenience I will assume that one sentence can explain another, but very little hangs on this 
locution. These claims could be translated into talk of facts or propositions instead. 
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As an introduction to the idea that facts cannot explain themselves, consider the fact 
that bare repetitions of an explanandum statement are universally recognized as failing to 
explain. Let’s take as an example the situation of a cat, Lucy, who has fleas. Lucy’s owner 
wants an explanation of the fact that Lucy has fleas, and so he takes Lucy to the vet. 
Obviously, if the vet offers “Lucy has fleas” as an explanation of the fact that Lucy has fleas, 
then something has gone wrong. Something has gone similarly wrong if the vet offers “Lucy 
has the property of having fleas” as an explanation of the fact that Lucy has fleas. In the 
second case the vet’s attempt at explanation is not quite identical to the explanandum, but 
still doesn’t offer enough to be a contender for an explanation. What Lucy’s owner is looking 
for from the vet is something like “the brand of flea treatment you have been using is 
inferior” or “Lucy has had contact with a flea-ridden cat and fleas spread”. Of course, there 
may be many ways in which an attempt at explanation in such a context can go wrong, not in 
virtue of failing to be an explanation but instead in virtue of being the wrong sort of 
explanation. For example, suppose (improbably!) that in response to the question “Why does 
Lucy have fleas?” the vet starts by describing the Big Bang, the cooling of the Earth, the 
process of evolution and so on. The vet’s response would typically be inappropriate not 
because it fails to explain why Lucy has fleas, but because it is not the sort of explanation 
that is relevant in this context. I am interested only in those attempts at explanation that fail 
because they are in some sense factually too close to the explanandum.  
Hempel and Oppenheim considered a phenomenon very close to this case, in which 
an attempt at explanation fails because the explanans is too close to the explanandum: the 
problem of ‘self-explanation’. They consider a case of attempted explanation in which one 
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premise in the explanans contains a proposition that is replicated in the explanandum, as 
follows: 
Consider the sentences T1 = ‘(x)[P(x) ⊃ Q(x)]’, C1 = ‘R(a, b) ⋅ P(a)’, E1 = ‘R(a, b)’ 
… it seems counterintuitive to say that (T1, C1) potentially explains E1 because the 
occurrence of the component ‘R(a, b)’ C1 in the sentence E1 amounts to a partial 
explanation of the explanandum by itself.120 
 
Hempel and Oppenheim consider some attempts to avoid cases that involve the 
problem of self-explanation, but argue that none of these attempts succeed121, and leave the 
problem of self-explanation, in their terms, ‘unsolved’. Self-explanation is an example of the 
phenomenon whereby an attempt at explanation fails because the explanans and 
explanandum are factually “too close” for one to explain the other.  
Another intuitive constraint on explanation, related to the idea that facts cannot 
explain themselves, is the constraint that the relation between explanans and explanandum 
should not be symmetric. The basic idea here is that an explanans and explanandum cannot 
switch roles, because the explanation relation is intuitively asymmetric. To introduce this 
idea, I will briefly describe Hempel and Oppenheim’s Deductive-Nomological model of 
scientific explanation and some counterexamples to it, which illustrate the idea that 
explanation is asymmetric. 
According to Hempel and Oppenheim, for some explanans to offer a D-N explanation 
of an explanandum, the following must be true: 
i) The explanans must constitute a valid deductive argument for the explanandum 
                                                       
120 Hempel, C. & Oppenheim, P. (1948) pg 29 
121 Though they do argue that the purported explanation above shouldn’t count as an explanation because the 
law T is dispensable to the deductive argument. See the rough version of the D-N model which I discuss on pg 
70.  
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ii) The explanans must include a law of nature as an essential premise of the 
deductive argument, such that if the premise were excluded, the deduction would 
not go through.  
iii) The explanans must include empirical content.  
iv) The premises in the explanans must be true.  
We should note that the D-N model offered by Hempel and Oppenheim is far more precise. 
What I have offered here is more a characterization of the explicandum that the D-N model 
aims at, rather than the model itself, but it is sufficiently detailed for our purposes. There are 
also a number of qualifications to note for even this rough characterization, including a 
number of restrictions on what can count as a law of nature, or “lawlike statement”, and the 
restriction that the explanandum cannot itself be a general or lawlike statement. These details 
aren’t, however, essential to the current discussion.122  
There is a large body of literature responding to the D-N model, including some 
striking counterexamples. One particular set of counterexamples is interesting for our 
purposes, those generated by the intuition that in cases of successful explanation the relation 
between explanans and explanandum is asymmetric. The most famous of these 
counterexamples is the case of the flagpole and the shadow.123 We can construct a successful 
D-N explanation in which the length of the shadow cast by a flagpole is explained by the 
length of the flagpole, combined with the position of the sun and geometrical laws. However, 
we can also construct an attempt at explanation that meets conditions of the D-N model but is 
intuitively not an explanation, in which the length of the shadow, combined with the location 
                                                       
122 Details on where we can find that discussion in H&O.  
123 Originally formulated by Bromberger although the specific flagpole case never appeared in his publications. 
Cases of a similar sort appear in Bromberger, S. (1966).  
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of the sun and the laws of geometry, explains the length of the flagpole. This is a 
counterexample to the D-N model because the length of the shadow intuitively does not 
explain the height of the flagpole. The difficulties posed by the tower-flagpole case aren’t 
exhausted by the fact that it presents explanation as symmetric, but this is arguably part of 
the problem with this case.  
Responses to these counterexamples vary. Van Fraassen famously described a case in 
which the length of the shadow does explain the height of (in his case) a tower because the 
person who built the tower took pains to ensure that it would cast a shadow on a precise 
spot.124 This appeal to context didn’t, however, undermine the general idea that the relation 
between explanans and explanandum is asymmetric. In Van Fraasens’s case, it is not simply 
the length of the shadow that explains the height of the tower, but the length of the shadow 
combined with some other facts about the builder’s intentions, none of which would be 
explained by the height of the tower. Furthermore, some have argued that what is 
problematic about the tower-flagpole case is not the fact that it doesn’t respect the necessary 
asymmetry of the relation between explanans and explanandum, but rather that in this 
particular case the length of the shadow does not explain the height of the flagpole because 
it’s not the kind of feature that could enter into the causal history of the height of the flagpole 
(except, perhaps, in an outré situation of the sort described by Van Fraassen). As I mentioned 
before, I don’t take the difficulties posed by the tower-flagpole case to be exhausted by the 
symmetry of the relation between purported explanans and explanandum, but I do take this 
case to illustrate the intuition that this relation is asymmetric. The restriction on explanation I 
am about to propose will rule out many cases where the relation between explanans and 
                                                       
124 For rather dramatic reasons. See Van Fraassen, B. (1980) pg 134.  
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explanandum is symmetric, and so these facts about the asymmetry of explanation provide 
some further motivation for that restriction.    
I will now propose a necessary condition for explanation that captures the fact that 
sometimes two sentences are factually “too close” for one to explain the other, and will also 
go some way towards capturing the idea that the explanans-explanandum relation is 
asymmetric.  
Let us say that two sentences are “factually equivalent” iff there is no metaphysically 
possible world in which one sentence is true and the other false.125 So, for instance, “all 
ravens are black” and “all non-black things are non-ravens” are factually equivalent. “Lucy 
has fleas” and “Lucy has the property of having fleas” are factually equivalent, as are “Lucy 
has fleas” and “Lucy has fleas and 2+2=4”, but “Lucy has fleas” and “Lucy’s owner has 
been using inferior flea powder” are not factually equivalent. I propose that no explanandum 
can be explained by a sentence to which it is factually equivalent. This “factual non-
equivalence” condition is a minimal constraint on explanation, as obviously it takes far more 
for one sentence to explain an explanandum than for that sentence to be factually non-
equivalent to that explanandum. But the factual non-equivalence condition successfully 
captures the intuition that facts cannot explain themselves. 
Although the factual non-equivalence condition applies across almost all accounts of 
scientific explanation, there is an important class of exceptions, which I will take a moment 
to identify before setting aside. In any case in which the explanandum is metaphysically 
necessary, no attempt at explanation will meet the factual non-equivalence condition. If we 
                                                       
125 I say “metaphysically possible” rather than “logically possible” because using logical possibility as a 
criterion fails to rule out many cases in which the purported explanans and explanandum are too close for one to 
explain the other. For example, “water is able to put out fires” and “h2o is able to put out fires” are not far 
enough apart for either to explain the other, and yet a restriction based on logical possibility wouldn’t rule this 
case out.  
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wish to permit explanations of metaphysical necessities, as we should, then we must 
acknowledge that this class of cases is an exception to the factual non-equivalence condition. 
Examples of such cases include explanations in mathematics and certain kinds of theological 
explanation (where the explanandum is a fact about God and as such is metaphysically 
necessary). For the purposes of this discussion, however, I will put such cases to one side.  
It is important to note that the factual non-equivalence condition is a biconditional. 
Without this feature, any explanation involving deduction, including classic models of 
scientific explanation such as the D-N model, would not count as scientific explanations. As 
it stands, D-N explanations involve a conditional, but not a biconditional, such that there are 
metaphysically possible worlds in which the explanandum is true and yet the premises in the 
explanans are false. These include possible worlds in which the laws of nature are different, 
or in which the same result is reached via the same laws from different empirical starting 
points, such that the “empirical content” in the explanans would be false. The factual non-
equivalence condition permits explanations involving deduction, and only rules out as 
explanations those cases in which there is no metaphysically possible world in which one of 
the sentences (explanans or explanandum) is true and the other false.  
There is another group of seeming counterexamples to the factual non-equivalence 
condition that we must handle with caution, those cases in which a conceptual truth appears 
to offer an explanation. For example, consider the case of a scientist in a lab who is faced 
with a clear, colorless liquid in a test-tube. The scientist knows that this liquid is called 
“water”, and he wishes to know why the liquid’s meniscus forms a particular curve.126 The 
scientist’s colleague, watching him puzzle over this case, informs the scientist that “Water is 
                                                       
126 Thanks to Ram Neta for this case.  
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H2O”. The scientist knows all about H2O, and so now has an explanation for the particular 
shape of the meniscus. It seems in this case that an explanation is provided by a conceptual 
truth127, and hence generates a counterexample to the factual non-equivalence condition for 
explanation. In response to this case, we should first of all note that if the explanandum is 
contingent then the factual non-equivalence condition is still met. More importantly, 
however, I would argue that in this case the conceptual truth provides access to an 
explanation that has otherwise contingent content, and that in other similar cases, a 
conceptual truth may form part of an explanation that is otherwise contingent. Such cases 
will still meet the factual non-equivalence condition, as only cases in which the explanandum 
is metaphysically necessary generate counterexamples to the factual non-equivalence 
condition. These are the cases that I have identified and set aside, and the considerations 
surveyed in the previous paragraphs indicate that this is a fairly small group, made up most 
notably of mathematical and theological explanations.  
 
Section 4: A solution to the collapse problem  
So far we have established “the explanation condition” for emergence: A macro-level 
property p possessed by whole made up of components A, B, C ... n in relation r is emergent 
iff there is no available explanation of the fact that the following regularity obtains of natural 
necessity: Whenever components A, B and C... n are combined in relation r, the resulting 
whole instantiates property p. We have also established the “factual non-equivalence” 
condition for explanation: that one sentence cannot explain another factually equivalent to it. 
                                                       
127 We need not regard water= H2O as a conceptual truth to recognise the force of the problem. Recognising 
water=H2O as a metaphysical truth generates a similar counterexample.  
  
 
75 
We are now in a position to return to the collapse objection and assess the resources that 
these findings offer for solving the collapse problem.  
A collapse objection is a challenge to the position that some macro-level property is 
emergent. The presence of a collapse-inducing property supposedly makes the purported 
emergent no longer meet a necessary condition for emergent autonomy. If a collapse-
inducing property is enough to make the relevant macro-level property non-emergent, then 
according to the explanation condition for emergence, a collapse-inducing property must 
provide resources for an explanation of the relevant regularity. A “collapse account” is an 
attempt at explanation based on a collapse-inducing property. In this section I will show that 
any collapse account fails to meet the factual non-equivalence condition for explanation, and 
so a collapse-inducing property is not enough to make the relevant macro-level property non-
emergent.  
I will begin by examining some familiar cases before stating this claim in a general 
form. In the case of Broad, the explanandum is the fact that the following regularity obtains 
of natural necessity: Whenever sodium and chlorine are combined into sodium chloride, the 
resulting compound is soluble in water.  The collapse objection to the claim that solubility is 
an emergent property invokes the fact that sodium has the property of generating a 
compound that is soluble in water when combined with chlorine into sodium chloride.128 This 
property provides resources for the following collapse account: Sodium has (of natural 
necessity) the property of generating a compound that is soluble in water when combined 
with chlorine into sodium chloride, and that is why it is naturally necessary that whenever 
sodium and chlorine are combined into sodium chloride, the resulting compound is soluble in 
                                                       
128 Where, as in the original collapse objection, this disposition manifests itself of natural necessity in response 
to stimulus conditions.  
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water. As we can immediately see, the collapse account fails because the purported 
explanans is factually equivalent to the explanandum. 
In the case of Bedau, the explanandum is the fact that the following regularity obtains 
of natural necessity: Whenever five filled cells are combined into an R-Pentomino, the 
resulting configuration halts at 1103 generations. The property invoked in the collapse 
objection to Bedau is each individual filled cell’s property of forming a configuration whose 
development halts at 1103 generations when combined with other cells into an R-
Pentomino.129 This property provides resources for the following collapse account: Each 
filled cell has the property of generating a configuration that halts at 1103 generations when 
combined with four other filled cells into an R-Pentomino, and that is why it is naturally 
necessary that whenever five filled cells are combined into an R-Pentomino, the resulting 
configuration halts at 1103 generations. Again, the purported explanans is factually 
equivalent to the explanandum, and so the collapse account fails. 
Finally, in the case of Chalmers, again taking Jim as our example, the explanandum is 
the fact that the following regularity obtains of natural necessity: Whenever microphysical 
entities are combined together into P, Jim experiences red. In Chalmers’ case, the 
fundamental physical entities have the property of being governed by the Psycho-Law, where 
the Psycho-law is the psychophysical law that governs the relationship between the 
fundamental physical facts about Jim and Jim’s qualitative experience. This property 
provides resources for the following collapse account: Each micro-physical entity has the 
property of generating a whole that experiences redness when combined with other micro-
physical entities into configuration P, in virtue of being governed by the Psycho-law, and 
                                                       
129 Again, where this disposition manifests itself of natural necessity in response to stimulus conditions.  
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that is why it is naturally necessary that whenever micro-physical entities are combined 
together into P, Jim experiences red. Again, the purported explanans is factually equivalent 
to the explanandum, and so the collapse account fails.130  
In each of these cases, we can see that the purported explanans offered in the collapse 
account is factually equivalent to the relevant explanandum. This shouldn’t be surprising, 
when we consider that the general form of the explanandum is that the following regularity 
obtains of natural necessity: Whenever components A, B and C are combined in relation r, 
the resulting whole instantiates property p. The general form of the collapse account is 
Component A has the property of forming a whole that instantiates property p when 
combined in relation r with parts B and C. The presence of a collapse-inducing property 
doesn’t provide resources for an explanation, but merely for a sentence that is factually 
equivalent to the relevant explanandum. A collapse account is rather like the vet’s statement 
that “Lucy has the property of having fleas”. It fails as an explanation in virtue of being 
factually too close to the explanandum.  
On reflection, we can see that this result accords with a common, intuitive response to 
collapse objections. After presenting collapse objections to Broad, Bedau and Chalmers in 
Section 2, I mentioned that a standard response to the collapse objection is something along 
the lines of “that’s cheating” or “that’s clearly not what the author meant”. The collapse 
objections generate dissatisfaction, and the connection between emergence and explanation 
reveals why this is the case. We use the concept of emergence to track the availability or 
                                                       
130 This result depends on how we conceive of the Psycho-law. If it is understood as the general law that 
governs the relationship between qualitative experience and consciousness, rather than a particular law 
governing P and Jim’s experience of redness, then these two statements are not factually equivalent. In this 
case, however, the corresponding general statements will be factually equivalent. (Whenever micro-physical 
properties are instantiated conscious properties are instantiated, in virtue of being governed by the Psycho-
Law, and that is why it is naturally necessary that whenever micro-physical properties are instantiated 
conscious properties are instantiated.) 
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otherwise of explanations, and collapse objections simply bypass that explanatory work. A 
collapse objection is an attempt to establish “on the cheap” that some property is non-
emergent, and so it makes perfect sense to regard collapse objections as illegitimate. 
I have now argued for a condition for emergence and a necessary condition for 
explanation, and have demonstrated that collapse accounts (attempts at explanation based on 
collapse-inducing properties) don’t meet the necessary condition for explanation.  My 
conclusion (from the condition for emergence) is that a collapse-inducing property is not 
enough to make a given macro-level property non-emergent. Of course, the failure of the 
collapse objection does not show that the relevant property is emergent. Rather, it shows that 
a collapse-inducing property cannot decide the matter either way.   
Let’s return to the case of Broad to see my approach in action, using the simple case 
of sodium chloride for illustration. Imagine that we are examining the elements sodium and 
chlorine and the compound sodium chloride, and investigating whether sodium chloride’s 
water-solubility is an emergent property. On my view, the collapse-inducing property 
remains one of the micro-level properties; sodium still has the property generates a 
compound that is soluble in water when combined with chlorine into sodium chloride. 
However, because of the explanation condition for emergence, sodium’s possessing this 
property is not enough to make sodium chloride’s water-solubility non-emergent. What 
would be enough would be for an explanation of the relevant sort to become available.131 In 
this way the collapse problem is blocked by the explanation condition for emergence.  
The results of this section, in addition to providing a solution to the collapse problem, 
also provide some insight into the failure of the strategies attempted in earlier chapters. In 
                                                       
131 And, as a historical note, this was what happened. Physical explanations of chemical bonding revealed the 
British Emergentists to be wrong. See McLaughlin, B. (1992)  
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Chapter 2, I examined various attempts to restrict the micro-level properties in purported 
cases of emergence (to intrinsic, or non-dispositional, or natural properties). None of these 
attempts worked, and now we can see why. These metaphysical distinctions failed to pick out 
what is really important about emergence: the availability or otherwise of scientific 
explanations. Rather than attempt to eliminate collapse-inducing properties from the micro-
level bases of purported emergents, my approach has left them there but rendered them 
harmless.  
In Section 2 I mentioned that, although my solution to the collapse problem 
presupposes that metaphysical, logical and nomological necessity are distinct, we needn’t 
endorse this view in order to adopt my solution to the collapse problem. This solution can be 
tweaked to fit a framework in which, for example, modality is exhausted by metaphysical 
modality. In such a case we could, for example, and depending on the framework, stipulate 
that both the explanandum and the collapse account are metaphysically contingent but still 
factually equivalent to each other. Or that both are metaphysical necessities, in which case 
they would of course be factually equivalent. Similar tweaks can be made for alternative 
modal frameworks depending on the details of the case at hand, and so this solution to the 
collapse problem doesn’t depend on a particular modal framework. 
 
Section 5: The perspectival move 
According to the explanation condition for emergence, if a macro-level property p is 
emergent, then there is no available explanation of the fact that the following regularity 
obtains of natural necessity: Whenever components A, B, C… n are combined in relation r, 
the resulting whole instantiates property p. I argued in Section 3 that the relevant kind of 
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explanation and notion of availability will differ across different perspectives, and so what it 
takes to meet the explanation condition will vary across perspectives. This means that a 
property’s emergence is relative to a perspective; a property that is emergent from one 
perspective may not be emergent from another. 
As I mentioned before, an immediate response to this strategy is to argue that a 
certain type of scientific explanation is privileged, and hence avoid the appeal to 
perspectives. I have already argued against this particular move, but I will now consider 
another strategy of a similar sort. One could simply take all of the different kinds of scientific 
explanation to which emergence is relative, as a disjunction, and then say that emergence is 
relative to the disjunction, thereby again avoiding the appeal to perspectives. This may at first 
seem like a plausible strategy, but my reasons for not taking it are similar to my not arguing 
for a particular form of explanation being privileged. The basic problem is that, within many 
different discourses about emergence, it is very important that the absent explanation is of a 
particular type. For example, in the famous case of the “explanatory gap” in philosophy of 
mind, to the philosopher looking for an a priori reductive explanation, a mechanistic 
explanation won’t do, and the availability of such an explanation won’t render the relevant 
property non-emergent. I will examine this case in some detail in Chapter 4, but for the 
meantime we can note that much of the debate over the explanatory gap is conducted over 
whether mechanistic, neuroscientific explanations of conscious experience are ‘enough’ to 
close the explanatory gap (in my times, render this phenomenon non-emergent) or whether 
the only kind of explanation that can do so is an a priori reductive explanation. This is a case 
in which the absence of a particular kind of explanation is important, and not just the absence 
of some kind of explanation. 
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Earlier, in Section 3 of this Chapter, I argued that different areas of scientific practice 
are associated with different kinds of explanation. The phenomenon I am pointing towards 
now is a simple corollary of this commitment. If different areas of scientific practice are 
associated with different kinds of explanation, and the concept of emergence appears across 
these different areas, then we should expect the concept of emergence to be associated with 
the unavailability of different kinds of explanation. And, I have argued in this chapter, this 
expectation is vindicated. Adopting the strategy of understanding emergence as relative to a 
disjunct of all of the different kinds of scientific explanation requires us to ignore the 
differences that genuinely obtain across the different contexts in which the concept of 
emergence is used.  
An objection to the perspectival strategy, related to the idea of leaving open the 
relevant kind of explanation, is the challenge that the perspectival account of emergence 
permits deviant cases of emergence. For example, there may be cases of emergence relative 
to a form of explanation that involves crystal gazing, or the reading of tea leaves, and 
intuitively such cases ought to be ruled out. In response I would argue that it is indeed 
important to capture the intuition that there is something wrong with such cases, but that I 
have resources for doing so without imposing restrictions on the relevant kind of scientific 
explanation. I deal with this objection thoroughly in Chapters 4 and 5, but in the meantime I 
will say that my way of handling such objections is to offload the deviance of the case onto 
the notion of explanation, rather than of emergence. So, such a case may turn out to be a case 
of emergence in virtue of its explanatory profile, but that case of emergence will be of little 
scientific or philosophical interest because of the kind of explanation involved. A similar 
strategy will apply to cases in which emergence is relative to an unrealistic notion of 
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unavailability, or to an observer with imperfect measuring tools. Chapters 4 and 5 will 
include a detailed treatment of a range of such cases.  
Understanding emergence as relative to a perspective involves understanding 
emergence as mind-dependent, which has implications for the potential causal role of 
emergent properties. For many philosophers, much of the interest in the subject of emergence 
is tied up with the idea that macro-level entities may be causally autonomous in virtue of 
having emergent properties. Wilson sums up this sentiment in a recent article: 
Why care about what emergence is, and whether there is any? To start, many 
complex entities of our acquaintance (tornados, plants, people and the like) appear to 
be composed of less complex entities, and to have features which depend, one way or 
another, on features of their composing entities. Yet such complex entities also 
appear to be to some extent autonomous, both ontologically and causally, from the 
entities upon which they depend. Moreover, and more specifically, many “higher-
level" entities (particulars, systems, processes) treated by the special sciences appear 
to be broadly synchronically dependent on “lower-level" (and ultimately fundamental 
physical) entities. Yet, as is suggested by the associated special science laws, many 
higher-level entities appear also to be ontologically and causally autonomous, in 
having features in virtue of which they are distinct from and distinctively causally 
efficacious relative to the lower-level entities upon which they depend, even taking 
into account that the latter stand in various aggregative relations. An account of 
emergence making sense of these appearances would vindicate and illuminate both 
our experience and the existence and tree-like structure of the special sciences, as 
treating distinctively real and efficacious higher-level entities and their features.132  
 
According to the proponent of this widely held, attractive position, an account of 
emergence is worthwhile and interesting in so far as it takes on the question of how macro-
level entities can be causally autonomous and yet also dependent on their micro-level bases 
in a naturalistically respectable way. The findings I have presented pose a serious problem 
for this conception of emergence. In using emergence to account for the seeming causal 
autonomy of higher-level entities, we must hold that such entities are causally autonomous in 
                                                       
132 Wilson, J. (forthcoming) 
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virtue of the fact that some of their properties have “emergent” status; this status is a marker 
of causal autonomy. I have argued, however, that emergence is relative to a perspective. 
Unless the causal efficacy of higher-level entities is relative to a perspective just like a 
property’s emergent status, emergence cannot account for the causal efficacy of higher-level 
entities.  
Of course, this finding does not settle the question of whether or not higher-level 
entities are causally efficacious. Instead, it shows that if higher-level entities are causally 
efficacious, they are not causally efficacious in virtue of some of their properties being 
emergent. The collapsing emergence findings have broken the link between causation and 
emergence, though the implications of this finding depend, however, on the view of 
causation one adopts. A Kantian, a perspectivalist or a subjectivist about causation would 
probably be able to reconcile the idea of emergence as perspectival with the idea that 
emergence is causally efficacious, but anyone with a more metaphysical conception of 
causation is likely to have some difficulty with this result.  
These results do not in any way undermine non-reductionism. Indeed, I take it that the 
motivation for developing a non-reductionist metaphysics, as outlined in Wilson’s quote, is 
as substantial as ever. But these results undermine the strategy of using the concept of 
emergence to work out a non-reductionist metaphysics. What the right tools are for this work 
remains to be seen, whether the best resources for working out a non-reductionist 
metaphysics will come to us from mereology, causal differences or some other kind of 
apparatus. In Chapter 5 I will take up this question again.  
In this chapter I have offered a solution to the collapse problem, based on the 
connection between emergence and explanation. In Chapters 4 and 5 I will develop a positive 
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account of emergence based on this solution to the collapse problem, which I call “the 
perspectival account of emergence”. In Chapter 4 I will develop and argue for an explication 
of the concept of emergence along these perspectival lines, and in Chapter 5 I will formulate 
and defend the final version of the positive perspectival account of emergence.  
  
 
Chapter 4: An Explication of Emergence 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
There is a general consensus in contemporary philosophy that ongoing debates about 
emergence are confused and messy. Kim, for example, said in a recent paper “those 
discussing emergence, even face to face, more often than not talk past each other. Sometimes 
one gets the impression that the only thing that the participants share is the word 
‘emergence’.”133 O’Connor refers to emergence as “a notorious philosophical term of art”134, 
while Chalmers adds “The term ‘emergence’ often causes confusion in science and 
philosophy.”135 In an introduction to a recent collection on the subject, Bedau and 
Humphreys say, “the topic of emergence is fascinating and controversial in part because 
emergence seems to be widespread and yet the very idea of emergence seems opaque, and 
perhaps even incoherent.”136 Dialogue becomes even more difficult when we turn to 
scientific uses of the concept of emergence, which are often taken to be radically 
discontinuous with philosophical approaches. Some claim that the idea of emergence 
                                                       
133 Kim, J. (2006) pg 548 
134 O’Connor, T. (2006) 
135 Chalmers. D. (2006) pg 1 
136 Bedau, M. & Humphreys, P. eds (2008) pg 1 
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prevalent in science is an entirely different concept from the idea of emergence prevalent in 
philosophy. 
In this chapter, I will attempt to clear up some of this confusion by offering an 
explication of the concept of emergence that unifies philosophical and scientific uses. 
Building on the solution to the collapse problem that I offered in Chapter 3, I will argue that 
the best way to understand the concept of emergence is as the unavailability of a certain kind 
of scientific explanation for an observer or observers. I will adopt Carnap’s criteria for 
successful explication, and will argue that the explication I offer meets those criteria and 
fares better against them than alternative explications. I will argue that, in addition to its 
unificatory appeal, this explication opens up avenues for scientific and philosophical research 
and dialogue about the nature of emergence. Finally, I will examine two case studies 
(contemporary debates about the explanatory gap in philosophy of mind and the historical 
vitalist-mechanist debates) and use them to illustrate the useful work that this explication can 
perform when applied to particular debates about emergence.  
 
Section 2: Philosophical Approaches to the Interpretation Question 
In Chapter 1, I introduced the “Interpretation Question” about emergence: What is 
emergence? In this section, I will examine features of some mainstream philosophical 
answers to the Interpretation Question.  
Given the idea of emergence as a combination of dependence and autonomy, one part 
of a typical philosophical attempt to answer the Interpretation Question is an account of 
emergent autonomy.  Often such an account will start either with the claim that emergent 
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autonomy is metaphysical or the claim that emergent autonomy is epistemic. To say that 
emergent autonomy is metaphysical is to say that emergents aren’t “metaphysically 
exhausted” by their underlying micro-properties, which can be understood in a number of 
different ways including: a failure of the macro-level to reduce to the micro, the macro-level 
properties having causal powers that the micro-level properties do not have, or modal 
differences between the micro-level and macro-level properties. The proponent of an 
epistemic view, on the other hand, would hold that emergent properties are only 
epistemically, rather than metaphysically, autonomous from the micro-level. This section 
will be devoted to developing an understanding of this distinction.  
The distinction between metaphysically and epistemically autonomous emergents is 
tricky because neither of these groups is homogenous. Many different cases fall under the 
label of metaphysical autonomy and the same is true for epistemic autonomy. In what 
follows I will examine some examples of metaphysical and epistemic approaches to 
emergence and reveal that, despite this heterogeneity, there is a reasonable way to draw the 
distinction. In order to do this, I will examine a paradigm case from each camp: Chalmers’ 
metaphysical view and the epistemic view defended by Hempel and Oppenheim. 
According to Chalmers, almost all of the facts about the world are logically 
necessitated by the micro-level facts, which he takes to be the facts about fundamental 
physics, with one very important exception: the case of consciousness. The facts about 
consciousness are not logically necessitated by the micro-level facts, but only nomologically 
necessitated. That is to say, in worlds with laws like ours, the same microstates will generate 
conscious experience but there are logically possible worlds in which the same microstates 
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do not generate conscious experience. This makes conscious experience, according to 
Chalmers, a case of strong emergence. As he puts it: 
We can think of strongly emergent phenomena as being systematically determined by 
low-level facts without being deducible from those facts. In philosophical language, 
they are naturally but not logically supervenient on low-level facts.137 
Chalmers’ account of strong emergence is an example of a metaphysical account of 
emergence in so far as it presents emergent autonomy as determined by metaphysical factors, 
in this case the modal independence of the macro-level from the micro-level.138 Not all 
metaphysical approaches to emergence account for emergent autonomy in terms of modality. 
Some, for example, hold that macro-level properties are emergent in virtue of causal powers 
that aren’t reducible to the causal powers of the micro-level.139 The central characteristic of 
metaphysical approaches to emergence, however, is that they locate emergent autonomy in 
some metaphysical, rather than merely epistemic, difference between the micro-level and the 
macro-level.  
Epistemic approaches portray emergent autonomy as merely epistemic rather than 
metaphysical. For example, consider Hempel and Oppenheim. According to Hempel and 
Oppenheim, for example:  
“emergence of a characteristic is not an ontological trait inherent in some 
phenomena; rather it is indicative of the scope of our knowledge at a given time; thus 
it has no absolute, but a relative character; and what is emergent with respect to the 
theories available today may lose its emergent status tomorrow”140.  
                                                       
137 Chalmers, D. (2006)  
138 Note that, given the collapse problem, emergence is very delicate, and this case is no exception. Whether or 
not a given macro-level property meets Chalmers’ criterion for emergence depends on what micro-level 
properties get into the micro-level base. 
 
139 See O’Connor, T. and Wong, H. (2005) 
140 Hempel, C. & Oppenheim, P. (1965) pg 64 
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Hempel and Oppenheim offer the following definition of emergence:  
The occurrence of a characteristic W in an object w is emergent relative to a theory 
T, a part relation Pt and a class G of attributes if that occurrence cannot be deduced 
by means of T from a characterization of the Pt-parts of w with respect to all the 
attributes in G.141  
Hempel and Oppenheim take emergence to be relative to a number of different 
factors. In Section 1, I mentioned that emergence is always relative to a choice of levels, and 
this is characterized by Hempel and Oppenheim as a “parthood relation”. As they put it, 
“Before we can significantly ask whether a characteristic W of an object w is emergent, we 
shall therefore have to state the intended meaning of the term ‘part of’. This can be done by 
defining a specific relation Pt and stipulating that all and only those objects which stand in 
Pt to w count as parts or constituents of w.”142 Emergence is also, on their account, relative 
to a theory, because theories introduce laws and principles that make some features deducible 
that would not be deducible from a body of knowledge that doesn’t include the theory. For 
example, Hempel and Oppenheim discuss a case in which electric current flows through a 
wire connecting a piece of copper and a piece of zinc that are partly immersed in sulphuric 
acid. They argue that the facts about this flow may not be deducible from basic information 
about the attributes of copper, zinc and the acid, but may be deducible from a theory that 
includes these details, plus the principles and general laws of chemistry.143 Finally, Hempel 
and Oppenheim argue that emergence is relative to a class of attributes of the parts.  
                                                       
141 Hempel, C. & Oppenheim, P. (1965) pg 64 
142 Hempel, C. & Oppenheim, P. (1965) pg 62 
143 Hempel, C. & Oppenheim, P. (1965) pg 63 
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Social factors play a significant role in Hempel and Oppenheim’s account of 
emergence. In their early, informal characterization of emergence (given above), Hempel and 
Oppenheim talk of features being relative to “the theories available today”, and yet in the 
later, formal characterization of emergence (also given above) there is no mention of time or 
availability. Emergence per se for Hempel and Oppenheim is simply a failure of deducibility. 
The practice of actually labeling some property as emergent is, however, slightly more 
complicated, as is revealed in the early informal statement. When we label a property as 
“emergent”, this label is typically relative to the best, or even the most commonly known, 
theories of the time. This brings an interesting social element into Hempel and Oppenheim’s 
ideas about emergence; emergence per se is relative to theory and knowledge, and when we 
label properties as “emergent” we assume a background of theory and knowledge that, in 
typical cases, are widely accepted in the relevant social context.  
For our purposes, Hempel and Oppenheim’s view provides a helpful example of an 
epistemic account of emergence. They locate emergent autonomy in the scope of human 
knowledge and the theories we have at hand. As they say of the application of their view to 
the cases of life and mind, “If the assertion that life and mind have emergent status is 
interpreted in this sense, then its import can be summarized approximately by the statement 
that no explanation, in terms of micro-structure theories, is available at present for large 
classes of phenomena studied in biology and psychology.”144 This last quote also indicates 
that Hempel and Oppenheim take emergence to be closely connected to the availability of 
scientific explanation, a connection that will feature prominently in my own account of 
emergence. 
                                                       
144 Hempel, C. & Oppenheim, P. (1965) pg 65 
  
 
91 
These two cases, Chalmers and Hempel-Oppenheim, provide an illustration of the 
major differences between epistemic and metaphysical accounts of emergence. Epistemic 
accounts of emergence locate emergent autonomy in the scope of knowledge of an individual 
observer, a group or a society of scientific practitioners. According to proponents of 
epistemic accounts of emergence, a macro-level property is emergent relative to a body of 
knowledge, which makes emergence epistemic, though whether or not a property is emergent 
relative to a body of knowledge may be an objective matter. Metaphysical accounts, on the 
other hand, locate emergent autonomy in the mind-independent world such that emergence is 
not relative to a body of knowledge, but exists per se in virtue of metaphysical relations 
between micro-level and macro-level properties.145  
 
Section 3: The Concept of Emergence in Scientific Practice 
In this section, I will examine the uses to which the concept of emergence is put in 
purely scientific, rather than philosophical or interdisciplinary contexts. Interest in scientific 
uses of the notion of emergence has grown over the last few decades as improvements in 
computational modeling have led to developments in “systems sciences”, which are roughly 
those areas of scientific practice that focus on complex systems and proceed by building 
models of those systems. Much scientific dialogue about emergence appears in the context of 
systems sciences, but the idea of emergence also appears in other areas such as quantum 
mechanics, developmental psychology and Artificial Life.  
                                                       
145 There are some other kinds of philosophical accounts of emergence, including computational views, which 
locate emergent autonomy in the computational irreducibility of the macro-level from the micro-level, but most 
philosophical accounts tend to fall into the category of metaphysical or epistemic.  
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The division between philosophical and scientific treatments of emergence isn’t 
entirely clear. Some scientists make philosophical claims about emergence when they 
employ the concept, and indeed some of the areas in which the idea of emergence features 
are areas in which scientists and philosophers interact, such as cognitive science and the 
interdisciplinary cluster around systems science. In this section I will try to avoid blurring the 
boundaries by examining pieces from scientific rather than philosophical journals and 
focusing on authors who self-identify as scientific practitioners rather than as philosophers.  
Many authors have claimed that scientific and philosophical uses of the concept of 
emergence are discontinuous, some going so far as to claim that there are in fact two separate 
concepts of emergence, one corresponding to the concept prevalent in science and one 
corresponding to the concept prevalent in philosophy. For example, Chalmers draws a 
distinction between two different concepts, strong emergence and weak emergence, and 
claims that “Strong emergence is the notion of emergence that is most common in 
philosophical discussions of emergence” while “Weak emergence is the notion of emergence 
that is most common in recent scientific discussions of emergence…”146 Stephan says of the 
concept of emergence “People associate with this concept the hope to adequately classify 
hard philosophical problems such as the problem of phenomenal qualities and they associate 
with it the hope to characterize adequately behaviors of artificial systems, which are not 
explicitly programmed, but rise from self-organizing processes. A closer look, however, 
reveals that we have no concept of emergence that is apt for both issues.”147This brief survey 
of scientific uses of the concept of emergence will indicate that this is not in fact the case, 
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and that scientific ideas about emergence are continuous with philosophical ideas about 
emergence.  
Systems biology and systems chemistry are areas in which emergence is a fairly 
prevalent concept. In a recent article on systems chemistry from the journal Nature, Nitschke 
describes systems chemistry as “the study of complex systems, or networks, of molecules” 
and directly addresses questions about the nature of emergence: “Emergence occurs when a 
complex system exhibits properties that can’t be predicted by considering its subcomponents 
in isolation... Predictability is subjective, however... Perhaps a better definition of ‘emergent’ 
is ‘interesting and counter-intuitive’ which highlights the necessary subjectivity and ties the 
elucidation of emergent phenomena directly to the scientist’s role in unraveling the 
predictive rules that underlie such phenomena.”148For this practitioner, emergence is tied to 
unpredictability.  
In another recent piece on systems chemistry, Balazs and Epstein claim that “The 
concept of emergence in the physical and biological sciences is an elusive one” but go on to 
offer a definition “The term refers to phenomena in which the complexity of structures or 
behaviors in systems with many interacting components exceeds that predicted from the 
knowledge of the individual components and the forces between them.”149 Again we can note 
the appeal to unpredictability, in this case the unpredictability of the complexity of certain 
systems.  
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Another area of scientific practice in which the concept of emergence is prevalent is 
Artificial Life. A journal serving the Artificial Life community describes Artificial Life as “a 
new discipline that investigates the scientific, engineering, philosophical, and social issues 
involved in our rapidly increasing technological ability to synthesize life-like behaviors from 
scratch in computers, machines, molecules, and other alternative media.150”  Assad and 
Packard claim that, “since its inception, the field of Artificial Life has consistently referred to 
the property of ‘emergent’ phenomena as one of its distinguishing features”151 but go on to 
express concern about the absence of a definition of emergence. They propose a graded scale 
of emergence from strong to weak, where each place on that scale represents a different form 
of failure of deducibility. In the weakest cases, the facts about the emergent features are 
deducible in hindsight after observing the relevant phenomenon but not before (presumably 
because the observation provides new information about the micro-level properties, though 
this isn’t specified by the authors), while in the strongest cases the emergent features of the 
phenomenon are impossible to deduce from a full specification of the relevant micro-level 
properties. This is under-specified, and Assad and Packard are unclear about whether they 
see this scale as a definition of emergence, a heuristic for picking out cases of emergence or 
something else. For our purposes, however, we can again note the appeal to unpredictability, 
and also to failure of deducibility. These themes are evident in other writings on Artificial 
Life. Bonabeau and Therelaultz, for instance, say: “emergence is generally defined as a 
process through which entirely new behaviors appear, whose properties cannot be derived 
from a given model of how the system behaves, so that another model has to be built in order 
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to deal with these new behaviors.”152This extract is interesting because the phrase “entirely 
new behaviors” has metaphysical connotations, but the newness of these behaviors is 
understood in terms of a failure of derivability within a given model.  
The concept of emergence is currently prevalent in fundamental physics. 
Fundamental physical notions of emergence have received much philosophical attention, 
most of which treats such emergence as metaphysical. For example, Silberstein and 
McGeever argue that “fundamental physics provides us with the strongest empirical evidence 
for ontological emergence”153, where ontological emergence is understood as “features of 
systems or wholes that possess causal capacities not reducible to any of the intrinsic causal 
capacities of the parts nor to any of the (reducible) relations between the parts.”154 Because 
purported cases of emergence in fundamental physics have received so much philosophical 
attention I will leave them out of this section, pausing only to note that these typically fall 
into the category of philosophically detailed metaphysical accounts of emergence.  
Finally, a historical treatment of the concept of non-reductionism reveals both 
metaphysical and explanatory ideas about emergence. In an article called More is Different, 
published in the journal Science in 1972, Nobel-laureate physicist P.W. Anderson presented 
some challenges to what he called the “reductionist hypothesis”. As he puts it,  
“The behavior of large and complex aggregates of elementary particles, it turns out, 
is not to be understood in terms of a simple extrapolation of the properties of a few 
particles. Instead, at each level of complexity entirely new properties appear, and the 
                                                       
152 In Langton, C. (1995) pg 306 
153 Silberstein, M. & McGeever, P. (1999) pg 184 
154 Silberstein, M. & McGeever, P. (1999)pg 182 
  
 
96 
understanding of the new behaviors requires research which I think is as fundamental 
in its nature as any other.”155 
Although Anderson does not use the term “emergence”, it is clear that he is talking about 
complex phenomena that resist reductive explanation. Anderson gestures towards both a 
metaphysical claim and a claim about the explanatory status of these phenomena. The 
metaphysical claim is that there are new properties and entities at higher level of complexity, 
while the explanatory claim is that complex systems cannot be explained in terms of the 
simpler parts that compose them.  
In this section I have very briefly examined some extracts from practitioners working 
in systems chemistry, Artificial Life and physics. In each extract, some claims about 
emergence were made, many of them vague and schematic by philosophical standards. 
Despite this vagueness, however, the following common features were evident: emergence 
was tied to unpredictability, failures of derivability, and resistance to certain kinds of 
explanation. Some metaphysical underpinnings for such features were gestured towards, but 
not explicitly addressed.  
In passing, it is important to note that, when talking about the unpredictability and 
underivability of facts about emergence, practitioners typically mean unpredictability or 
underivability from a restricted set of facts. Practitioners will tacitly understand at least 
roughly what set of facts is at issue. Unpredictability or underivability is typically understood 
as unpredictability or underivability from only the facts about the micro-level, and excluding 
past experience of similar systems, configurations, compounds and so on. This qualification 
is necessary if attributions of emergence in scientific contexts are to remain consistent.  
                                                       
155 Anderson, P.W. (1972) pg 393 
  
 
97 
As I mentioned at the start of this discussion, the position that there are at least two 
radically different concepts of emergence, one of which roughly corresponds to philosophical 
use and one to scientific use, is fairly popular. The extracts we have examined from scientific 
practitioners suggest, however, that this position is false. Features such as unpredictability, 
resistance to certain kinds of explanation and difference in metaphysical status are features of 
philosophical as well as scientific treatments of emergence, which indicates some level of 
commonality between those conceptions. 
 
Section 4: The Need For a New Approach 
The philosophical literature on emergence is notoriously messy. Proponents of 
metaphysical and epistemic accounts of emergence will often take emergence to obviously be 
a metaphysical or an epistemic phenomenon, and the approach of starting with a particular 
idea of emergence as necessarily epistemic or necessarily metaphysical has led to a situation 
in which there is little common ground in philosophical debates about emergence. Wilson’s 
pessimism about this state of affairs is representative: “Though a thousand flowers may 
fruitfully bloom, this much diversity is unuseful for the purposes of illuminating the structure 
of natural reality. Different accounts often disagree on whether an entity is emergent, and 
when they agree there is often no clear basis for this agreement.”156 Scientific uses of the 
concept of emergence generate even more confusion. As was emphasized in Section 3, many 
authors take the scientific and philosophical concepts of emergence to be radically 
discontinuous, though the extracts surveyed in Section 3 indicate that this is not the case. 
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The current situation is that philosophers with different views on emergence typically 
understand “emergence” as a term of art, different in the hands of each person who uses it. 
This makes philosophical dialogue about emergence troublesome and dialogue between 
philosophers and scientific practitioners even more so. If there really are numerous different 
concepts of emergence being applied to different kinds of phenomena, then this diversity 
isn’t a problem so long as individuals are explicit about the concept they are deploying and 
deploy it appropriately. In what follows, however, I will offer a rational reconstruction of the 
concept of emergence that will unify philosophical and scientific uses. In doing so I will 
show that one concept can serve the majority of purposes to which the concept “emergence” 
is typically put, and that furthermore using this unified concept will open up interesting 
avenues for philosophical and scientific dialogue about and research into emergence. This 
rational reconstruction will be based on my solution to the collapse problem, so in addition to 
its conceptual benefits this explication of emergence will also avoid the collapse problem.  
The basic idea of a rational reconstruction is to take a vague but prevalent concept 
from a domain of discourse and to offer a precisification of that concept based on features of 
its use.157 Examples of domains of discourse include scientific practice, medicine, law, 
religion and mathematics. Although rational reconstruction aims at accuracy to original use, 
it isn’t determined by original use, and allows for revisions to the concept in question. 
Carnap gives a rational reconstruction of probability in his Logical Foundations of 
Probability, and at the start of that text he offers an account of rational reconstruction, which 
he refers to as “explication”. (Henceforth I will treat “rational reconstruction” and 
“explication” as interchangeable.) As Carnap puts it: “The task of explication consists in 
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transforming a more or less inexact concept into an exact one or, rather, in replacing the 
first by the second. We call the given concept … the explicandum and the exact concept 
proposed to take the place of the first … the explicatum.”158 He goes on to offer a 
characterization of an adequate explication, according to which an explication is better 
insofar as it more fully satisfies the following desiderata: 
1. Similarity. “The explicatum is to be similar to the explicandum in such a way that, in 
most cases in which the explicandum has so far been used, the explicatum can be 
used; however, close similarity is not required, and considerable differences are 
permitted.” 
2. Exactness. “The characterization of the explicatum, that is, the rules of its use… is to 
be given in an exact form, so as to introduce the explicatum into a well-connected 
system of scientific concepts.” 
3. Fruitfulness. “The explicatum must be a fruitful concept, that is, useful for the 
formulation of many universal statements…” 
4. Simplicity. “The explicatum should be as simple as possible; this means as simple as 
the more important requirements 1, 2 and 3 permit.”159 
In the next section I will offer a rational reconstruction of the concept of emergence and will 
adopt Carnap’s criteria for successful explication as my own standards for success.160 The 
concept of emergence is, however, a tough target for a rational reconstruction because it is 
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used in philosophy as well as in scientific practice, and so the explicandum has already 
received some substantial philosophical attention. I will attempt to work around this feature 
by simply taking the explicandum to be the concept of emergence as it is used across both 
scientific practice and philosophy, and to offer an account that unifies those uses as far as 
possible.161 
The task of rationally reconstructing a concept is different from that of offering a full 
philosophical account of the phenomenon, if there is one, to which that concept applies. In 
this piece I will offer a rational reconstruction of the concept of emergence, but that 
reconstruction will leave open serious philosophical questions about the nature of emergence. 
One could formulate a successful rational reconstruction of the concept of emergence even if 
there were no cases of emergence in the world, only people using the concept. A 
philosophical account of emergence will answer questions, particularly metaphysical 
questions, left open by a rational reconstruction. For an example of this distinction, consider 
the difference between a reconstruction of the concept of causation and a full philosophical 
account of causation. A reconstruction of the concept of causation may include features such 
as transitivity and time-asymmetry. The philosophical account of causation then has to make 
room for such features, showing that they have a certain place in a metaphysical landscape, 
for example, or perhaps explaining them away as features of perspectives. In this paper, I will 
merely offer a reconstruction of the concept of emergence, leaving the completion of the 
development of my full account of emergence for Chapter 5.   
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Section 5: An Explication of Emergence 
I offer the following explication of the concept of emergence: 
(EM) Given components A, B, C…n  arranged in relation r into a whole, and an 
observer O, property x of the whole is emergent for O iff there is no scientific 
explanation available to O of the fact that the following regularity obtains of natural 
necessity: Whenever components A, B, C…n are combined in relation r, the resulting 
whole instantiates property x. 
In the rest of this section I will examine some of the central features of EM, before moving 
on to assess EM against Carnap’s criteria for successful explication in Section 8.  
First of all, I should point out that “components” should be understood very loosely. I 
simply take the term “component” to be a placeholder for “bearer of the micro-level 
properties” and the term “whole” as a placeholder for “bearer of the macro-level properties”, 
where the distinction between micro and macro can differ from case to case along the lines 
described in Chapter 1. This means that emergence is relative to a component-whole relation, 
as well as to a particular specification of the components.  
According to EM, a property isn’t emergent per se but only emergent relative to an 
observer, among other factors. Although the conception of emergence given in EM refers to 
only one observer, EM allows for the possibility that a given property may be emergent for 
many observers, or even all, while another may be emergent for only one, or a few observers. 
I take “explanation” to be a scientific explanation, but the particular kind of 
explanation in question can vary from observer to observer, depending on a range of factors 
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including the area of science in which that observer is working, the tools available to them 
and so on. I have argued in detail elsewhere that this is the correct form for the explanandum 
and won’t repeat that argument here162, but let me emphasize that the explanandum is a 
natural necessity rather than a simple generalization. This builds a nomological 
supervenience relation into this explication of emergence, such that emergent macro-level 
properties supervene of natural necessity on their micro-level bases. The relevant notion of 
“availability” also depends upon the relevant observer. One observer may take an 
explanation to be unavailable if a group of top scientists have worked on the question for a 
long time and have not succeeded in formulating such an explanation. A different observer 
may have a different standard, such that an explanation is unavailable only if it is impossible 
to formulate one. 
One striking feature of EM is that it portrays emergence as extremely prevalent. For 
instance, if the relevant observer has very limited scientific knowledge, then for that observer 
there may be very many more cases of emergence than for an observer with more extensive 
scientific knowledge. If we endorse EM, we endorse the idea that each of these cases is a 
genuine case of emergence, relative to the relevant observer. Some might take this to be an 
unfortunate feature, but I would argue that it is unproblematic. The prevalence of emergence 
would be problematic if we had to treat all such cases as equal, but EM provides resources to 
address questions about why some cases of emergence are more interesting than others. For 
instance, we can focus on differences between the capacities, tools and knowledge of 
different observers and on differences between the different sets of micro-level properties. If 
some macro-level property is emergent simply because the observer has a misguided 
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conception of scientific explanation, then this is an uninteresting case of emergence. A more 
interesting case could involve the fact that a central, important kind of scientific explanation 
has not yet been recognized. Or alternatively, another kind of interesting case could involve 
the fact that an explanation of a certain kind is, although recognized as a kind of explanation, 
unavailable in this particular case, and that furthermore this is true for all observers in the 
contemporary scientific community. Given that EM doesn’t treat all cases of emergence as 
homogeneous, the prevalence of emergence isn’t a problem for this reconstruction. There 
may be many cases of emergence, but EM allows for great variation among the different 
cases.  
This last point is an immensely important element of the conception of emergence 
provided in EM. EM offers a conception of emergence as a prevalent and varied 
phenomenon. In endorsing the concept of emergence offered in EM, we endorse a shift in 
dialogue about emergence. We ask not just whether some property is emergent, but also why 
and for whom it is emergent. On this conception of emergence, there are many different cases 
of emergence that obtain for many different ranges of observers and for many different 
reasons.  
A fan of metaphysical accounts of emergence might argue that EM is an inadequate 
explication of emergence because metaphysical accounts of emergence typically don’t 
present emergence as relative to an observer. Instead, metaphysical accounts of emergence 
typically present emergent macro-level properties as emergent for everyone, which makes 
relativization to an observer redundant. In response I would point out that EM portrays 
emergence as relative to an observer, but this doesn’t mean that each case of emergence is 
emergent for only one observer. Some cases of emergence may be emergent relative to many 
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observers, and others relative to only a few. Some cases may be emergent for all possible 
observers, and nothing in EM rules out such an eventuality. EM makes room for cases of 
emergence in which the emergence obtains for metaphysical reasons (in which case the 
relevant property would be emergent for all observers for all time) but also for cases in which 
the emergence obtains merely for epistemic reasons. I will return to this point when assessing 
objections to EM.  
Someone may wonder why EM does not include any reference to unpredictability, or 
to a failure of deducibility, given that these are such prevalent features across different 
accounts of emergence. In response I would point out that in other writing I have argued that 
accounts of emergence which take such features to be necessary for emergence face a serious 
problem, the collapse problem, the only viable solution to which involves understanding 
emergence as intimately connected to explanation. More importantly, however, EM can 
make room for conceptions of emergence as sometimes (though not necessarily) involving a 
failure of deducibility, or the unpredictability of facts about emergent macro-level properties 
from facts about micro-level properties, depending on the relevant conception of explanation. 
Some kinds of explanation involve deduction and if such explanations are unavailable, then 
the case of emergence will involve a failure of deducibility. EM makes room for such cases, 
but avoids the collapse problem that afflicts accounts of emergence that take failures of 
deducibility or predictability to be necessary for emergence.  
Those familiar with the philosophical literature on the explanatory gap will recognize 
the appeal to the unavailability of an explanation as an element of the explanatory gap. There 
are many different formulations of the explanatory gap, based around different ideas about 
explanation and about the target phenomenon, but the rough idea is that facts about 
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qualitative experience cannot, even in principle, be deduced from physical facts. In Section 9 
of this chapter I will examine the case of the explanatory gap in some detail, but for the 
moment we can note that if there is an explanatory gap, then according to EM it presents a 
particularly prevalent and intriguing case of emergence.  
 
Section 6: Considering Carnap’s Criteria 
In this section I will argue that EM meets Carnap’s criteria for successful explication. 
I will take the criteria of similarity, exactness, fruitfulness and simplicity in turn. For each 
criterion I will argue that EM meets that criterion successfully, and will also consider the 
extent to which alternative explications of emergence meet the same criterion. 
6.1 Similarity 
In Carnap’s words, “The explicatum is to be similar to the explicandum in such a way 
that, in most cases in which the explicandum has so far been used, the explicatum can be 
used; however, close similarity is not required, and considerable differences are 
permitted.”163 The question at hand, then, in asking whether or not EM is sufficiently similar 
to the explicandum, is firstly whether or not in most cases where the concept of emergence is 
used, the concept of emergence specified by EM could be used, and secondly whether or not 
in most cases where EM applies, the concept of emergence is used.  
The answer to the first question is yes, with some unproblematic exceptions. The 
most serious exception is those metaphysical accounts of emergence that portray emergents 
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as necessarily metaphysically autonomous from their micro-level bases. EM doesn’t rule out 
a metaphysical interpretation of certain cases of emergence, however, but presents a 
conception of emergence according to which not all cases of emergence obtain for 
metaphysical reasons. According to EM, emergence itself is not a metaphysical concept, but 
some cases of emergence may obtain for metaphysical reasons. Another version of this 
objection is the claim that relativization to an observer rules out those treatments of 
emergence that portray emergence as obtaining for all observers (which includes 
metaphysical accounts of emergence). According to such treatments, if any property is 
emergent then it is emergent for all. In response I would point out that EM doesn’t rule out 
cases in which some macro-level property emerges from a given set of micro-level properties 
for a great many observers, or even all observers, and so such cases don’t raise problems for 
EM.  
Someone wedded to a metaphysical concept of emergence may, however, take further 
exception to EM along the following lines: common practice shows that the only cases of 
emergence worthy of the name are those in which the property is emergent for all observers, 
for metaphysical reasons. The proponent of this objection would argue that, given this feature 
of the concept of emergence, the problem with EM is that it permits weak cases of 
emergence that aren’t interesting or strong enough to deserve the name “emergence”. In 
response I would argue that my research into common use of the concept of emergence in 
philosophy and science shows that not all, or even most, uses of the concept presuppose that 
the emergence in question must be strong. Instead, this research shows that there are two 
dominant conceptions of emergence, epistemic and metaphysical. These share some features 
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– connection to explanation, connection to failure of deducibility or derivability – but not the 
idea that emergent autonomy should be understood entirely in metaphysical terms.  
Furthermore, I have offered a reconstruction of the concept of emergence as relative 
to an observer, but this does not rule out the possibility that some cases of emergence may 
obtain for metaphysical reasons. In such cases, the relevant property would simply be 
emergent for all observers. I leave open the option of giving a metaphysical interpretation of 
such cases – my only restriction is to demand that we understand emergence as relative to a 
perspective. This rules out taking emergence itself as a perspective-dependent metaphysical 
relation, but it doesn’t preclude developing a metaphysical interpretation of particularly 
intriguing, prevalent cases of emergence if there is good reason to do so.  
Finally, let’s test two alternative explications of emergence against Carnap’s 
similarity criterion. I will examine a metaphysical explication of emergence, according to 
which a macro-level property is emergent only if it is metaphysically autonomous from the 
micro-level properties, and an epistemic explication of emergence, according to which 
emergence is a merely epistemic phenomenon. To make these alternatives as charitable as 
possible, I keep them quite close to EM, tweaked only to encompass the relevant epistemic 
and metaphysical differences. The alternative explications are as follows: 
(MET) Given components A, B, C…n arranged in relation r into a whole, a property x of the 
whole is emergent iff  
i) there is no available scientific explanation of the fact that the following regularity 
obtains of natural necessity: Whenever components A, B, C…n are combined in 
relation r, the resulting whole instantiates property x 
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ii) because x has causal powers not had by any property of A, B, C…n when not 
arranged in relation r.  
(EP) Given components A, B, C…n arranged in relation r into a whole, a property x of the 
whole is emergent iff  
i) there is no currently available scientific explanation of the fact that the following 
regularity obtains of natural necessity: Whenever components A, B, C…n are 
combined in relation r, the resulting whole instantiates property x  
ii) though an explanation will become available as our knowledge improves.  
I include the notion of causal powers in MET because it is a standard way to 
understand metaphysical autonomy, but one could replace this clause with a different 
metaphysical notion of autonomy, such as failure of reduction or modal differences.  The 
important idea is that MET portrays emergent autonomy in metaphysical terms. The 
epistemic criteria are included in EP to indicate that emergence exists in virtue of a 
contingent gap in knowledge, which is a feature of most epistemic accounts of emergence.  
I have already argued that an explication like MET doesn’t successfully meet the 
similarity criterion because it cannot be used in contexts where emergence is taken to be a 
contingent epistemic phenomenon, and given that such contexts include many scientific uses 
of the concept, this makes MET particularly unscientific as well as insufficiently similar. 
Alternatively, EP also fails to meet the similarity criterion because it cannot be used in 
contexts where emergence is turns out to be a permanent feature for all observers. EM avoids 
this problem because relativization to an observer makes room for the convergence of many 
observers on many different cases of emergence, whereas EP doesn’t include this element 
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and furthermore a core element of EP is the idea that the unavailability of explanation 
characteristic of emergence is contingent. EM fares better than both of these alternative 
explications against the similarity criterion.  
6.2 Exactness 
The criterion of exactness demands that, as Carnap puts it, “The characterization of 
the explicatum, that is, the rules of its use… is to be given in an exact form, so as to introduce 
the explicatum into a well-connected system of scientific concepts.”164  In our case, we wish 
to introduce the explicatum into a well-connected system of philosophical concepts, as well 
as scientific. An appropriate test, then, for how well EM meets the criterion of exactness in 
comparison with its rivals, is to ask if in most cases it would be clear whether or not the 
concept applies, and if the explicatum is capable of being introduced into contemporary 
science and philosophy and thereby connecting with theories in those disciplines.  
EM involves the unavailability (the meaning of which is specified by the observer) of 
a scientific explanation (also specified by the observer). Accordingly, to find out whether 
some property is emergent, we must find out what the relevant observer is looking for and 
what they take “unavailable” to mean. This is fairly simple, and given that the explanation 
condition is shared across EM, MET and EP, if it is inexact in one of these reconstructions it 
will be so across all. The concept of “explanation” is common in science and philosophy, and 
so would pose no barrier to EM connecting with theories across those disciplines, and the 
same is true for the concept of “available”. The part-whole relation depends on the details of 
the case at hand, but as I mentioned before is to be interpreted very loosely and so requires 
                                                       
164 Carnap,R. (1950) pg 7 
  
 
110 
no new conceptual apparatus to understand. Overall, it would be easy in any particular case, 
given knowledge of the relevant facts, to work out whether some property is emergent 
according to EM, and none of the concepts invoked in EM pose a barrier to connections with 
scientific or philosophical theories.  
Let’s now assess MET and EP against the exactness criterion. Note that, because 
MET includes a difference in causal powers as a criterion for emergence, the proponent of 
MET will face significant epistemic problems when applying this concept. As the case of the 
British Emergentists famously shows, it can be very easy to attribute a robust metaphysical 
difference to the world that turns out be merely epistemic on the discovery of new 
information about the phenomenon in question.165 Given this feature, it isn’t clear in any 
given case whether or not MET applies, and so MET fares poorly on the exactness criterion. 
The causal condition may also raise problems when it comes to connecting with scientific 
theories about emergence, which often do not invoke metaphysical notions such as causation.  
EP will fare about as well as EM on the exactness criterion, as it too involves the 
unavailability of an explanation. Overall, then, it looks as though EP and EM meet the 
exactness criterion fairly well, and that MET does not.  
6.3 Fruitfulness 
Carnap says of the fruitfulness criterion “The explicatum must be a fruitful concept, 
that is, useful for the formulation of many universal statements…”166 Someone familiar with 
the philosophical literature on emergence may argue that my explication fails to meet this 
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criterion, for the following reason: this explication fails to make room for substantial 
philosophical debate about emergence. If we accept this explication of emergence, then we 
are committed to the idea that all we need to do to find out if some macro-level property is 
emergent is to ask whether or not there is an explanation of a certain sort available to some 
observer. Further philosophical debate is halted in its tracks, and so this is not a fruitful 
explication of emergence.  
In response, I acknowledge that it is an implication of EM that the question of 
whether some property is emergent or not for some observer is simple to answer.  However, I 
see this as a positive feature. In making the question of whether or not some phenomenon is 
emergent so easy to answer, this explication rules out non-substantial debates about 
emergence in which people starting with different definitions of emergence talk past each 
other. EM also opens up avenues for fruitful research into the nature of emergence, 
continuous across different areas in science and philosophy, because EM offers such a 
versatile, unified conception of emergence. For example, philosophers can address 
themselves to questions about exactly why a given macro-level property is emergent for 
some observer, whether this is true for other observers and for what reasons. They can also 
address themselves to questions about scientific explanation; much of the debate about the 
relationship between properties of the brain and properties of qualitative experience has been 
occupied with discussion of exactly which sort of explanation we ought to take as appropriate 
for this relationship.167 This research is continuous with and complimentary to empirical 
research into the reasons for different cases of emergence, which can be conducted by 
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scientific practitioners. This level of unification and continuity across different approaches to 
emergence is unavailable to the proponent of MET or EP.  
EM portrays emergence as prevalent and often cheap, but it allows for continuous 
dialogue and research into emergent phenomena on the part of philosophers and scientists. 
EM provides a framework within which reasons for the presence of emergent phenomena can 
be researched and understood, which meets Carnap’s criterion of “useful for the formulation 
of many universal statements”.  
MET fares badly on the fruitfulness criterion. In endorsing a metaphysical explication 
of emergence we effectively embrace the idea that further empirical research won’t add to 
our philosophical understanding of the nature of the emergent phenomenon. Once some 
phenomenon has been labeled as metaphysically emergent, empirical research effectively 
stops. Indeed, in this particular case, metaphysical research into the reason for a given case of 
emergence also stops, given MET’s causal powers requirement. Furthermore, because MET 
requires that all emergence be metaphysical, most of the cases that are labeled as emergent in 
scientific practice will no longer count as emergent, and the potential for dialogue between 
philosophers and scientists that is supported by EM is unavailable to the proponent of MET. 
EP fares slightly better on this criterion than MET. On an epistemic conception of 
emergence, we assume that the macro-level property is emergent for merely epistemic 
reasons, rather than metaphysical reasons. This allows for and even encourages further 
empirical research into the natural phenomena involved in purported cases of emergence. It 
does not, however, allow for philosophical research into the possibility of emergence 
obtaining for metaphysical reasons, and so EP faces a reversed version of the problem that 
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faced MET. MET made little room for scientific research into emergence, and EP makes 
little room for philosophical research. By permitting different cases of emergence to obtain 
for very different reasons, and by allowing for continuous research and dialogue about 
emergence across philosophy and the sciences, EM meets the fruitfulness criterion more 
successfully than EP or MET.  
6.4 Simplicity  
The simplicity criterion states that the explicatum must be as simple as meeting the 
other three requirements will allow. Someone may argue that EM is not simple, perhaps 
pointing to the relativization to an observer as a rather complicated aspect of EM, but given 
how central that aspect of the reconstruction is for enabling the explicatum to meet other 
criteria, fruitfulness and similarity in particular, this consideration doesn’t hold much weight.  
MET fares worse by the simplicity criterion than EM because the causal aspect of that 
explication makes it more complicated. EP fares roughly the same as EM on this criterion; 
the contingent element makes EP slightly more complicated than EM but the lack of 
relativization to an observer in EP balances out this consideration. 
Overall, a survey of Carnap’s criteria indicates that the rational reconstruction EM 
meets these criteria, and does than more successfully than other mainstream explications of 
emergence. EM fared better than the MET on all criteria, better than EP on two criteria and 
equally well as EP on two criteria. In Section 7 I will consider and respond to some 
objections to EM as an explication of emergence.  
 
  
 
114 
Section 7: Objections 
7.1 Neither metaphysical nor mysterious 
Someone could argue against EM along the following lines: the philosophical 
community may not agree on much about emergence, but it agrees on the idea that 
emergence is mystical and surprising. EM portrays emergence as a prevalent, cheap 
phenomenon and so fails to do justice to mainstream conceptions of emergence. Alexander is 
famously quoted by Broad as describing emergence as a phenomenon that we must accept 
unexplained, “with the philosophical jam which Professor Alexander calls ‘natural 
piety’”168, and yet my explication of emergence captures none of this mystery – it requires no 
piety.  
In response, I would argue first of all that the conception of emergence as inherently 
mysterious is not universally shared across either the philosophical or scientific literature on 
the subject. Epistemic and scientific conceptions of emergence, for example, typically don’t 
involve this appeal to mystery, though they may portray emergence as often interesting and 
unpredictable. Even if this feature were a universal commitment, however, this consideration 
doesn’t make for an objection to EM as an explication of emergence because EM allows for a 
certain amount of mystery. Obviously not all cases of emergence, according to EM, will be 
mysterious. But those cases that are prevalent across many different observers and are also 
stable for those observers, and in which the reasons for the emergence are poorly understood, 
will remain both intriguing and mysterious.  
                                                       
168 Broad, C.D. (1925) pg 55. 
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Furthermore, one could argue that in EM the sense of mystery associated with 
emergence is replaced with the idea that emergence involves the unavailability of a certain 
kind of explanation. A plausible way to think about this replacement is that when we 
originally thought emergence was mysterious what was actually involved was a failure of an 
attempt at an explanation.  
One kind of mystery that EM makes no room for is the kind associated with the idea 
that emergence is basic, brute and unexplainable-in-principle. I would argue that this is no 
great conceptual loss, however, as endorsing the existence of such mysterious phenomena 
discourages philosophical and scientific research. It is a benefit of EM that the possibility is 
always open that some new piece of knowledge or theoretical tool may come along and 
render a property that was emergent for many observers no longer emergent.  An illustrative 
way to think of this feature of EM is in terms of the attitude it recommends that we adopt 
towards cases of emergence. EP, among other epistemic views on emergence, demands 
optimism about emergence, the idea being that what is unexplainable now will not be so in 
the future. MET demands pessimism, because emergence involves features that are 
unexplainable in principle, for metaphysical reasons. EM, on the other hand, demands neither 
optimism nor pessimism about emergence. Some cases may turn out to be intractable, while 
others may disappear quite quickly, and EM does not require us to adopt the same attitude 
towards all cases.  
7.2 Unified, but sparse and cheap 
EM definitely unifies diverse conceptions of emergence, but perhaps at the cost of 
content; one could argue that the only way such impressive unification can be achieved is by 
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making the explication almost content-free. EM is so sparse that it is hardly surprising that it 
can encompass almost every account of and purported case of emergence. This is a legitimate 
concern, and a concept of emergence that is so broad as to say almost nothing about the 
phenomenon is of little interest and little use.  
In response, I would argue that EM does portrays emergence as prevalent and often 
cheap, but also allows for differences between more and less interesting cases of emergence, 
depending on the nature of and number of observers in question, the kind of explanation they 
have in mind, and the relevant notion of availability. Emergence may be prevalent, according 
to EM, but not all cases of emergence are equal. There are many different kinds of cases of 
emergence, and some of them are far more interesting than others. We can bring 
philosophical and scientific resources to bear on questions about why a given property is 
emergent for a given observer or observers, and all the while practitioners can avoid the 
problem of “talking past each other” about emergence.  
EM provides resources to differentiate between cases, and for conducting ongoing 
dialogue and research into the nature of emergence. This should ameliorate concerns about 
the cheapness and prevalence of emergence according to EM.  
 
Section 8: Putting the explication to work 
Having formulated and defended EM as an explication of emergence, I will now 
examine two case studies in which EM offers a clear, helpful approach to a long-standing 
philosophical or scientific debate. The cases are: the explanatory gap in contemporary 
philosophy of mind and the mechanist-vitalist debate in the history of philosophy. Examining 
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these cases will enable me to demonstrate that this explication of emergence can perform 
useful work, by cutting through confusion and clarifying debates.  
8.1 The explanatory gap 
The “explanatory gap” is a label used in philosophy of mind for the idea that we lack 
a satisfactory explanation for the fact that conscious experience arises from brain activity.169 
Levine offers an intuitive statement of the idea of an explanatory gap: 
While we seem to have some idea how physical objects, or systems, obeying physical 
laws, could instantiate rational and intentional properties, we have no idea, I 
contend, how a physical object could constitute a subject of experience, enjoying, not 
merely instantiating, states with all sorts of qualitative character… There seems to be 
no discernible connection between the physical description and the mental one, and 
thus no explanation of the latter in terms of the former.170 
There are many different formulations of the explanatory gap. Some think that the gap is 
between conscious experience and physical properties, while others take the relevant gap to 
be between conscious experience and neuroscientific properties. Some deny the existence of 
such a gap, while others strongly affirm its existence. There are also differences between 
different authors in their views on the significance of the gap, what sort of explanation is 
thought to be missing, and what it means for an explanation to be missing.   
The explanatory gap plays a major role in philosophy of mind because many people 
not only think that there is such a gap, but that its existence generates a serious problem for 
physicalist theories of mind. The basic idea behind this challenge is that, if physicalism is 
true, then a physicalistically acceptable explanation of conscious experience should be 
                                                       
169 Although the term “explanatory gap” is most often used in philosophy of mind, the idea crops up in some 
other areas of philosophy, including debates about reductionism and non-reductionism in metaphysics. 
 
170 Levine, J. (2001) pg 76 
  
 
118 
available. This explanation should enable us to cross the explanatory divide between physical 
properties and consciousness without positing any non-naturalistic entities, properties or 
substances. If such an explanation is not available, then, according to this line of thought, we 
have good reason to think that physicalism is not true. Accordingly, the explanatory gap has 
become one of the major obstacles to a physicalist theory of mind, and has generated a wide 
range of literature in which naturalistically inclined philosophers of mind attempt to grapple 
with this problem.  
Responses to the challenge to physicalism vary. Some argue that there is such a gap, 
and that it is a problem for physicalism.171 Some argue that there is such a gap, but that it is 
not a problem for physicalism.172 Others argue that the gap doesn’t pose a problem for 
physicalism, because we can explain the gap through appeal to the idea that phenomenal 
experience requires particular conceptual resources.173 And finally, some have taken the 
explanatory gap as a reason to endorse non-physicalist theories of mind, and to devote their 
attentions to making such theories as naturalistic as possible.174  
In many of these cases, differences between responses to the explanatory gap come 
about as a result of very different views on the appropriate kind of explanation to look for, 
and about what it is for an explanation to be “missing”. It is therefore tempting, as in the case 
of emergence in general, to take much of the debate over the explanatory gap as involving 
                                                       
171 Jackson, F. (1982), Nagel, T. (1974) 
172 Block, N. & Stalnaker, R. (1999). They argue that the explanatory gap isn’t a challenge for physicalism 
because physicalism needn’t be construed in terms of a priori analysis.  
 
173 This is known as the “Phenomenal Concepts Strategy”. See e.g. Balog, K. (forthcoming) 
174 Chalmers, D. (1996) 
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philosophers talking past each other. Armed with EM, however, we can distinguish the deep, 
interesting debates about the explanatory gap from the insubstantial, misguided debates.  
The first step in this process is to understand claims about the explanatory gap as 
claims about emergence, in line with the explication of emergence given in EM. On this 
picture, the view that there is an explanatory gap amounts to the view that for some 
observer/s and some property p of conscious experience, there is no explanation available to 
that observer/s of the fact that the following regularity obtains of natural necessity: Whenever 
components N1, N2,.. Nn are combined in relation r, the resulting whole instantiates property 
p, where components N1...Nn can be understood as neurophysiological components.175  
This picture makes it clear that the following question is underspecified: “Is there 
really an explanatory gap?” If we think of the explanatory gap in terms of EM, we can see 
that to ask this question has suppressed subscripts that need to be given values before we can 
ask philosophically interesting questions, and that to ask this question without filling out the 
subscripts is to miss the point about the explanatory gap. We must first of all begin by filling 
in the subscripts, by asking, for example: “For whom does this case of emergence obtain?” 
“What is the relevant form of explanation?” “What is the relevant standard of availability?” 
“Is there a case of emergence if we switch from neurophysiological components to physical 
components?” These questions are not particularly deep, but need to be answered in order to 
fully understand the case. Having answered such questions, we can then move on to address 
the philosophical issues. For example: “What sort of explanation of such a phenomenon 
should we be seeking?” “What is an appropriate standard for the availability of an 
                                                       
175 They could be physical, chemical etc components instead but I’ll use neurophysiological components as a 
case study.  
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explanation?” “What are the implications of there being a case of emergence for x many 
observers with y conception of explanation?”  
In offering this analysis of the debate, I don’t mean to suggest that the debates on the 
explanatory gap are for the most part misguided. Indeed, some of the most notable work on 
the subject, including the dialogue between Jackson & Chalmers and Block & Stalnaker, can 
be understood as addressing the following question: what sort of explanation ought we to be 
looking for in this case, and should that form of explanation involve a priori derivation?176 
However, on first exposure to the debate about the explanatory gap, it can be tempting to go 
straight for questions that on closer examination turn out to be misguided, such as, “is there 
really an explanatory gap?” Understanding the debate as a debate about emergence, 
conceived of in terms of EM, makes it clear that we should avoid such questions, and why 
we should avoid them.  
8.2 The vitalist-mechanist debate 
The debate between vitalists and mechanists is hard to pinpoint, both chronologically 
and philosophically. For the sake of convenience I will stipulate that I am interested in the 
19th century incarnation of the debate, and will offer a rough characterization of the 
philosophical positions on both sides. I don’t intend to offer a definitive historical 
interpretation of this debate, but instead wish to offer one interpretation of it as a case to 
which we can apply EM. This application will, as in the case of the explanatory gap, enable 
us to distinguish interesting, well-formed questions from uninteresting ones, and will also 
                                                       
176 See Chalmers, D. & Jackson, F. (2002) and Block, N. & Stalnaker, R. (1999) 
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provide a clear framework within which to understand how the positions changed as the 
relevant science progressed.  
The distinction between the mechanist and the vitalist can be drawn in terms of their 
respective approaches to the question of life. Beckermann offers a rough characterization of 
the distinction, which I will adopt: 
“... mechanists claimed that the properties characteristic of living organisms 
(metabolism, perception, goal-directed behavior, procreation, morphogenesis) could 
be explained mechanistically, in the way the behavior of a clock can be explained by 
the properties and the arrangement of its cogs, springs and weights. ... vitalists, on 
the other hand, maintained that the explanation envisaged by the mechanists was 
impossible and that one had to postulate a special nonphysical substance in order to 
explain life – an entelechy or élan vital.”177 
There were different varieties of vitalism and of mechanism, depending on factors such as 
the nature of the mechanistic explanation in hand and the strength of the associated 
metaphysical thesis. Indeed, some have argued that it would be better to think of mechanism 
and vitalism as collections of strands of thought rather than unified philosophical positions. 
Benton, for instance, argues that “it is a mistake to regard vitalism as one doctrine, or set of 
doctrines.”178 For the purposes of this discussion, however, I will continue to use 
Beckermann’s definition.  
C.D. Broad originally presented his account of emergentism as providing middle 
ground between mechanism and vitalism.179 This may make it confusing to apply EM to the 
mechanist-vitalist debate, because doing so requires us to think of the debate in terms of 
emergence. But I will suggest that in this section we put aside the history of the term 
                                                       
177 Beckermann, A. (2000) pg 1 
178 Benton, E. (1974)  pg 17 
179 Broad, C.D. (1925) pg 61 
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“emergence” for the moment and wholeheartedly adopt EM as the correct conception of 
emergence. Then we can, as in the case of the explanatory gap, apply EM to the mechanist-
vitalist debate.  
The first step in this process, as in the case of the explanatory gap, is to conceive of 
vitalism as a claim about emergence. According to this view, vitalism amounts to the position 
that for some feature l (a property characteristic of living creatures) and some observer/s, 
there is no explanation available to the observer/s of the fact that the following regularity 
obtains of natural necessity: Whenever components C1, C2,.. Cn are combined in relation r, 
the resulting whole instantiates property l. Components C1...Cn can be understood as 
chemical components, but depending on the relevant kind of mechanism, they may 
alternatively be understood as physical or physiological components.  
To get to some of the interesting questions about vitalism, we can fill in the details. 
Again, we can see that the question “Is vitalism true?”  is underspecified. There are 
suppressed subscripts, which must be filled out by asking questions such as “What is the 
relevant notion of explanation?” and “For whom does this case of emergence obtain?” 
Having done so, we can then begin to ask philosophically and scientifically interesting 
questions about this debate, including “Were scientists right to look for mechanistic 
explanations of these natural phenomena, rather than an alternative sort of explanation?” or 
“What is the significance, metaphysical or otherwise, if a mechanistic explanation is 
unavailable for y number of observers?”  
One of the scientifically interesting questions in this area is the question of whether or 
not a mechanistic explanation of the relevant feature was available, and this debate actually 
  
 
123 
took place over the particular case of fermentation. Louis Pasteur and Marcelin Berthelot 
offered rival accounts of fermentation, with Pasteur arguing that fermentation was a vital 
process and Berthelot arguing that fermentation could be explained mechanistically, without 
needing to call upon the notion of life. Fruton quotes Berthelot stating his objective as 
follows: “To banish life from all explanations relative to organic chemistry, that is the aim of 
our studies”180and Berthelot claimed to have developed an entirely chemical (in our sense, 
mechanistic) explanation of fermentation. It is important to reconstruct this exchange as a 
genuine debate, rather than two scientists talking past each other, and EM provides resources 
for doing so. Pasteur and Berthelot shared a notion of explanation and of availability, and had 
a substantial, genuine disagreement about whether or not an explanation of a specific sort 
was available according to their shared standards.  
In contemporary philosophy and science debates about the nature of life have 
changed, with the focus of attention switching from formulating an explanation of the 
instantiation of features commonly associated with life to other questions about the nature of 
life.181 We can use EM to represent this state of affairs by stating that either (depending on 
the motivation for this historical claim, given that there are different versions in the 
literature) we have uncovered a mechanistic explanation, thereby making an explanation 
available and properties such as l no longer emergent, or we uncovered some other form of 
explanation and decided not to look for mechanistic explanations of features associated with 
life any more. Alternatively, some may hold that this shift in attention hasn’t resulted from 
any developments in the mechanist-vitalist debate but is simply a product of different trends 
                                                       
180 Fruton, J (2006) pg 61 
181 Including attempts to develop improved definitions of life, and research into the limits of life involving A-
Life.  
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taking hold in philosophy and science, in which case there is no change in the debate to 
represent. Either way, looking at this debate through the lens of EM provides clear 
distinctions between interesting and uninteresting issues, preserving the idea that 
disagreements between scientists of the time were substantive and providing a simple way to 
understand the historical development of the mechanist-vitalist debate.  
 
Section 9: Conclusion  
Following a brief survey of philosophical and scientific approaches to emergence, I 
offered an explication of the concept of emergence as the unavailability of a scientific 
explanation for an observer or observers. I argued that this explication meets Carnap’s 
criteria for successful explication and that it has substantial unificatory appeal, as it allows 
for continuity between philosophical and scientific research into emergence.  
Endorsing this view requires a shift in the way we think about emergence. The 
interesting questions about emergence are not, on this view, questions about whether some 
property is emergent, but instead are about who the property is emergent for, what their 
conception of scientific explanation is and so on. Instead of regarding emergence as a 
homogenous phenomenon, as it is typically understood, my explication of emergence 
portrays emergence as prevalent and very diverse. This change may be radical, but in making 
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it we replace a “notorious philosophical term of art”182 that “often causes confusion in 
science and philosophy”183 with a precise, unified and naturalistic concept.  
Having offered this explication of the concept of emergence, I will now move on to 
formulate and defend my positive account, the perspectival account of emergence, in Chapter 
5. 
                                                       
182 O’Connor, T. (2006) 
183 Chalmers. D. (2006) pg 1 
  
Chapter 5: The Perspectival Account of Emergence 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
In this chapter I will formulate and defend an account of emergence, the perspectival 
account of emergence, based on the results of Chapters 2 through 4. In Section 2 I will 
formulate the account and discuss some of its central features in detail. In Section 3 I will 
explore the metaphysical implications of the perspectival account of emergence. In Section 4 
I will describe a range of different ways to differentiate between the many cases of 
emergence permitted by the perspectival account of emergence. In Section 5 I will consider 
the problem of downward causation, which is traditionally thought to pose problems for 
accounts of emergence. And finally in Section 6 I will consider some objections and replies 
to the perspectival account of emergence.  
 
Section 2: The Positive View 
In Chapter 4, I introduced a distinction between the tasks of formulating a rational 
reconstruction of the concept of emergence, and formulating a positive account of 
emergence. For a reconstruction of the concept of emergence to be successful, there need be 
no actual cases of emergence in the world, but merely people using the concept, and 
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standards for a good reconstruction184 are based on factors such as accuracy to common use 
of concept and potential benefits associated with adopting the reconstruction. A positive 
account of emergence, on the other hand, not only picks out the correct concept of 
emergence, but must also address questions about whether there is anything that corresponds 
to that concept, and if so, where that it stands in the metaphysical landscape. A good example 
of this distinction comes up in the case of causation. A reconstruction of the concept of 
causation may include features such as time-asymmetry or transitivity, while a positive 
account of causation must say something about whether such features are parts of the 
metaphysical landscape, or whether they are epistemic features, and so on.  
In this chapter I will offer a positive account of emergence based on the rational 
reconstruction of the concept of emergence developed in Chapter 4, which I called “EM”. 
There are a great many cases of the phenomenon picked out by EM and so there is no hard 
work to be done in arguing that this emergence exists. There remain, however, hard questions 
to answer about the metaphysical implications of this account of emergence and about how to 
differentiate between different cases of emergence, as well as a number of objections to 
consider, and Sections 3 to 6 of this chapter will be devoted to responding to those questions 
and objections.  
In Chapter 4, I offered the following rational reconstruction of the concept of 
emergence: 
(EM) Given components A, B, C…n  arranged in relation r into a whole, and an 
observer O, property x of the whole is emergent for O iff there is no scientific 
                                                       
184Such as those developed by Carnap in Carnap, R. (1950) 
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explanation available to O of the fact that the following regularity obtains of 
natural necessity: Whenever components A, B, C…n are combined in relation r, 
the resulting whole instantiates property x. 
My positive account of emergence, the perspectival account of emergence, is as follows:  
A property is emergent iff it meets the conditions of (EM).  
EM portrays emergence as relative to a number of different factors: an observer, a 
component-whole relation, occupants of that component-whole relation, a kind of 
explanation, and a notion of unavailability. I will now briefly describe each of these factors.  
I understand “observer” to simply mean any live human observer. This rules out cases 
of emergence that are relative to the point of view of, for example, Laplacean Martians or 
computer programs.185 I don’t impose any restrictions on the notion of observer other than 
that observers be live humans, and this view accordingly permits cases of emergence relative 
to the points of view of children, people who cannot perform mathematical calculations and 
so on. I will address the challenges raised by such cases in Section 6 of this chapter, and for 
the moment I will simply point out that I do permit such cases as cases of emergence. I 
endorse the claim that many of the cases in which emergence is relative to an observer in a 
particularly unusual or epistemically disadvantaged situation make for deviant or 
uninteresting cases of emergence, but later on I will argue that I have resources to 
accommodate this fact without imposing further restrictions on what counts as an observer.  
                                                       
185 I find this to be the most sensible way of picking out observers, but there is nothing to prevent someone from 
tweaking my account of emergence to include a somewhat looser notion of “observer” that would permit such 
cases.  
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The second and third factors to which emergence is relative, according to EM, are a 
component-whole relation and the occupants of that relation. I spent some time discussing 
the different contenders for component-whole (or micro-macro) relation in Section 2 of 
Chapter 1, so for the moment I will simply point out that I take an ecumenical position on the 
nature of the component-whole relation, and leave it open with the aim of encompassing as 
many current uses of the concept of emergence as possible. In doing so I run the risk of 
permitting deviant cases of emergence, as before, but I will argue that I have resources on 
hand to deal with this problem. To specify the occupants of the component-whole relation is 
simply to pick out the phenomenon of interest, whether it is the relation between properties 
of a particular chemical compound and properties of its component elements, or the relation 
between properties of cells in an Artificial Life configuration and properties of the 
configuration, or some other relation between micro- and macro- levels.  
The fourth factor to which emergence is relative, according to EM, is a kind of 
explanation. Rather than specifying a particular notion of explanation to which emergence is 
relative, In Chapter 3 I argued that it is best to leave this open. If I specify one kind of 
explanation to which emergence is relative, then the appeal to explanation that I introduced 
in Chapter 3 will not offer a general solution to the collapse problem, because emergence is 
associated with the unavailability of many different kinds of explanation across the 
philosophical and scientific literature. See Sections 2 and 5 of Chapter 3 for a further 
discussion of this claim.  
The final factor to which emergence is relative, according to EM, is a notion of 
unavailability. This is included to capture the idea that different investigators will work with 
different notions of unavailability depending on disciplinary norms, among other factors. For 
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example, a group of epistemologists may hold a standard of unavailability such that an 
explanation is only unavailable if an ideal epistemic agent couldn’t formulate one. On the 
other hand, a group of neuroscientists may hold that an explanation is unavailable if the best 
neuroscientists in the world have been attempting to formulate one for a decade or more and 
have not yet succeeded. I have placed no restrictions on what counts as unavailability, which 
as before generates a “deviant cases” problem that I will address later on in this chapter.  
In Section 3 I will examine the metaphysical implications of the perspectival account 
of emergence, but before doing so I will offer some general reflections on the difference 
between this perspectival account of emergence and a metaphysical account of emergence. 
The perspectival account of emergence portrays emergence as relative to an observer, and 
hence not a part of the mind-independent metaphysical landscape. Note, however, that a 
standard way to move from such a relativistic account to a metaphysical account would be to 
argue that there is a metaphysically privileged version of each one of the relevant factors 
(explanation, unavailability, observer and so on), and that cases of emergence relative to 
those factors are the real, metaphysical cases of emergence. I will discuss this move in some 
detail in the following section, but for the moment I simply wish to point out that I do not 
intend to make it. I will show in Section 3 that the perspectival account of emergence is 
compatible with, though does not entail, a variety of different metaphysical views. 
In this section I have discussed each of the factors to which emergence is relative: an 
observer, a component-whole relation, occupants of that component-whole relation, a kind of 
explanation and a conception of unavailability. Each of these factors also permits a different 
way of individuating and classifying different cases of emergence, and in Section 4 I will 
explore some other ways to individuate between different cases of emergence. 
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Section 3: Metaphysical Implications 
The perspectival account of emergence portrays emergence as relative to a number of 
different factors, most notably to an observer. In this section I will expand on this relativism, 
and discuss its implications for the metaphysical status of emergence.  
3.1 Observers and Perspectives 
The definition of an “observer” in account is simply a live human being, and I don’t 
impose any further restrictions on what it takes to be an observer. “Observers”, for the 
purposes of this account of emergence, are individuated along the same lines as live human 
beings. This simple mode of individuation enables the perspectival account of emergence to 
avoid difficult questions about what “perspectives” are, how best to individuate perspectives, 
and what it takes to occupy one.  
There is a broader notion of “perspective” which may appear to be a more attractive 
resource for the development of an account of emergence than this simple idea of an 
“observer”. I won’t attempt to offer any kind of analysis of the concept of a perspective, but 
even without doing so it is clear that there are some differences between the general idea of a 
perspective and the idea of an observer, understood as a live human being. For example, a 
perspective can be shared between multiple observers, such that we can speak of the 
“perspective of women in philosophy”, or the “perspective of 19th century chemists”. People 
can also occupy more than one perspective at once; for instance, I occupy the perspective of 
a denizen of Chapel Hill and the perspective of a citizen of the United Kingdom. This 
general, rough notion of “perspective” doesn’t come attached to a simple mode of 
individuation, and it isn’t clear what differentiates one perspective from another. 
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Although it is simpler to base an account of emergence around observers, rather than 
perspectives, because it is simpler to individuate observers and also to say what they are, it is 
important to be able to capture the idea that in some cases, a property is emergent for 
multiple observers. An account of emergence as relative to a perspective rather than an 
observer would allow for this feature because multiple observers can share perspectives. 
Rather than appealing to perspectives, however, I capture this feature through appeal to the 
idea that multiple observers may converge on particular cases of emergence. Some cases of 
emergence may be emergent for only one observer, while others may be emergent for a great 
many, or even all, observers. This convergence feature allows us to capture the sensible idea 
that sometimes, particularly in situations where observers work together in groups, certain 
properties will be emergent for the group, and not just for some particular individual. The 
appeal to convergence allows us to accommodate such cases without having to grapple with 
the abstract, vague idea of perspective.  
In line with conventions in the literature, however, I will continue to call this account 
a “perspectival” account of emergence rather than, say, an “observer-relative” account of 
emergence. This is because the term “perspectival” is often used to describe views that take 
some entity or relation to be a feature of interactions between people and the world, rather 
than a strictly mind-independent feature of the world, and this is the category in which the 
perspectival account of emergence belongs.  
The appeal to observers generates a simple question: When an observer gains new 
knowledge (or a tool etc) so that a property is no longer emergent for them, does that mean 
that the observer relative to which this property was emergent has now changed? Or is it 
instead the case that the observer is the same, but that the property is no longer emergent for 
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that observer? I opt for the latter answer. If some development occurs such that a property 
that was emergent for a particular observer is no longer emergent for that observer, then that 
property was in the past emergent for that observer but that it is now no longer emergent for 
that observer. This way of representing such cases enables me to avoid counterintuitive 
claims such as that the identity of the observer changes in light of having learnt something 
new.  
3.2 Metaphysical Implications 
Embracing the perspectival account of emergence involves understanding emergence 
as relative to an observer. According to some alternative, metaphysical accounts of 
emergence, emergence is a relation that obtains between groups of properties that are 
metaphysically distinct. The idea behind this picture of emergence is that emergence tracks 
distinctions in the mind-independent universe, and understanding emergence as relative to an 
observer interferes with this conception of emergence. In this section I will expand on the 
original position and on the nature of this interference.  
Mainstream metaphysics is a common term for a conception of metaphysics 
according to which the goal of metaphysics is to delineate the structure of the mind-
independent universe.186 Most of those who embrace this conception of metaphysics believe 
that such enquiry is possible, and hence that we can limn the structure of the mind-
independent universe. On the mainstream conception of metaphysics, anything that isn’t part 
of the mind-independent universe isn’t a proper subject of metaphysical enquiry, though it 
may be a proper subject of philosophical enquiry. To think of emergence as metaphysical in 
                                                       
186For a thorough illustration of this position, see Manley, D. (2009) and Sider, T. (forthcoming) 
  
 
134 
this sense is to think of emergence as a relation that obtains in the mind-independent 
universe.  
Embracing the idea of emergence as relative to an observer involves embracing the 
idea that emergence is not part of the mind-independent universe, and so not properly 
“metaphysical” in mainstream terms. As I have presented the perspectival account of 
emergence, there are no facts of the matter about whether or not there is any emergence 
independently of observers. Of course, whether or not some property is emergent from some 
other properties for a certain observer may be a perfectly objective matter, but without the 
observer there is no fact of the matter about emergence.  
Of course, many philosophers are quite happy with the idea that metaphysical enquiry 
may include enquiry into features of the universe that appear to be dependent upon the 
interests of human observers, on what they find interesting and choose to explain. The 
definition of metaphysics, and of the proper role of metaphysical enquiry, raises questions 
that beyond the scope of the present discussion. In the mean time I will simply say that, 
according to one popular, contemporary conception of metaphysics, understanding 
emergence as relative to a perspective puts emergence beyond the domain of metaphysical 
enquiry, because it portrays emergence as relative to an observer, rather than as mind-
independent.  
The position that emergence is relative to an observer also has significant 
implications for the causal status of emergence, which I touched on at the end of Chapter 3 
but will now turn to in more detail. According to proponents of metaphysical accounts of 
emergence, much of what is interesting about emergence is tied up in the idea that emergence 
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may somehow enable us to develop a naturalistic form of metaphysical non-reductionism. On 
the one hand, some have argued, reductionism is unrealistic because it fails to vindicate the 
appearance that macro-level entities, and in particular the entities of the special sciences, are 
real and causally efficacious.187 On the other hand, most philosophers would like to hold on 
to the belief that such entities are also related to the micro-level entities that compose them 
in, as Wilson puts it “a naturalistically respectable way”188. Emergence has been presented 
as the relation that can reconcile these seemingly opposing appearances, in so far as it can 
account for the causal efficacy of macro-level entities without having to posit non-natural 
entities or properties. 
For an appeal to emergence to play such a role, however, emergence must be capable 
of endowing macro-level entities with their autonomous causal powers. According to such an 
account, macro-level entities would be causally autonomous in virtue of having causal 
powers. The idea that emergence is relative to an observer poses a problem for this claim. If 
emergence is relative to an observer, then whether or not some property is emergent can vary 
from observer to observer. Few metaphysical accounts of causation portray causal capacity 
as varying across observers in this way, so it seems unlikely that the perspectival account of 
emergence can play this role of accounting for the apparent causal autonomy of macro-level 
entities.  
The implications of this finding depend, however, on the relevant view of causation. 
A perspectival, subjectivist or Kantian account of causation would, depending on the details 
of the account, probably be able to reconcile the idea of emergence as relative to a 
                                                       
187See Fodor, J. (1974) and Wilson, J. (2010) 
188 Wilson, J. (forthcoming) 
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perspective with the idea of emergence as the locus of the causal autonomy of macro-level 
entities. But most metaphysical accounts of causation, which portray causation as a mind-
independent relation, would not be able to reconcile the idea of emergence as relative to an 
observer with the idea of macro-level entities having causal powers in virtue of having 
emergent properties.  
Overall, then, the perspectival account of emergence has two important metaphysical 
implications. First of all, it portrays emergence as relative to an observer, rather than mind-
independent, and so not properly “metaphysical” according to at least one popular conception 
of metaphysics. Secondly, it renders one popular view of the proper role for an account of 
emergence, as a way to vindicate the seeming causal autonomy of the special sciences, 
untenable on most accounts of causation.  
3.3 Compatible with reductionism and with non-reductionism 
I have argued that emergence is not a feature of the mind-independent metaphysical 
landscape. It may be tempting to interpret this view as supporting metaphysical reductionism 
or eliminativism of some kind. In this section I will discuss the fact that the perspectival 
account of emergence presents emergence as a merely explanatory, rather than metaphysical, 
phenomenon, but remains agnostic on the broader question of the viability of non-
reductionism. I will describe how both the non-reductionist and reductionist could adapt the 
view to suit their own needs, although the perspectival account of emergence doesn’t entail 
or even lend support to either position.  
So far I have argued that emergence is an explanatory, rather than metaphysical 
relation. This means that we cannot use the concept of emergence as a way of fleshing out, or 
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giving substance to, metaphysical non-reductionism. However, a proponent of metaphysical 
non-reductionism could use the perspectival account of emergence as a guide to potentially 
metaphysically interesting cases of emergence. For example, consider a case in which some 
property is emergent relative to all observers, relative to some particular kind of explanation. 
If the kind of explanation is thought by the non-reductionist to have a particular metaphysical 
status (as, for example, a priori reductive explanation is thought to have by some 
philosophers of mind) then they may take this as reason to think that this case warrants 
further metaphysical research. However, in such a case the metaphysical work will not be 
done by emergence, but by some other metaphysical relation.  
Identity provides a good example of such a case. Some philosophers have argued that 
identity is not an explanatory relation.189 If this is true, then identities will present cases of 
emergence (a position that appears strange at first if we consider that emergentism about the 
mind is traditionally opposed to identity theory about the mind, although thinking of 
emergence in explanatory terms deals with this counter-intuitive appearance). These cases of 
emergence will obtain for metaphysical reasons, in so far as identity is a metaphysical 
relation, but the metaphysical “work” is performed by the identity and not by emergence 
itself. The emergence in this case is effectively “underpinned” by a metaphysical relation.  
I have argued that emergence is not metaphysical but this does not rule out the 
prospect that some cases of emergence may obtain for metaphysical reasons. Accordingly, 
the perspectival approach to emergence is compatible with metaphysical non-reductionism, 
though incompatible with a view according to which emergence is the metaphysical relation 
                                                       
189 Thanks to Karen Neander for this case. For discussion of the idea that identities are not explanatory, see 
Papineau, D. (2011) 
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that grounds non-reductionism. The non-reductionist could even use the perspectival 
approach to emergence as a way of identifying cases that are metaphysically interesting, 
though to do so they must provide an independent argument for the position that the absence 
of a certain kind of explanation for  particular observer or observers is a privileged guide to 
metaphysics.  
On the other hand, the metaphysical reductionist may also use the perspectival 
account of emergence for their own purposes, though just as in the case of the non-
reductionist, they must provide some extra independent arguments for that position. The 
reductionist could argue that the perspectival approach to emergence helps us to identify 
explanatory “gaps” (in a loose sense), which are simply cases in which we lack a decent 
scientific explanation of some phenomenon. The reductionist could then argue that such 
explanatory gaps are no guide to metaphysics, just as the non-reductionist could argue that 
some such gaps are a guide to metaphysics.  
The perspectival account of emergence is compatible with metaphysical non-
reductionism and reductionism, though neither view is entailed or even implied by the 
perspectival account. In each case a separate argument must be made addressing the question 
of whether or not certain kinds of explanatory gap are a legitimate guide to metaphysics.  
In passing, we should note that this is another instance of the useful house-clearing 
work done by the perspectival account of emergence. Having provided tools to enable us to 
carefully and precisely catalogue the many different cases of emergence, we have also 
precisified exactly what a reductionist or non-reductionism would then need to do in order to 
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vindicate their position: argue that the unavailability of certain explanations either is (in the 
non-reductionist case) or is not (in the reductionist case) a guide to metaphysics.  
The perspectival account of emergence is relativistic, and portrays emergence as non-
metaphysical. However, once all of the subscripts are filled out – the part whole relation, the 
kind of explanation, the notion of unavailability and so on – there is a fact of the matter about 
whether or not some property is emergent, relative to those subscripts. This means that there 
can be substantive disagreement about whether or not some property is emergent, so long as 
such disagreement takes place against shared standards for unavailability, explanation and so 
on. For example, consider the case of the vitalist-mechanist controversy discussed in Section 
8 of Chapter 4. I argued that reconstructing the debate between Pasteur and Berthelot as a 
debate about emergence presents it as a substantive debate about whether or not an 
explanation of a particular kind was available, relative to shared standards. The perspectival 
account of emergence may be relativistic, but we may still have substantive debates about 
emergence, so long as they are relative to shared standards.  
 
Section 4: Differentiation among emergents 
The perspectival account of emergence permits a wide range of cases of emergence. 
For example, one property may be emergent because the relevant observer is looking for a 
mechanistic explanation and none is available, while another may be emergent because the 
observer in question is looking for an a priori explanation and none is available. Typically 
accounts of emergence do not permit such a wide variety of cases, but I will argue that the 
fact that the perspectival account of emergence admits such a range of cases is not a problem 
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for that account because there are resources available to differentiate between cases. The 
perspectival account of emergence admits a great many cases of emergence, but does not 
treat them all as equally interesting. In this section, I will describe some of the different ways 
in which we can differentiate between cases of emergence. 
An initially quite tempting way to differentiate between cases of emergence is to 
place cases of emergence on a spectrum running from “strong” to “weak”, where placement 
on that spectrum would be determined by the number of observers an emergent is emergent 
for. This is, however, misguided for a number of reasons. The idea of emergence as lying on 
a spectrum from strong to weak masks the wide range of reasons for which certain cases of 
emergence obtain, independently of the number of observers that converge upon them. 
Accordingly, I recommend that we should take there to be a wide range of emergents which 
we can differentiate in terms of different factors depending on our interests, rather than a 
spectrum of emergents running from strong to weak.  
In this section I will survey a few obvious contenders for individuating factors, or 
ways to differentiate between the many different emergent properties. Note, however, that I 
take there to be no absolutely privileged distinctions between cases of emergence. Cases of 
emergence are more and less interesting depending on our goals and interests. Consider, for 
example, a historian of philosophy who is interested in cases of emergence that are emergent 
for a certain historical group for scientists, but not for contemporary scientists. Now compare 
her with a neuroscientist who is interested in cases of emergence that obtain only when the 
observers are looking for mechanistic explanations. These different people have different 
interests, which will dictate exactly how they differentiate between cases of emergence. The 
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first person will differentiate on the basis of the relevant observers, while the second will 
differentiate in terms of the relevant explanation.  
As I mentioned in the introduction to this section, an obvious contender for 
differentiating between different cases of emergence is in terms of numbers. Some cases of 
emergence are emergent for many observers, while others will be emergent for only a few. 
Following the locution introduced in Section 2, when one case is emergent for multiple 
observers I will say that those observers “converge” on the case of emergence. This feature 
does not, however, tell us very much about different cases of emergence. Consider, for 
example, a case of emergence on which many observers converge because it is impossible 
for humans to develop the relevant kind of explanation. Alternatively, consider a case of 
emergence on which many observers converge out of a contingent accident; it just so 
happens that so far no one has developed an explanation of the relevant sort. Thinking in 
terms of simple numbers provides us with a starting place for differentiation, but cannot 
reveal much about the differences between such pairs of cases.  
Another differentiation factor is the stability of the case of emergence for the relevant 
observer. The perspectival account of emergence portrays emergence as relative to an 
observer, but some cases will stay with an observer over time and some will not. For 
instance, in a case of emergence in which it is impossible for a human observer to formulate 
an explanation will be stable for that observer, i.e. the relevant macro-level property will be 
emergent for that observer for all time. A case in which the observer lacks some important 
computational tool which is later made available to them will be less stable; when the 
observer is able to use the tool and so formulate an explanation, the property will no longer 
be emergent for them. Cases in which the observer simply makes logical mistakes will also 
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be unstable for that observer, because when the observer gets better at logic, the property will 
no longer be emergent for them.   
Another way to differentiate between cases of emergence is to differentiate on the 
basis of the relevant notion of availability in question. Some cases of emergence may be 
emergent for an observer with a fairly lax standard of availability, such that an explanation is 
unavailable if the observer herself isn’t aware of such an explanation. Other cases may be 
emergent for an observer with a different standard for availability, such that only if it is 
impossible to formulate an explanation is the explanation unavailable. Cases of emergence 
also differ in terms of the tools available to the relevant observers. Some properties may be 
emergent for a group of observers because they lack a particular tool, such as a kind of 
computer. Other properties may be emergent for a group of observers because they lack 
certain skills, such as mathematical or logical skills, that would permit them to formulate an 
explanation of the relevant sort. These cases suggest different modes of individuation 
between cases of emergence, in terms of the tools and knowledge available to the relevant 
observers.  
There are many other ways to differentiate between the many cases of emergence that 
are permitted by the perspectival account of emergence. I have surveyed only a few different 
factors that we may use to taxonomize these different cases of emergence, and one could use 
many more, depending on one’s interests.  
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Section 5: Downward Causation 
“Downward causation” is the term for a phenomenon whereby an emergent property 
has causal powers not only to affect other properties or entities at the macro-level, but also to 
affect micro-level properties and entities. As Bedau and Humphreys put it, in cases of 
downward causation, “emergent phenomena have novel effects on their own emergence 
base.”190 Some philosophers have argued that downward causation is both a necessary 
feature of and a barrier to the existence of emergence. Kim argues for the position that 
downward causation is necessary for emergence, and that downward causation is impossible, 
hence undermining the very possibility of emergence.191 In this section I will briefly outline 
the idea of downward causation and why it is often thought to be a necessary but also 
problematic feature of emergence, and will then show that downward causation is not a 
feature of emergence according to the perspectival account of emergence.  
Given an idea of emergence as a combination of dependence and autonomy, some 
philosophers, particularly those who favor metaphysical accounts of emergence, have argued 
that there must be a causal element to emergent autonomy. According to such a view, any 
emergence worthy of the name must involve macro-level features that are in some sense 
causally autonomous. As Kim puts it, “… the causal powers the emergents bring with them 
must be new and distinctive… if they were reducible to the causal powers of the base-level 
                                                       
190 Bedau, M. and Humphreys, P. (2008) pg 6 
191 Kim, J. (2006)  
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properties they would be bringing nothing new and would have nothing new to contribute to 
the evolving causal structure of the world.”192 
If emergent macro-level properties are causally autonomous, however, in so far as 
their causal capacity is not exhausted by the causal capacity of underlying micro-level 
properties, then we face an apparent overdetermination problem. To illustrate this problem, 
consider two sets of properties, P and Q, where P-properties are micro-level properties and 
Q-properties are macro-level properties, and imagine that all Q-properties are emergent from 
P-properties. Q1 is an emergent property, and Q1 causes the instantiation of Q2, another Q-
property. However, if all Q properties are emergent from P properties, then Q2 must itself 
have a corresponding micro-level P-property, P2, from which it emerges. But if Q2 is 
emergent from P2, then the instantiation of P2 is sufficient to cause the instantiation of Q2, 
which leaves us with an ovderdetermination problem: both P2 and Q1 are sufficient to cause 
the instantiation of Q2. The overdetermination is systematic; every case of emergence will 
bring with it an overdetermination problem, which challenges the idea that emergents bring 
novel causal contributions to the world.193  
In addition to this general causal exclusion problem, the prospect of downward 
causation generates an additional problem for those who endorse the principle of the 
completeness of physics.194 The prospect of downward causation violates the principle of the 
completeness of physics, because downward causation involves a macro-level property 
                                                       
192 Kim, J. (2006) pg 557 
193 This is a rough version of the overdetermination problem generated by downward causation as presented by 
Kim in Kim, J. (2006).  
 
194 See pg 25 for details on the principle of the completeness of physics.  
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causing an effect at the micro-level, and this cannot be reduced to an instance of micro-micro 
causation. 
There are a number of responses to these problems, both the causal exclusion problem 
and the particular problem of downward causation. One could argue against setting up our 
understanding of emergence in this way; for instance, I have portrayed emergence as a 
relation that obtains between many micro-level properties and one macro-level property, 
whereas this version of the problem of downward causation presents emergence as a one-one 
relation. One could argue against the idea that property instantiations cause other property 
instantiations. One could also simply deny the principle of the completeness of physics. 
There is a lot in this discussion to respond to, but in the rest of this section I will leave much 
of this discussion to one side. I will argue that, even if we take this presentation of the 
problem of downward causation on its own terms, the prospect of downward causation does 
not pose a problem for the perspectival account of emergence.  
The response to the problem of downward causation from the perspectival account of 
emergence is fairly simple: there is very little room in the perspectival account of emergence 
for causation. In building this account, I did not start with the assumption that emergents 
must make novel causal contributions. Indeed, I argued in Chapter 4 that this assumption 
about the concept of emergence is false; the idea that emergent properties have novel causal 
powers is a feature of some treatments of emergence, but is far from universal. Furthermore, 
the resulting account presents emergence as relative to an observer, rather than part of the 
mind-independent universe, and there are few accounts of causation that can reconcile this 
with the idea that emergent properties are in some sense the locus of the causal efficacy of 
macro-level entities. Because of its observer-relative status, the perspectival account of 
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emergence has little to do with causation, and so the problem of downward causation is no 
problem for the perspectival account of emergence.   
 
Section 6: Objections and Replies 
In this section I will consider some objections to the perspectival account of 
emergence and offer responses to those objections.  
6.1 Objection 1: This is simply an epistemic account of emergence 
The first objection I will consider is the position that the perspectival account of 
emergence offers nothing over and above what is offered by a standard epistemic account of 
emergence. According to this line of thought, in developing the perspectival account I have 
brought nothing new to debates about emergence, and the appeal to observers adds nothing to 
the familiar position that emergence merely indicates the limits of our knowledge. 
I have a number of responses to this objection. First of all, epistemic accounts of 
emergence are often presented as dealing with a different sort of phenomenon from those 
dealt with by metaphysical accounts. Some proponents of epistemic accounts of emergence 
think that there is an epistemic “type” of emergence, and another, “metaphysical” type too.195 
I, however, am coming from a very different place. I have argued that metaphysical accounts 
of emergence do not survive the collapse problem. Accordingly, I do not present the 
perspectival account as a complementary alternative to a metaphysical account of emergence, 
but as the only game in town.  
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My second response focuses on differences in the content of a standard epistemic 
account, as opposed to the perspectival account. The perspectival account, in permitting 
convergence of observers on cases of emergence and differentiation among cases of 
emergence based on various factors, permits far more variation and differentiation between 
cases of emergence than is permitted in a traditional epistemic account of emergence. For 
instance, Hempel and Oppenheim, who offer an epistemic account of emergence, make no 
attempt to address questions about for whom some property is emergent. The perspectival 
account, as its name suggests, takes perspective far more seriously. In claiming that some 
property is emergent, we must specify who it is emergent for, and also what standards they 
adopt for explanation, availability and so on. Traditional epistemic accounts of emergence, 
on the other hand, don’t permit this focus on the particular perspective from which some 
property is emergent, nor do they permit differences between cases of emergence on the basis 
of differences between the observers for which the relevant properties are emergent. 
Another new element of the perspectival account of emergence, which makes it 
different from a simple epistemic account of emergence, is the explicit focus on explanation. 
According to the perspectival account, emergence tracks explanatory relations, rather than 
the absence of knowledge, a feature that takes it beyond a merely epistemic account of 
emergence. For these reasons, the perspectival account of emergence is a genuine new 
alternative rather than an epistemic account in disguise.  
6.2 Objection 2: Permits bizarre cases 
The perspectival account of emergence permits a wide, varied range of cases of 
emergence. Consider three cases of emergence: a case that obtains because the relevant 
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observer has a misguided conception of scientific explanation, a case that obtains because the 
observer doesn’t have access to a particular computer program, and a case that obtains 
because it is impossible for any human observer to develop an explanation of the relevant 
sort. The fact that the perspectival account categorizes all of these as emergent might be seen 
as a problem for the position; perhaps it would be better to acknowledge no emergence at all 
than to permit such a wide and odd variety of cases.  
In response, I would acknowledge that the perspectival account does permit a wide 
range of cases, and that some of those cases are emergent for seemingly odd, uninteresting 
reasons. However, I will first of all point out that there is no conceptual requirement that 
emergence be rare. Some metaphysical accounts of emergence present emergence as a rare 
phenomenon, but this is not a central element of the concept of emergence. In many cases, 
across philosophical and scientific accounts of emergence, emergence is presented as 
prevalent.196 The fact that the perspectival account presents emergence as prevalent is not in 
itself an objection to the account.  
The more challenging idea in this area is the idea that emergence is, generally 
speaking, supposed to be at least interesting. If this is true, then the fact that the perspectival 
account permits cases that are uninteresting is a reason not to endorse it. In response, I would 
return to the rich resources that are available to differentiate between cases of emergence. 
The perspectival account does not, as I have emphasized already, involve treating all cases of 
emergence as equal. Indeed, a central part of the new contribution made by the perspectival 
account comes in understanding emergence as a common, variegated phenomenon. 
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Permitting cases of emergence that are emergent for “uninteresting” reasons, such as 
observers who cannot formulate an explanation because they don’t have the right computer 
program, isn’t a problem so long as we don’t have to treat all cases of emergence as equal. 
Endorsing the perspectival account does bring with it a very different way of thinking about 
emergence overall. It is a shift from thinking of emergence as something homogeneous to 
something heterogeneous. But the fact that it involves this shift is not an objection to the 
account, particularly when we consider the resources available to differentiate between cases.  
6.3 Objection 3: What about deduction? 
I have presented an account of emergence based on explanation. One could argue that 
this is a conceptually inadequate account of emergence because so many accounts of 
emergence are based on failures of deducibility.197 Is this a failure of the perspectival 
account, that it doesn’t present a failure of deducibility as at least necessary, if not sufficient, 
for emergence? 
In response, I would point out that in Chapter 3 I argued that an account of emergence 
must include the explanation condition in order to avoid the collapse problem. Accounts of 
emergence based on failures of deducibility face the collapse problem and so aren’t viable. 
More generally, however, an account based on explanation can encompass cases of 
emergence that involve deductive failures, depending on the notion of explanation in 
question. If the observer is looking for an explanation that involves deduction and none is 
available, then we have a case of emergence that involves a failure of deducibility.  
                                                       
197 See Mitchell, S. (forthcoming) 
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The appeal to deducibility, and other, similar features such as unpredictability, 
reflects the very simple idea that in cases of emergence we constrained our attempts “move 
from” facts about the micro-level to facts about the macro-level, whether that move is 
understood in deductive terms or otherwise. The explanation condition for emergence, 
however, captures this idea perfectly, and so we lose none of the intuitive appeal of the 
association between emergence and deductive failures when we embrace an account of 
emergence that involves explanation. 
6.4 Objection 4: This isn’t about metaphysics 
A common response to the perspectival account of emergence runs along the 
following lines: what this account does is provide us with tools to identify many different 
kinds of explanatory gaps that obtain for many different reasons. But this account does not 
say anything about metaphysics and so isn’t a complete account of emergence. A complete 
account of emergence would ideally address questions about the viability of metaphysical 
non-reductionism.  
In response I would point out that the collapse problem and the failure of various 
responses to it show that there is no viable, non-arbitrary metaphysical conception of 
emergence. So I have said something about the metaphysics of emergence, in so far as I have 
argued that emergence is not a metaphysical phenomenon, but instead an explanatory one. 
Emergence, I have argued, is not the metaphysical basis of non-reductionism.  
Of course, the perspectival account of emergence is compatible with both 
metaphysical non-reductionism and with metaphysical reductionism, so long as neither 
position is thought to be metaphysically under-written by emergence. But the perspectival 
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account of emergence presents emergence as a non-metaphysical relation, and so does make 
metaphysical commitments. The perspectival account of emergence is not an incomplete 
metaphysical account of emergence, but instead a complete non-metaphysical account of 
emergence.  
 
Section 7: Conclusion 
In this chapter I have formulated and defended the perspectival account of 
emergence, building on the results of Chapters 2 through 4. I have discussed in detail some 
different features of this account, as well as considering some objections to the view. In the 
concluding section of this dissertation I will offer some broad reflections on the nature of 
emergence and on the prospects for a more general perspectival approach to metaphysics. 
  
Summary and Conclusion 
 
I began this discussion of emergence by focusing on two purportedly characteristic 
features of emergence. Firstly, emergence is a relation that is used to track purported 
distinctions between metaphysical levels, and secondly, “emergence” is a “term of art”, 
different in the hands of whomever chooses to use it. After working through the collapse 
problem and developing the perspectival account of emergence, however, we face a very 
different picture. According to the account of emergence I have developed, emergence is an 
explanatory, rather than metaphysical, phenomenon and doesn’t track distinctions between 
metaphysical levels. Furthermore, I have offered a precise definition of emergence, in place 
of a philosopher’s “term of art”.  
In these concluding remarks I will summarize the content of Chapters 1 through 5, 
and will then offer some broad reflections on the nature of emergence according to the 
perspectival account of emergence. I will also discuss the potential benefits of taking a 
similar perspectival approach to other debates in metaphysics, beyond the topic of 
emergence. 
In Chapter 1, I introduced the idea of emergence. I showed that emergence is often 
used to vindicate metaphysical non-reductionism of different kinds. I also explored some 
other uses of the concept of emergence, including epistemic and computational uses. I then 
traced the historical development of the concept, through its early incarnations in the work of 
  
 
153 
the British Emergentists, through a fallow period in the early 20th century during which 
appeals to emergence weren’t prevalent in philosophy, through to the contemporary scene in 
which the idea of emergence is popularly used by philosophers and scientists. I discussed 
some related concepts, including reductionism, supervenience and physicalism.  
In Chapter 2, I presented a problem for metaphysical accounts of emergence, the 
collapse problem, which indicates that emergence tracks relationships between arbitrary 
groups of properties rather than distinctions between levels of properties in nature. I explored 
the idea that the collapse problem involves a kind of cheating, and that in formulating it, I 
had attributed far too broad a group of properties to the micro-level. I attempted to flesh out 
this criticism in a number of different ways by restricting the micro-level properties in line 
with a metaphysical distinction, such as the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
properties and the distinction between dispositional and non-dispositional properties. In each 
of these cases, however, these attempts to solve the collapse problem for metaphysical 
accounts of emergence failed.  
In Chapter 3, I offered an alternative solution to the collapse problem. I argued that 
emergence is commonly associated with the unavailability of certain scientific explanations, 
and codified this association into a condition for emergence, the explanation condition, 
according to which a property is emergent if and only a certain scientific explanation is 
unavailable. The explanation condition, combined with a minimal restriction on scientific 
explanation, provided a solution to the collapse problem because, given that collapse 
objections don’t provide resources for explanations, they aren’t enough to make a given 
macro-level property non-emergent. Understanding emergence in terms of explanation 
allowed me to solve the collapse problem. 
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At this point, however, my account of emergence was not complete. While exploring 
the connection between emergence and explanation, I observed that emergence is associated 
with the unavailability of radically different kinds of explanation, including mechanistic 
explanations, a priori reductive explanations, computational explanations and explanations 
involving models of certain systems. The collapse problem is a general problem, and so to 
offer a general solution I realized that I needed to make room for this variation. So I argued 
that the relevant kind of explanation varies depending on who is conducting the investigation, 
and so that what it takes for some property to be emergent varies from observer to observer. 
In Chapter 4, I offered a rational reconstruction of the concept of emergence based on 
the solution to the collapse problem that I developed in Chapter 3. Taking Carnap’s criteria 
for success in rational reconstruction – similarity, exactness, fruitfulness, and simplicity – I 
argued that an explication of the concept of emergence as the unavailability of a certain 
scientific explanation for an observer met these criteria better than alternative explications. I 
argued that this explication offered a unified concept of emergence, which, unlike most 
philosophical treatments of emergence, allowed us to regard philosophical and scientific uses 
of the concept of emergence as continuous. 
Finally, in Chapter 5 I formulated a positive account of emergence, the perspectival 
account of emergence, according to which a property if emergent iff a certain scientific 
explanation is unavailable to an observer. I discussed some of the central features of this 
positive account, and looked into different ways of differentiating between the wide range of 
cases permitted by the perspectival account of emergence.  
The perspectival account of emergence offers a new way of thinking about 
emergence. According to this view emergence is relative to an observer, among other factors, 
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and it is common and heterogeneous. There are many different cases of emergence, which 
obtain for many different reasons. On this account, describing some property as “emergent” 
is the beginning of a conversation, rather than the end. Once we have described a particular 
property as emergent, we can then move on to ask why it is emergent, for whom. We can ask 
whether this property is emergent relative to an alternative notion of explanation, or of 
unavailability. Furthermore, both philosophers and scientists can conduct research into what 
makes some property emergent. This makes for not only a deeply variegated notion of 
emergence, but also one that unifies philosophical and scientific thinking about emergence. 
This account of emergence enables us to move beyond philosophical debates about cases of 
emergence that start with a conception of emergence as necessarily metaphysical or 
necessarily epistemic. Instead we have an account of emergence that permits emergence to 
obtain for many different reasons.  
I have argued that emergence is not a metaphysical phenomenon, and that appeals to 
emergence should not be used in attempts to vindicate metaphysical non-reductionism. 
However, I have also argued that the perspectival account of emergence offers a useful tool 
to the metaphysician, because it offers a way to catalogue and taxonomize all of the different 
types of case of emergence. Adopting this perspectival account of emergence makes precise 
exactly what work needs to be done in order to argue for the position that some case of 
emergence obtains for a metaphysical reason. For example, I have argued that the 
metaphysical non-reductionist would have to argue that a particular observer or observers, a 
particular notion of explanation, a particular notion of unavailability and a particular 
conception of the part-whole relation are metaphysically privileged, in order to show that any 
particular case of emergence obtains for a metaphysical reason.  
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One may be tempted to interpret this perspectivalism as part of a broader commitment 
to reductionism, or even relativism about metaphysics, but this is not the case. I have argued 
that, because of the collapse problem, emergence is not a metaphysical relation. However, I 
am optimistic about the possibility of metaphysics, conceived of as the delineation of the 
structure of the mind-independent universe. What’s more, I think that a broader perspectival 
approach to metaphysics, and not just to emergence, could provide a helpful supplement to a 
more traditional approach to metaphysics.  
I did not begin this research by deciding to understand emergence as a perspectival 
relation; the need to solve the collapse problem brought me to that result. But in formulating 
the perspectival account of emergence, it has become clear that a perspectival approach has 
some interesting benefits that may generalize to other cases. The unique contribution of the 
perspectival approach to metaphysics is, as the name suggests, that it encourages us take 
perspective very seriously. Using the perspectival approach to emergence, I was able to 
provide tools for taxonomizing and specifying in detail what each instance of emergence 
consists of. This clears the way for the person who wants to argue that one of these cases of 
emergence is underpinned by some metaphysical relation to argue that one of these 
explanatory profiles in particular is metaphysically privileged. Similarly, the person who 
argues that no case of emergence obtains for a metaphysical reason must argue that none of 
these explanatory profiles can be a guide to metaphysics. In each case the perspectival 
approach to emergence makes the next step clear, and precisifies exactly what would be 
required to justify a metaphysical commitment.  
A perspectival approach to some other phenomenon could follow this pattern. Before 
engaging in metaphysical enquiry a philosopher could carefully document explanatory 
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practices, the objects that they posit for pragmatic reasons, the categories that have a special 
status because they are pragmatically valuable, and so on. Having done so, the philosopher 
could survey the results and only then identify cases that are ripe for further metaphysical 
investigation. The idea behind this approach would be to take metaphysical commitment 
slowly and carefully, and to ensure that when we make a metaphysical commitment, the 
feature is not in fact a feature of our explanatory practices, our perspectives or our interests, 
but is instead a genuine feature of the mind-independent universe.  
I anticipate that a similar, perspectival approach will be of great use in the study of 
other phenomena. Accordingly, in future research I intend to develop a general perspectival 
approach to metaphysics and argue for its usefulness through a number of different case 
studies, beyond this application to the case of emergence.  
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